Funk v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Amendment of charge.-(a) An indictment or information which charges the commission of an offense shall not be dismissed but may be amended on motion by the prosecutor at any time because of any immaterial defect, including: (1) Any miswriting, misspelling, .or grammatical error; (2) Any misjoinder of parties defendant or offenses charged; (8) The presence or absence of any unnecessary or repugnant allegation; (4) The failure to negative any exception, excuse, or proviso contained in the statute defining the offense; (5) The use of alternative or disjune-tive allegations as to the acts, means, intents, or results charged; (6) Any mistake in the name of the court or county in the title of the action, or the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (7) The failure to state the time or place at which the offense was committed where time or place is not of the essence of the offense; (8) The failure to state an amount of value or price of any matter where such value or price is not of the essence of the offense; or (9) Any other defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. (b) The indictment or information may be amended in matters of. substance or form by the prosecutor upon giving notice to the defendant and with the consent of the court, at any time before arraignment. When the information or indictment is amended, it shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. (c) Upon motion of the prosecutor the court may at any time before, during, or”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hicks · Hutchinson v. State

2. ““This Court has recently decided this issue in State v. McMillan, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 612 . In that case, we conceded the statute does not, by its precise language, suggest anything other than that appellant’s proposition is correct. However, we went on to say the statute ‘does not preclude a different jury from determining the issue should the first jury fail to reach agreement.’ Id. at 409 N.E.2d at 617 . In so holding we pointed out a retrial on the habitual charge involves an issue of fact easily severed from the issues involved in the trial on the underlying felony, due to the bifurcated nature of the proceeding as a whole. Thus, we hold a new jury is qualified to make the determinations necessary for a finding as to the habitual criminal status. “In McMillan, supra, we specifically held that it is in the public interest that the State be given an opportunity to secure an enhanced penalty should the first attempt result in a deadlocked jury. In the instant case, the mistrial was not the result of a deadlocked jury but for other reasons. We see no reason for a different rule no matter what the cause of the mistrial. We therefore hold there was no error in overruling appellant’s objection to being retried on the habitual offender count in front of a new jury impaneled solely for that purpose.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carter v. State · Pitts v. State

3. ““We reaffirm our holding in Wise [Wise v. Stak, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 114 ], supra, and hold the statute does not punish for a status but provides for an enhanced punishment because of the ineffectiveness of prior confinement and rehabilitative efforts.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hernandez v. State