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← 429 Pa. Super. 158 - Commonwealth v. Johnson

429 Pa. Super. 158 - Commonwealth v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

35
cited by 35 later decisions
4
states following
October 2010
most recently cited

33 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently October 2010 · most notably 453 Pa. Super. 294 - In the Interest of B.C. (1996), 443 Pa. Super. 616 - Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt (1995)

33 state decisions

270199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Katz v. United States · Mapp v. Ohio · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Adams v. Williams

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[ W]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, the officer may conduct a patdown search to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. Rather, a protective search -permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause — must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby. If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. We have already held that police officers, at least under certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search. [This is pursuant to the] plain view doctrine. Under that doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i.e., if its incriminatin”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the State by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [ 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ] (1961), guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures “ ‘conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 [ 105 S.Ct. 409, 410 , 83 L.Ed.2d 246 ] (1984) (per curiam) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 [ 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 ] (1967) (footnotes omitted)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 [ 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 ] (1978); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 [ 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 ] (1983). One such exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [ 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ] (1968), which held that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot” the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Id., at 30 [88 S.Ct. at 1884-85]; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146 [ 92 S.Ct. 1”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Where it is `immediately apparent' from the tactile impression that the suspect possesses contraband on his person, a seizure of the contraband is justified.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.