¶1OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶2We remain convinced that appellant’s first three grounds of error, which relate to the admission of testimony of Inspector Hadaway, were properly disposed of in our original opinion affirming the conviction.
¶3Our disposition of appellant’s fourth ground of error is vigorously attacked upon the grounds and authorities set out by Judge Morrison in his dissent.
¶4In his brief filed in the trial court appellant set forth as his ground of error No. 4: “The trial court erred in refusing to limit the jury’s consideration of extraneous: offenses and other acts of misconduct.”
¶5The argument found in said brief reflects that the contention was that “assuming the admissibility of the extraneous offenses and separate acts of misconduct,” the trial' court erred in refusing to limit the jury’s consideration of same “to the issues of intent, identity, system, purpose, motive or whatever issue the state contemplated resolving by the introduction of such evidence.”
¶6Citing Ernster v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 422, 308 S.W.2d 33, 34-35, the brief urged that the defendant “should not have been tried as a criminal generally.”
¶7The objection to the charge was:
“Defendant further objects to the Court’s failure to charge the jury in regard to the ‘extraneous offenses’ introduced before the jury over the objections of the defendant for the reason that the same deprives the defendant of a fair trial and the jury should be limited in their consideration of same.”
¶8Art. 36.14 Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. requires-that objections to the charge shall distinctly specify each ground of objection.
¶9It is apparent that the objection did not point out what evidence was referred to as “in regard to ‘extraneous offenses’.”
¶10It is also apparent that the objection referred only to extraneous offenses, whereas the ground of error complained of the court’s failure to limit the jury’s consideration of extraneous offenses and other acts of misconduct.
¶11The objection made no reference to what limitation the trial court failed to place upon “the consideration of extraneous offenses and other acts of misconduct,” but as stated above, it was argued in the brief that evidence relative to extraneous offenses: *934should have been limited “to the issues of intent, identity, system, purpose, motive or whatever issue the state contemplated resolving by the introduction of such evidence.”
¶12Assuming that the objection to the court’s charge was sufficient and that the court erred in failing to limit some or all of the testimony of Inspector Hadaway referred to in appellant’s grounds of error 1, 2 and 3, it does not follow that the omission of such limiting charge is ground for reversal of the conviction.
¶13Art. 36.19 V.A.C.C.P. reads:
“Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action upon appeal that any requirement of Articles 36.14, 36.15, 36.-16, 36.17 and 36.18 has been disregarded, the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial. All objections to the charge and to the refusal of special charges shall be made at the time of the trial.”
¶14In arguing his ground of error No. 3, appellant pointed out in his brief filed in the trial court that there was no attempt to rebut the presumption that the possession of the 12 quarts of wine was for the purpose of sale, and intent or purpose was not therefore a contested issue before the jury.
¶15This would appear to answer any claim that the omission of a limiting charge was prejudicial insofar as the guilt of appellant of possessing such wine for the purpose of sale is concerned. It seems clear under the record that a charge limiting the evidence referred to in appellant’s ground of error Nos. 1, 2 and 3 would have had no effect on the jury’s finding on the issue of guilt.
¶16Cases decided prior to the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, and other cases which relate to the prejudicial effect of error in the charge of the court submitting the issue of punishment as well as guilt or innocence, may not be applicable where, as here, the issue before the jury does not include punishment.
¶17Appellant elected to have the jury which had found him guilty assess his punishment. Prior convictions alleged for enhancement and others were admissible at such hearing and were proved.
¶18It is difficult to see how appellant could have been prejudiced by testimony at his main trial that he had stated that he was a bootlegger, and that he had been observed carrying on such business at his cafe.
¶19Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.