¶2The defendant was convicted for burglary in the second degree and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
¶4In Bracewell v. State, 401 So.2d 123 (Ala. 1979), our Supreme Court held that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense governs the confession's admissibility. "Absent a clear expression in the statute to the contrary, we think the law applicable at the time of the offense was intended to govern the offense, the offender, and all proceedings incident thereto, and we so hold." 401 So.2d at 124.
¶5In Hansen v. State, 375 So.2d 564 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), this Court followed Bracewell and held that the calling of the jury venire and the selection of juries were governed by the statutes in effect on the date of the commission of the offense charged.
¶6Neither Bracewell nor Hansen dealt with the particular issue and statute involved in this case. Those cases must be limited to their specific holdings. Since South answered the very issue presented here, we feel compelled to adhere thereto.
¶8A judgment entry reflects that upon arraignment the defendant, with appointed counsel, "waives youthful offender status, and being arraigned . . . pleads not guilty."
¶9We agree that the trial judge owes an affirmative duty to apprise an accused youthful offender of the benefits of the Youthful Offender Act. Bledsole v. State, 409 So.2d 924, 926 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Johnson v. State, 55 Ala. App. 579,317 So.2d 546 (1975). However, here, in view of the judgment entry reciting that the defendant waived youthful offender status, we can only reasonably conclude that the act had been called to the defendant's attention. Bledsoe. We distinguish this case from one where the record is silent as to whether or not the accused waived youthful offender treatment. We also note that this matter is raised for the first time on appeal.
¶11The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶12AFFIRMED.
¶13All Judges concur.