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429 S.W.2d 505

Moten v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1968-06-05

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1983

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The court may adjourn veniremen to any day of the term. When jurors have been sworn in a felony case, the court may, at its discretion, permit the jurors to separate until the court has given its charge to the jury, after which the jury shall be kept together ... until a verdict has been rendered or the jury finally discharged, unless by permission of the court with the consent of each party.. .. In any case in which the jury is permitted to separate, the court shall first give the jurors proper instructions with regard to their conduct as jurors when so separate ed.” (Emphasis added.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Pena v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1968-06-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1OPINION

DICE, Judge.

¶2The offense is robbery by assault with firearms; the punishment, twelve years.

¶3Three grounds of error are urged by appellant in his brief filed with the clerk of the trial court.

¶4In his first ground, appellant insists that the court erred in failing to give the jury instructions as “set out in Article 35.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” before they separated during the first recess taken in the trial.

¶5Art. 35.23, supra, provides, in part, as follows:

“In any case in which the jury is permitted to separate, the court shall *506first give the jurors proper instructions with regard to their conduct as jurors when so separated.”

¶6While the court’s instructions at such time did not constitute a strict compliance with Art. 35.23, supra, we find no reversible error, as the record reflects that the careful trial judge, prior to voir dire examination, informed the jury panel that the jury would be permitted to separate during recesses, and fully instructed the panel with regard to their conduct as jurors when so separated. We do not construe Art. 35.23 as requiring the judge to give instructions to the jury before each recess taken in the case. The ground of error is overruled.

¶7In his second ground of error appellant complains of certain jury argument of state’s counsel on the issue of guilt or innocence.

¶8In his opening argument to the jury, counsel for the state, in discussing reasonable doubt and why “defendants” were acquitted, made a statement to which appellant objected and upon which the court ruled, as follows:

“[MR. CASILLAS]: I don’t know why people are turned loose. Maybe I could tell you, but we might have a mistrial, and enough shouts of a mistrial have been made over there.
“MR. BAILEY: I am going to object to that, Your Honor. No evidence whatsoever that there has been any mistrial in this Court before. Tell him to stay within the record if he will, please.
“THE COURT: All right. That will be overruled. But let’s talk about the facts of this case, Counsel.”

¶9In his brief, appellant contends that counsel’s statement was prejudicial because it was a comment upon a mistrial a week before the instant trial.

¶10We do not so construe the statement, as it reasonably appears that counsel was implying that there might be a mistrial if he made certain statements. We perceive no reversible error. The ground of error is overruled.

¶11In his third ground of error, appellant insists that the court erred in permitting Officer' Zapata to refer to certain pictures which he received from Houston and were used in the identification of appellant by the complaining witness.

¶12Appellant insists that the reference to the pictures was prejudicial to him in that it insinuated he had been charged with robbery in Houston.

¶13It should first be noted that no objection was made to the testimony of Officer Zapata of which appellant complains. Nor did the officer’s testimony imply that appellant had been charged with a robbery in Houston. No photographs of appellant were introduced in evidence. The reference by state’s counsel to the pictures in jury argument does not sustain appellant’s contention of error. The ground of error is overruled.

¶14The judgment is affirmed.

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