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← 424 So. 2d 1345 - Waldrop v. State

424 So. 2d 1345 - Waldrop v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

22
cited by 22 later decisions
3
states following
May 2014
most recently cited

22 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently May 2014

22 state decisions

1601982199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Aguilar v. Texas · Payton v. New York · United States v. Santana · United States v. Johnson · 396 So. 2d 645 - Beck v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"`However, the general and uniform rule is that the right of a prosecuting attorney to testify in a criminal case "is strictly limited to those instances where his testimony is made necessary by the peculiar and unusual circumstances of the case. Even then, his functions as a prosecuting attorney and as a witness should be disassociated. If he is aware, prior to trial, that he will be a necessary witness, or if he discovers this fact in the course of the trial, he should withdraw and have other counsel prosecute the case." [Citations omitted.]'"”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[i]n closing argument, the prosecutor also argued his own credibility to the jury-a practice condemned in State v. McCuistion , 88 N.M. 94 , 537 P.2d 702 (1975).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “"So sacred and fundamental is the principle that the jury not be improperly influenced that our Supreme Court has held that it constituted reversible error to allow the Sheriff, who had acted as the bailiff to the jury, to testify as a witness for the State even though there was no testimony of any conversation between the sheriff and the members of the jury. There the mere `possibility of influence exerted on the jury's verdict by the sheriff-bailiff was sufficient to deprive the defendant of his right to trial by an impartial jury.' Chancellor v. State , 291 Ala. 413 , 282 So.2d 242 (1973). "We fully recognize that the matter of allowing a prosecutor to become a witness is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. However, once a district attorney testifies he should withdraw from the prosecution of that particular trial unless there is some sound and compelling reason which would require his continued service. See State v. Donahue , 315 So.2d 329 (La. 1975), where the district attorney was ordered recused because he `was the sole witness of the content of an oral confession which it is acknowledged he will testify to at the trial.' "`Our decision is reached only because of the high respect we have for the office of the district attorney and because of our recognition of the power and influence he exerts in the prosecution of a criminal case. Any decision other than the present one seriously jeopardizes and imperils the fact finding process of a trial by jury.'" Id.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.