Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 4 district · 32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “There is no doubt that the Commonwealth failed to comply with the pretrial report. The question is whether the defendants were prejudiced by the breach. See Commonwealth v. Gliniewicz, 398 Mass. 744, 748-749 , 500 N.E.2d 1324 (1986). In the Gliniewicz case, the pretrial conference report explicitly obliged the Commonwealth to make certain evidence available for inspection. In the course of its testing, the Commonwealth destroyed a portion of the defendant’s boots with the result that the defendant could not possibly duplicate the tests. We held that the Commonwealth’s test results should not have been admitted. Id. at 749 , 500 N.E.2d 1324 . “[W]hen potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed, a balancing test is employed to determine the appropriateness and extent of remedial action. The courts must weigh the culpability of the Commonwealth, the materiality of the evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendants.” Commonwealth v. Willie, 400 Mass. 427, 432 , 510 N.E.2d 258 (1987). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a ‘reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination,’ that access to the [material] would have produced evidence favorable to the case.” Id. at 433 , 510 N.E.2d 258 , quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1 , 12 464 N.E.2d 1356 (1984). The test conducted by each expert in this case was substantially the same. The chance to replicate the test on the left sneaker was probably lost because Brody’s te”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 176 F. Supp. 2d 45 - DiBenedetto v. Hall · Frank Dibenedetto v. Timothy Hall et al.

2. “The judge gave an instruction on joint venture that Costa’s counsel requested and to which DiBenedetto’s counsel did not object at any time. We do not review jury instructions in such a situation (Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 631 , 634 n. 9, 519 N.E.2d 245 [1988]), except to determine whether they created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice (see Commonwealth v. Ward, 412 Mass. 395, 398 , 590 N.E.2d 173 [1992]). The instruction on joint venture erroneously combined language concerning guilt as an accessory before the fact (not requiring proof of the defendant’s presence at or near the crime scene) with language concerning guilt as a joint venturer and thus failed to make explicit that guilt as a joint venturer required the defendant’s presence at or near the crime scene. See Commonwealth v. Lafayette, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 534 , 539-541 & n. 7, 665 N.E.2d 1025 (1996). However, the instruction could not have led to an unjustified verdict. There was evidence of conduct by the defendants before the trial that would have warranted a finding that each was an accessory before the fact, a charge that was within the scope of the indictment. See G.L. c. 274, § 2; Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 151 , 256 N.E.2d 745 (1970). The challenged instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. In practical terms, the case was tried and argued on the theory that the defendants were the shooters. The invited error in the judge’s charge”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 176 F. Supp. 2d 45 - DiBenedetto v. Hall

3. “The judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding testimony intended to show that the victims, strong-arm men in the crew of La Cosa Nostra (LCN) criminals, were killed by fellow LCN members as “fall-out” from an earlier LCN murder of one Vincent Limoli. The judge concluded that the Limoli murder was remote and that the proffered evidence was complicated and would divert the jury’s attention. The defendants did not offer evidence, other than speculation, that some third person or persons had a motive to kill the victims because of Limoli’s murder. Nor did they show that the killings in this case were suffi ciently similar to the Limoli killing to warrant admission. The defendants farther argue that the judge improperly restricted their cross-examination of Storella on the same subject to show his bias. The judge barred DiBenedettos’ counsel from seeking to establish on cross-examination that, because of the Limoli murder, Storella had accused the defendants falsely, out of fear, in order to protect the real killers. This was a matter within the judge’s discretion. The defendants did not make a plausible showing that circumstances existed on which the alleged bias could be based.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 176 F. Supp. 2d 45 - DiBenedetto v. Hall