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← 43 Ala. App. 385 - Cooper. v. State

43 Ala. App. 385 - Cooper. v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1966

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
3
states following
December 2003
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 24 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently December 2003 · most notably United States v. DiGilio (1976), United States v. Thweatt (1970)

4 federal appellate · 24 state decisions

10019661970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Doss v. State · Sorrell v. State · Griffith v. State · 17 Ala. App. 126 - Morris v. State · 23 Ala. App. 395 - Jones v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Summarizing, while there is some surface confusion as to the rationale of Dye v. State, 25 Ala.App. 138 , 142 So. 111 , contrasted with that of Jones v. State, 23 Ala.App. 395 , 126 So. 178 , and Motes v. State, 20 Ala.App. 195 , 101 So. 286 , yet we believe reference to the rule of Doss, supra, as to the definition of an accomplice harmonizes the rulings. “We quote from Doss, supra, per Brown, J-: “ ‘The test of whether a- witness is an accomplice, within the meaning of section * * * is determined by the fact as to whether or not he could have been indicted and convicted of the offense charged, either as principal or accessory, and this depending upon the circumstances of the particular case may be a question of law for the court, or of fact for the jury. * * * ’ — Citing cases. “In Dye, supra, whether the receiver was privy to the burglary, lay only in inference. Therefore, the receiver’s complicity was a question of fact, not law.. “Jon.es (a conviction of larceny) was like the present case in that a receiver testifying against his connecting thief must be corroborated. “In Motes, supra, Mrs. Blankinship- was present when the conspiracy was launched. Also, she helped divide (and claimed part of) the spoils. Motes was convicted under a general verdict on a three-count burglary, larceny and receiving indictment. Hence, Mrs. Blankinship participated in probably all three phases of the same criminal transaction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.