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426 S.W.2d 877

Docket No. 41151.

Ingram v. State

James Sherman INGRAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided March 27, 1968.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1968.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1968-03-27

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently December 1986

10 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after finding of guilty (a) regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the State and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a full conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Boggs v. State

“The law places no limitation by reason of remoteness on prior convictions offered to show the prior criminal record of the defendant.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hurt v. State

Relies on Biaza v. Simon · Toms v. State · Davis v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1968-03-27

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*878 Herrick & Waltrip, by Bill Waltrip, Fort Worth, for appellant.

¶2Frank Coffey, Dist. Atty., Truman Power and William A. Knapp, Asst. Dist. Attys., Fort Worth, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

¶3

OPINION

¶4WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.

¶5The offense is felony theft of an automobile; the punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction for burglary, an offense of the same nature, 10 years.

¶6The prior conviction alleged for enhancement was in Stephens County on August 20, 1954.

¶7Proof was admitted over objection, at the hearing on punishment to be assessed, on April 19, 1967, that appellant was also convicted of burglary in Tarrant County on July 14, 1954, and in Ector County on February 20, 1954.

¶8Appellant's first ground of error complains of the admission of the evidence as to the Tarrant County and Ector County convictions on the ground that such convictions were too remote.

¶9The prior convictions were admissible under the portion of Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b) of the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure which, at the time of the trial, read:

"Regardless of whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the State and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character."

¶10Davis v. State, Tex.Crim.App., 419 S.W.2d 648.

¶11The law places no limitation by reason of remoteness on prior convictions offered to show the prior criminal record of the defendant.

¶12We note further that a ten year term in the penitentiary was assessed in each of said prior convictions and, in determining remoteness of a conviction, the computation of time should begin after release from prison. King v. State, Tex.Crim.App., *879 425 S.W.2d 356; Vaughn v. State, 143 Tex. A.R. 150, 157 S.W.2d 894; Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 392, 181 S.W.2d 276; Toms v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 264, 200 S.W.2d 174.

¶13Ground of error No. 1 is overruled.

¶14Appellant next complains of the court's failure to charge on the law of "driving without the owner's consent," a misdemeanor. (Art. 1341 Vernon's Ann. P.C.)

¶15No such issue was raised by the evidence which shows that appellant and two companions were seen driving an automobile from a car dealer's lot and were pursued and Apprehended after they fled from the car on foot. Westerman v. State, 144 Tex.Cr. R. 101, 161 S.W.2d 95; Hernandez v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 566, 189 S.W.2d 876.

¶16The remaining ground of error complains of the exclusion of testimony of appellant's mother, at the separate hearing on the punishment, to the effect that he had been treated in Peter Smith Hospital for alcoholism and had left the hospital against medical advice only a few hours before the offense was committed.

¶17The mother testified that her son was an alcoholic and had been treated "by medical doctors for this disease" at Peter Smith Hospital, and had been to Wichita Falls four times, specifically for the treatment of alcoholism.

¶18Mrs. Flannery was asked where her son had been on December 8th (the date the car was stolen) and answered: "In Peter Smith Hospital."

¶19There was no motion to strike the answer of the witness.

¶20If error was preserved it is not such as would warrant reversal of the conviction.

¶21The judgment is affirmed.

¶22

CONCURRING OPINION

¶23MORRISON, Judge.

¶24I concur in the affirmance of this conviction, but not upon the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion. I find it unnecessary at this time to pass upon the question of the admissibility of extraneous convictions not plead for enhancement, which may have been too remote under the rule announced in Blessett v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 517, 329 S.W.2d 434, upon which the appellant relies.

¶25State's Exhibit # 2 contained the judgment and sentence in three cases, including the one alleged for enhancement, and the record reflects that the prosecutor read only "portions" of the exhibit to the jury. There is no showing that they ever saw or heard about the "remote" convictions which had not been plead.

¶26For the reason stated, I join in the affirmance of this conviction.

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