Baker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'The recent United States Supreme Court case of Bullington v. Missouri, (1981) [451] U.S. [480], 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L Ed.2d 270, is not applicable since it involved a bifurcated death-penalty procedure wherein the jury returned a verdict fixing the punishment at life imprisonment and not at death. The defendant was granted a new trial on the substantive charge. The Supreme Court held that the state could not ask for the death penalty a second time since the sentencing procedure at the defendant's first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence and involved a consideration of the particular facts underlying the substantive offense. Bullington v. Missouri, supra. "Because the habitual offender statute does not create new or separate offenses and the habitual offender proceeding does not deal with the underlying facts on the substantive charge, the use of prior convictions at more than one habit, ual offender proceeding does not constitute double jeopardy. Our legislature has decided that an enhanced punishment of thirty additional years is appropriate for all individuals who are convicted of a felony when it is determined that they also have two prior felony convictions. There are no constitutional or collateral estoppel barriers to prevent the state from exacting that punishment each time a different felony is committed as long as the prior convictions do still exist.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clark Allen Hill v. State of Indiana · Dixon v. State

2. “"It is clear that the habitual offender charge in the instant case is based upon the fuct of two prior felony convictions. The action of the trial court at the previous habitual offender trial did not operate to 'acquit' defendant of the two prior felony convictions. Its action involved only the sentencing to be imposed upon the 1977 rape charge and a determination of defendant's status as an habitual offender based upon the evidence presented at that time. It is clear that there is nothing to prevent the state from alleging the fact of the prior felony convictions again at the instant trial since those two prior convictions do still exist."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Durham v. State · Perkins v. State

3. “We have consistently emphasized the unique status of the habitual offender statute and held that it does not establish a separate offense, but rather provides for the imposition of a more severe sentence for the substantive crime charged. We have explained that habitual criminality is a status for the enhancement of punishment upon the conviction of an additional, substantive crime. The purpose of the statute is to more severely penalize those persons whom prior sane-tions have failed to deter from committing felonies. (Citations omitted.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mers v. State