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427 F.2d 63

Docket No. 28721

Floyd v. United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided May 25, 1970.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1970-05-25

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 1985

3 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 4244 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Dusky v. United States · Murphy v. Houma Well Service · Huth v. Southern Pacific Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1970-05-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Summary Calendar.

¶2Joseph H. Davis, Macon, Ga., Franklin Delano Floyd, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.

¶3William J. Schloth, U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., D. L. Rampey, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant-appellee.

¶4Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and MORGAN and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6In this appeal from a judgment denying Appellant relief under 28 U.S. C.A. § 2255, the only issue presented is whether the District Court’s finding that Appellant was mentally competent on *64July 12, 1963 to waive indictment and to plead guilty to a bank robbery charge is supported by sufficient evidence. We believe that it was so supported and affirm.1

¶7This is the second appearance of this case here. In Floyd v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 368, where the events, including his escape from a mental hospital and examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244, leading up to Floyd’s plea of guilty to the bank robbery charge are set out, this Court remanded this case for a factual hearing. The conclusion that Floyd was competent reached by the District Court following that hearing, which was held on July 10, 1969, almost three years after remand, is what we review here.

¶8The tragic life of Franklin Delano Floyd is chronicled by the District Court.2 And the product of this life is *65a young man whose ability to cope adequately with the world has been severely impaired. We do not here, however, review his mental accountability to do the act, robbery of the bank. Rather, we are concerned with his mental accountability to stand trial and to plead guilty. See Johnson v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 344 F.2d 401. But under the standards by which we must judge, Rees v. Peyton, 1966, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583; Dusky v. United States, 1960, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824,3 we can not say that the District Court was clearly erroneous in its determination that Floyd was competent to stand trial. Cheely v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 547; Stonecipher v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 745.

¶9The District Court’s findings were made after a full hearing at which Floyd was well represented by appointed counsel. Unlike the earlier consideration leading to our reversal, the Court acted on testimony and depositions, not merely on hospital and medical reports and records, although such reports were used.

¶10The majority of the testimony came from the physician, Dr. Craig, who was treating Floyd shortly before his escape from the mental hospital. His testimony was that Floyd was suffering from chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia. Dr. Craig said Floyd had an intellectual understanding and appreciation of the events, but that he may have had a compulsion for punishment. He was unable to say whether Floyd was actually operating under compulsion, but believed this to be the most likely explanation for apparently irrational behavior. Thus, his testimony, the strongest for Appellant, does not require the conclusion that Appellant was incompetent.

¶11Moreover, the physician, Dr. Broucek, who examined Floyd pursuant to the 18 *66U.S.C.A. § 4244 proceeding indicated through reports that he did not believe Floyd was schizophrenic, but believed he was suffering from a less severe personality disorder. Dr. Broucek did not believe there were indications of a compulsive desire for punishment that impaired Floyd’s ability to understand what was going on and to make a choice whether to plead guilty.

¶12From such evidence it was for the District Court to find the facts. And such findings can not be disturbed here.

¶13Affirmed.

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