Villalta v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Chap. 765. AN ACT AUTHORIZING MARRIED WOMEN TO CONTRACT WITH THEIR HUSBANDS AND PERMITTING HUSBANDS AND WIVES TO SUE EACH OTHER IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CONTRACTS . Be it enacted, etc., as follows: Section 1. Chapter 209 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking out section 2, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, and inserting in place thereof the following section:- Section 2. A married woman may make contracts, oral and written, sealed and unsealed, in the same manner as if she were sole, and may make such contracts with her husband . Section 2. Said chapter 209 is hereby further amended by striking out section 6, as so appearing, and inserting place thereof the following section:- Section 6 . A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husband and wife except in connection with contracts entered into pursuant to the authority contained in section two . Section 3. Section 20 of chapter 233 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking out the second paragraph, as amended by section 3 of chapter 657 of the acts of 1951, and inserting in place thereof the following paragraph:- First, Except in a proceeding arising out of or involving a contract made by a married woman with her husband and except in a proceeding under chapter two hundred and seventy-three A and in prosecution begun under sections one to then, inclusive, of chapter two hundred and seventy-three, neither husband no”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. M.T.J.C. LLC v. Simon (In re Simon)

2. “We see no logical reason for the Legislature to deny the spousal privilege when a young victim of abuse is a child of one or both spouses (or other child closely related by consanguinity) but to perpetuate the privilege when the young victim is related to neither spouse. The abuse is the same. Society’s interest in convicting and punishing one who commits child abuse is the same. The threat to the preservation of the family unit arising from one spouse being compelled to testify against the other seems substantially identical in all instances. Indeed, if the defendant’s alleged child abuse was not incestuous, the spouse’s compelled testimony might be less threatening to the marriage than if she were compelled to testify, as the wife and defendant agree she must, concerning incestuous child abuse, which involves an even greater stigma than child abuse alone. The criminal conduct asserted in this case, abuse of the victim in the defendant’s home, shows that the need for the testimony of a defendant’s spouse may be as great as it would be if the alleged victim were their own child. We choose to apply the literal meaning of the words “child abuse” to § 20, cl. Second. Child abuse in common usage is not limited to the abuse of one’s own child but means the abuse of any child.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Banks