427 Pa. Super. 130 - Hahn v. Richter’s Empirical Analysis
1993
Citation profile
10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently January 2014
10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 21 U.S.C. § 301 (Animal Drug Amendments of 1968)
Relies on United States v. Rutherford · Webb v. Zern · United States v. Sullivan · Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc. · Kremer v. Grant
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In Incollingo v. Ewing, our Supreme Court categorized Chloromycetin, a prescription drug which had been on the market for more than 30 years at time of its decision as a product which was unavoidably unsafe but justifiably marketed and used notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The court further stated that the strict liability rule of Restatement 402(A) is not applicable in a case involving a prescription drug and that the standard of care required for a manufacturer of prescription drugs is set forth in section 388 of the Restatement (Second) which concerns the liability of a supplier of a chattel known to be dangerous for its intended use.” Hahn v. Richter, supra at 141 , 628 A.2d at 865 . (footnotes omitted) “The majority wrongly concludes that a manufacturer of a prescription drug cannot be strictly liable under 402A, and in support of its ruling relies upon language found in past cases. It begins with reference to our Supreme Court’s decision in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 , 282 A.2d 206 (1971). The majority interprets footnote nine in Incollingo v. Ewing, supra as the basis for its statement ‘that the strict liability rule of Restatement 402(A) is not applicable in a case involving a prescription drug and that the standard of care required for a manufacturer of prescription drugs is set forth in section 388 of the Restatement (Second) which concerns the liability of a supplier of a chattel known to be dangerous for its intended use.’ Majority opinion at ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent““(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if “(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and “(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. “(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although “(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and “(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.