Ritter v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The requirement that the jury fix punishment of death if it finds the defendant guilty is in no way binding on the trial court in the latter's role as the sentencing authority. Section 13-11-4 provides in pertinent part that, `notwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury ...,' the court, following the sentencing hearing and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances may sentence the defendant to either death or life imprisonment. See, Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1980). Under Alabama's statute the trial court and not the jury is the sentencing authority. Jacobs v. State, 361 So.2d 640 (Ala.1978)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ex Parte Baldwin · 456 So. 2d 1122 - Bryars v. State

2. “"Additionally, by providing for separate proceedings for determination of guilt and punishment, Alabama's death penalty statute eliminates those vices enumerated in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). In Roberts , the court pointed out the constitutional weakness of a mandatory death sentence: "`The constitutional vice of mandatory death sentence statutes— lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender —....' (Emphasis added.) "That point was reemphasized in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), when the Supreme Court said that capital sentencing decisions must focus `on the circumstances of each individual homicide and individual defendant.' See also, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This rationale is for the purpose of `determin[ing] independently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is warranted.' Proffitt , at 428 U.S. at 253, 96 S.Ct. at 2967. "In Ritter's case, the trial court had a separate sentence hearing and considered, as it appears in its findings after that hearing, each and every aggravating factor in § 13-11-6 and each and every mitigating factor in § 13-11-7, as well as giving the prosecution and defense an opportunity to present any evidence, documentary or otherwise, as well as to present arguments, as envisioned under § 13-11-3."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ex Parte Baldwin

3. “§ 13-11-2(a) If the jury finds the defendant guilty [of one of the aggravated offenses listed in § 13-11-2], it shall fix the punishment at death.... ". . . . "§ 13-11-3. If the jury finds the defendant guilty of one of the aggravated offenses listed in section 13-11-2 and fixes the punishment at death, the court shall thereupon hold a hearing to aid the court to determine whether or not the court will sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole.... "§ 13-11-4. Notwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, which shall be served without parole; or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex Parte Baldwin