Volume 43 — Appeals, District of Columbia

Hearing'on an áppeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents sustaining a motion to dismiss a notice of opposition to tbe registration of a trademark.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference case. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Angus McKenzie appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case awarding priority of invention relating to voting machines to his opponent, James C. Garrett. The issue is declared in the following counts: “1.

• Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding reversing a decision of the board of Examiners in Chief which had affirmed the decision of the Examiner of Interference. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Robert V. Cheatham appeals from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding awarding priority to Roy V. Collins. The issue of the interference is defined in the following counts: “1.

Hearing oh appeals from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an interference proceeding to which Jacob B. Blaw William Van JR. Whitall, Charles Id. McArthur, and Gillespie were original parties. Gillespie has dropped out.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dismissing an opposition to the registration of a trademark. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appellant, Simplex Electric Heating Company, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents dismissing its opposition to the registration by appellee, Gold Car Heating & Lighting Company, of the word “Simplex” as a trademark for thermostatic steam traps.

ITraking on an appeal from a decision of tlie Commissioner of Patents sustaining a motion for the dismissal of an opposition to the registration of a trademark.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Supreme ■ Court of the District of Columbia affirming an order of deportation of a United States Commissioner.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia. Chin AYah, appellant, ivas arrested as a Chinese person in the United States without authority, and ordered to be deported to China by order of the United States commissioner March 26, 1914. He appealed therefrom to the supreme court of the District. That court upon hearing affirmed the order of the commissioner, and Chin AYah has again appealed.</p> <p>On the trial the defendant offered in evidence a certificate issued by Felix McGettrick, United States commissioner for the district of Vermont, dated May 14, 1897, showing that Chin Leong Say had been adjudged to be lawfully in the United States by him. This was excluded, and exception reserved. He then offered a report of Examiner Plato Mount joy, dated January 25, 1896, to the Department of Justice, referring to the case of Chin Leong Say, and [stating] that, in his opinion, Commissioner McGettrick had tried the case of the said Chin Leong Say.</p> <p>.This was accompanied by evidence tending to show that the appellant, Chin AYah, had been tried under the name of Chin Leong Say by Commissioner McGettrick, and discharged.</p> <p>It appears by the bill of exceptions that Chin AYah had been arrested by a United States inspector on March 5, 1914, at a laundry in AYashington, I). C.; that the inspector, through an interpreter, interrogated said Chin AYah, and took down his statements in shorthand, Avhich he later wrote out in longhand. The same was produced and read. From this statement it appears that the defendant gave his name as Chin AVah, and his married name as Chin Suey AYah, age forty-seven; that he did not know where he was born. His parents’ names and residence wure given as Chin Along Dung, his father, and Ung Shee, his mother, residence Hung How village, Chipa. It tvas also stated that his father had lived in the United St&tes, and that his father and mother had told him he was born in the United States, and carried back to China by them when he was very young; that he had come to Canada in 1891, and from there to the United States; that he had been arrested and tried and given the certificate heretofore mentioned. He had come to New York, and from thence to Washington, where he had since lived.</p> <p>It was proved by the government interpreter that the only rule pronouncing Chinese names in English was by sound.</p> <p>Appellant testified of his arrest on the train from Montreal at St. Albans, Vermont; that he was carried in a few days to a town nearby and tried before Commissioner McGettrick, who gave him the certificate.</p> <p>On behalf of appellant, one Lee Woy testified that he came to the United States in 18 GG, and lived for five years in San Francisco; that he knew Chin Mong Dung, who kept a grocery store in San Francisco, and also his wife, Ung Shee; knew that Chin AVah was born in San Francisco; sawr him there as a baby, and afterwards saw him in China, to which his parents had returned; was then about thirteen years old; that he had seen Chin Wah at Richford or St. Albans, Vermont, afterwards in New York, and since in Washington. Was present at Chin A¥ah’s trial in Richford or St. Albans before a United States commissioner; that two Chinamen testified in that case, and also a white'boy, but does not know what they testified to; was himself sent for as a witness by Chin Wah, but attorney did not call him.</p> <p>Lee Kim, another witness for Chin Wak, testified to having lived in San Francisco, where he knew Chin AVah’s parents; that they had a baby bom there whom he knew to be the defendant. Name was Chin Suey Wah or Chin Leong Say. Defendant was about from one to two years old when witness left San Francisco. That he saw defendant afterwards in China, with his parents, when he was about thirteen years old.</p> <p>The following stipulation was entered into by the government:</p> <p>“Commissioner McGettrick kept no docket or record of his (‘ases, and turned none such over to the clerk of the United States district court in Vermont. He depended upon memoranda or simply note-books, containing simply the name of the defendant, and frequently only stating the disposition of the case. These fragmentary or sporadic documents, with the complaint, orders for processes, warrants, and marshals’ returns, were turned over to the clerk of the court at .Burlington, Vermont, by McGettrick.”</p> <p>After this stipulation, defendant offered in evidence the certificate which he stated had been given him by Commissioner McGettrick after his trial. This certificate, signed by McGettrick, show's that May 14, 1897, at Richford, Vermont, a complaint had been presented charging Chin Leong Say with violation of the statutes of the United States, and that upon full hearing, defendant had been discharged, and it was adjudged that said Chin Leong Say had the lawful right to be in the United States. This certificate, dated May 2(5, 1897, was excluded.</p> <p>There wras also offered a certified copy of a fee bill among the papers turned over by McGettrick to the clerk of the district court for the district of Vermont, which shows the names of witnesses in the case of Chin Leong Say as Moy Loy, J. A. Kelly, and Chin Goon. This was excluded, and exception reserved.</p> <p>There was next offered a certified copy of the report of Plato Mount joy, an examiner for the Department of Commerce and Labor, made to the Department of Justice. It seems that this examiner had been instructed to investigate charges of misfeasance made against McGettrick as commissioner.</p> <p>The part of the report is as follows:</p> <p>“May 14, 1897. Chin Leong Say Pees $9.23” (This wras one oí a number of Chinese cases embraced in said report). “The Commissioner (meaning McGettrick) is positive that he fried these persons, for his notes show it. He is a bold man who would venture to make any definite statements where any Chinese names occur, for they are so queer and peculiar, but I do not think that these names are to-be found in the marshal’s accounts for that quarter. The commissioner claims 88 cases, the marshal’s force apparently arrested only 76 Chinese persons. Unfortunately Air. Senter was sick and did not attend a single Chinese hearing that quarter, so that he can throw no light on the subject. The commissioner thinks that he may have mislaid the warrants and he is sure that he,tried the Chinamen; I think that it is very possible that he did try them, though the marshal’s accounts seem to be against him. But I am clearly of the opinion that, unless I have made some clerical error, he should not be allowed a single, solitary nickel out of the $788.20 which I recommend to be disallowed.”</p> <p>This was excluded, and exception reserved.</p> <p>Error has been assigned on the exclusion of these certificates and reports, as well as to the finding of the court that Chin Wah was not a citizen of the United States.</p>

<p>Criminal Law; Police Court; Jurisdiction; Food Adulteration.</p> <p>1. The fact that one, if convicted in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for a first offense, punishable by a fine only, for selling adulterated food in violation of the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 768, chap. 3915, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8717), could, if confined for nonpayment of the fine imposed, be released after thirty days under see. 1042, U. S. Lev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1706, whereas sec. 44 D. C. Code (31 Stat. at L. 1196, chap. 854), gives the police court power to commit an offender in a like situation for not to exceed one year (citing United States v. Mills, 11 App. D. C. 500), shows no inequality in the degrees of punishment in the respective courts, which would prevent the police court from being a “proper court of the United States,” within the meaning of the food and drugs act, for prosecution of its violation. (Citing Huyler’s v. Houston, 41 App. D. C. 452.)</p> <p>2. The provision of the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 768, chap. 3915, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8717), requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to publish the findings of' the court in prosecutions for its violation, adds nothing by way of penalty to the fine imposed for a first sale of adulterated food in violation of the act, so as to deprive the police court of the District of Columbia of jurisdiction of the offense.</p> <p>3. The police court of the District of Columbia is not deprived of jurisdiction of a first offense in violating the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 768, chap. 3915, Comp. Stat. 1913, § S717j, which is punishable by a fine only, by the fact that the information is in several counts charging distinct offenses whose aggregate imprisonment in default of the payment of the fine may be for more than one year, since the provision in sec. 934, D. C. Code (31 Stat. at L. 1341, chap. 854), that cumulative sentences aggregating more than one year shall be deemed one sentence, has no reference to a sentence to pay a pecuniary fine, followed by imprisonment in default of payment, but relates only to eases in which the punishment is to be imprisonment, (citing Harris v. Lang, 27 App. D. C. 84), and since sec. 44 of the Code expressly limits the authority of the police court to a commitment of one year in default of payment of tlie fine imposed, and it must be assumed that it will keep within its jurisdiction.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the respondent from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refusing to quash writs of certiorari and prohibition issued to the Police Court.

Hearing oil an appeal by the respondent from a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in a quo warranto proceeding ousting him from the office of commissioner of the District of Columbia.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiffs from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refusing to enjoin the. removal of a stable.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>Hiram C. McNeil and others appealed from a decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia granting an injunction in their suit against Hoy S. Gary.</p> <p>The bill -was filed October 31, 1912, by McNeil and others, residents of what is known as Saul’s Addition to the city of Washington, to enforce a restrictive covenant contained in all the deeds to said addition, by restraining the erection by Gary of a stable on his lot, intended by him to be used for stabling horses and storing wagons used in his business as plumber and express man. The building was iii course of erection at that time.</p> <p>The court sustained a demurrer to and dismissed the bill. That decree was appealed to the court of appeals and reversed May 5, 1913, — McNeil v. Gary, 40 App. D. C. 397, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1113, which is referred to for a more particular history of the case.</p> <p>It was held that the restrictive covenant was binding upon the defendant, and the cause was remanded to the equity court for further proceedings. Hpon the return of the cause, defendant Gary answered the bill, in which he admits “that at the time said bill of complaint was filed, she was causing to be erected on the rear of said lot, a one-story-and-loft frame stable about 34 feet long and 30 feet wide, to be of the value of about $300, containing five stalls for horses and a space for wngons and vehicles. She also admits that it was intended to use said stable for the purpose of stabling horses and wagons used in an express business and plumbing business conducted by her husband; that said express and plumbing business is being conducted at the place of business of her said husband in Washington, D. C., and not upon the said lot; that only two horses used in said business have been kept in said stable; that said stable has been used and was intended to be used to stable one horse, which is used by this defendant solely for family uses.</p> <p>“'Further answering, this defendant says that the said horses are used by this defendant and her family for family use and for driving purposes, at times when they are not used in said business; that they are not brought to said stable upon said lot for the purpose of using them in connection with said plumbing business or express business, but solely for the purpose of stabling them, and for having them eonraiiently located when it is desired to use them for family purposes.</p> <p>“Further answering the said paragraph, this defendant says that the allegations that the said stable will constitute a nuisance is untrue; that the said stable was built under a building permit properly issued by the building inspector of the District of Columbia after the plans thereof had been submitted to him; that proper provisions for sanitation and to prevent any nuisance in connection therewith were taken in the construction of said stable, and have been taken in its use.”</p> <p>It also appears from said answer that stables have been buil 1 by other occupants of said subdivision, and that garages have been built and used by six residents thereof.</p> <p>The cause was reheard March 5, 1914. Testimony was introduced tending to show that the stable in question was ■finished shortly after the suit was filed; that on the average about three horses are kept in the said stable, one of "which is driven to a buggy, one used for the wagon horse, and another is kept for the use of the family. The children go to Sunday school and church on Sunday, and drive it in the evening. IIis boy rides it. The horse belongs to his oldest daughter. Sometimes when he is very busy he puts that horse to a wagon for the plumbers to use. When they have some material that they have on a job and want to clean up on the same day, they put that horse to a wagon for that purpose.</p> <p>The stable is 25 feet from the rear of the lot, and 35 x 30 feet in size, including the wagon shed. Defendant keeps three ■wagons and a buggy in the wagon shed, and also a surrey. He does not use the surrey in connection with his plumbing or express business, but only for family use, and uses tbe buggy to drive to and from work and around during the day. lie often uses it in the evening to take his wife out.</p> <p>It was testified that there are other stables in the subdivision used as private stables by the owners, and also garages for private use.</p> <p>It is contended for a decree awarding a mandatory injunction to remove the said stable. The question submitted was whether the final decree should order the stable to be removed, or merely prohibit its use for business purposes.</p> <p>The court refused the decree for the removal of the stable, but entered one restraining the defendant, for a period of twenty years from and after January 1, 1906, from using or permitting the use of the building for any manufacturing, mechanical, or business purposes whatsoever. Costs of the ease were taxed against the defendant.</p> <p>Plaintiffs have appealed, assigning as error the refusal of the court to decree the removal of the stable.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of (lie Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict for the defendant directed by the Court, in an action to recover a certain amount alleged to have been loaned by the plaintiff to ihe defendant.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>Appeal from a judgment upon a directed verdict for the defendant, William D. Huston, appellee here, in an action for the recovery of $1,935 alleged to have been loaned the defendant by Peter Chalvet the plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s evidence, in the form of a deposition, was substantially as follows: He was seventy-two years old, and had .lived in Olivenheim, California, for thirty-five years. His wife, Minnie Chalvet, had been married beforé. She was of German descent, and could read and write the German language, but plaintiff could not. Mrs. Olmlvet had several children by her first marriage, one being the wife of the defendant. This daughter and her husband lived at Garrett Park, Maryland, where they owned a small home, for which the plaintiff understood they paid $3,000, and upon which there was an encumbrance of about $2,000. When plaintiff married Mrs. Chalvet he owned a ranch of 320 acres, but she had no property. She died in May, 1911.</p> <p>The plaintiff offered to prove, through his deposition, that in 1910 Mrs. Chalvet received a letter from the Hustons, saying that they wished to borrow from the plaintiff $2,100 to liquidate the mortgage on their home, and that they would give a new mortgage to secure the loan. This letter was written in German, but was read to the plaintiff by Mrs. Chalvet, and was finally lost. The court, over the objection and exception of the defendant, excluded the evidence.</p> <p>It further appeared that on October 7, 1910, plaintiff, with money which belonged to him, purchased a draft payable to his order for $2,000, which he. indorsed to Mrs. Chalvet. In addition he gave her $100 in cash. Taking the draft and money, Mrs. Chalvet came East and went to the home of the Hustons, in Garrett Park, where she remained about three months, when she returned to her home in California. She then told the plaintiff that the defendant would not give her a mortgage; that he, the defendant, “said that if he gave the mortgage, and the plaintiff and his wife should die, then Mrs. Chalvet’s other children would come in and get this note and mortgage, and might foreclose the mortgage, and he, Huston, would thereby lose the $1,500 he had already paid on the place.” The $2.000 draft was introduced in evidence, and showed that it had been indorsed by Mrs. Chalvet to the defendant. On December 15, 1910, while Mrs. Chalvet was at the Hustons, the defendant wrote a letter in English to the plaintiff, which was signed “Jenny and Will Huston,” and in which the defendant, among other things, said: “We made out the mortgage on our house just as mother wanted it, so you see that everything is alright.” On February 5, 1911, after Mrs. Chalvet’s return to California, the defendant sent her a letter in German, in which he said: “We hope that you all do very well. You may tell to Pet, that we will do the right thing. You need not be worried about it.”</p> <p>The defendant testified that the $2,100 was given his wife by Mrs. Chalvet; and that he and his wife “agreed to give Mrs. Chalvet a home with them as long as she lived, as well as provide a home for her husband, Mr. Peter Chalvet, the plaintiff, in this case, he to pay board for himself at the rate of $30 per month;” and that to secure the carrying out of this agreement as to Mrs. Chalvet the defendant and his wife executed a mortgage which provided that in consideration of the payment of $2,100 the Hustons would support, maintain, and provide a comfortable home for Mrs. Chalvet during her life. The mortgage contained no power of sale, and was to cease and determine upon the death of Mrs. Chalvet, who retained it in her possession without recording it until she was about to return to California, when she gave it back to the defendant. The money secured from the draft finally found its way into the joint bank account of the Hustons, and Mrs. Huston used several hundred dollars of it to purchase a piano, furniture, and various household necessities. At a later date there was deposited the balance of $1,100 in her individual account. The defendant further testified that in April, 1911, he secured a loan, through other sources, of $1,800 upon his property for the purposes of taking up the existing mortgage thereon. There was some further evidence tending to show that.Mrs. Chalvet had expressed the intent to give Mrs. Huston the money which she brought East.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia granting a divorce a mensa, et thoro and alimony. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict for the plaintiff in an action on an accident and disability policy of insurance. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, Isadore A. Slyder, appellee here, in the supreme court of the District, for damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff, accompanied by Sirs.

<p>Appear and Error ; Record.</p> <p>A decree will, on appellee’s motion, be affirmed upon appeal, where the statement of the evidence in the case has been stricken from the record by order of the court, since the evidence upon which the cause appears to have been heard in the court below, not being in the record, must be presumed to have supported the decree.</p>

JI earing on an appeal (specially allowed) from an order of the Supreme Court of tlie District of Columbia overruling a motion to dismiss a bill in equity to establish an equitable lien against a certain fund in the hands of an administrator. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is a special appeal from an order in the supreme court of the District, overruling’ a motion to dismiss appellees’ bill.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment dismissing' an action against tbe collector of a decedent’s estate, after a demurrer to tbe declaration bad been sustained, the plaintiff having elected not to amend bis declaration.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by a creditor of a decedent’s estate from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a probate court, dismissing a petition to compel the collector of the estate to pay his claim.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This case is closely analogous-to Berry & W. Co. v. Dante, ante, 110, this day decided. The question here involved is whether the probate court erred in refusing to grant the prayer of the petition of appellant, petitioner below, wherein the court was asked to make an order compelling the collector of the estate of Stilson Hutchins to pay petitioner’s claim against the estate.</p> <p>It appears that, during the lifetime of Hutchins, William J. Dante was appointed trustee in equity of the estate of Hut-chins ; that claims were paid by the trustee under the order of the equity court; that other claims were referred to the auditor of the court for report, among which was the one in issue; that the auditor reported favorably on this claim, and that on the death of Hutchins, Dante was appointed collector of the estate. Petitioner brought a suit to recover this claim against Hutchins during his lifetime, which suit stands undisposed of for lack of service upon the defendant. No attempt appears to have been made to revive the action.</p> <p>When the present petition was presented in the probate court, the collector answered, expressing his willingness to obey any order the court might make in the premises; but an answer was filed by Walter Stilson Hutchins, one of the sons of decedent, in which he objected to the payment of this claim, and contested the jurisdiction of the probate court to compel the collector to pay contested claims against the estate. On hearing, the court entered an order dismissing the petition, from which this appeal was taken.</p>

<p>Common Carriers; Public Utilities; Automobilés.</p> <p>1. A taxicab company is an agency for public use for the conveyance of persons or property within the District of Columbia for hire, within . the meaning of the act of Congress of March 14, 1913 (37 Stat. at L. 974, chap. 150), and, as such, subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of the District as a public utility, where it transports passengers for hire by means of automobiles from and to a union railroad station under a contract with the company owning. the station, whereby the latter receives a portion of its gross receipts; is also under contract with hotels to furnish livery service for guests, and maintains garages from which its automobiles may be ordered by telephone'; although every customer is entitled to the exclusive use of the vehicle hired and has the right to direct the destination of the vehicle at his pleasure, and although it asserts the right to refuse to carry any person applying for a vehicle, and does not solicit patronage on the public streets.</p> <p>2. Where it is claimed that the Public Utilities Commission of this District has jurisdiction over a taxicab company as a public utility under the act of Congress creating .the Commission, it is no defense to such a company which denies the jurisdiction of the Commission, that the Commission has failed to assume jurisdiction over others engaged in the same character of business; the question being, whether the company, and not another, is a common carrier.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an equity court, construing a will. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: A bill in equity was tiled in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, seeking an interpretation of certain provisions of the will of Lucy Page Whitehead, who died in December, 1912, leaving a last will and testament dated August 4, 1910, with codicil attached, dated April 8, 1912.

IXuaring oil an appeal by a trustee in bankruptcy, intervener in a suit in equity by a surety company, from a decree of the Supreme Court of tlie District of Columbia bolding an equity court, awarding tbe plaintiff a fund in tbe bands of a receiver theretofore appointed by tbe court.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiffs from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding an equity court, sustaining a motion by the defendant to dismiss, and dismissing, a bill in equity to restrain the Commissioner of Internal .Revenue from assessing and collecting a surtax imposed upon the plaintiffs’ income under the Federal income tax law.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>Appellants, John F. Dodge and Horace E. Dodge, plaintiffs below, filed a bill in equity in the supreme court of the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin the assessment and collection of the surtax imposed upon plaintiffs’ incomes under § 2 of the act of Congress approved October 3, 1913 (38 Stat. at L. 166-181, chap. 16), known as the “income tax law.”</p> <p>It is averred that plaintiffs, citizens of Michigan, are partners in business and the only persons interested in the firm; that they filed with the collector of internal revenue their returns showing the taxable income of plaintiff John F. Dodge to he $708,229.47, and the taxable income of plaintiff Horace E. Dodge to be $709,243.41, upon which the normal tax of 1 per cent due from both is computed in the returns to he $14,174.72, and that the surtax chargeable under the statute would amount to $65,148.36. To the assessment and collection of the surtax, plaintiffs accompanied their returns with a protest, alleging that the surtax levied upon individuals under subdivision 2, division A, of the income tax law is in conflict with the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that the provision providing for the assessment and collection of the surtax discriminates against individual taxpayers and in favor of corporations. It is further averred that the tax imposed is not uniform, and that no opportunity is afforded for a hearing before the assessment of the tax; hence the law is unconstitutional and void. Defendant moved to dismiss the bill on the ground that the suit could not be maintained, since its object is to restrain the assessment and collection of a tax, and that plaintiffs have an adequate and complete remedy at law. On hearing, a decree was entered dismissing the bill, from which this appeal was taken.</p>

<p>.Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an actipn in tort, brought by appellee, Eosa B. Smolik, plaintiff below, to recover from defendant, Elizabeth T. Traver, damages for an alleged assault and battery.</p> <p>It appears that plaintiff was employed at the time in the dressmaking establishment of one Madam Adele in this city. On the day of the alleged assault, plaintiff called at the home of defendant for the purpose of fitting a waist ordered by defendant, and also to collect a bill due her employer. On entering defendant’s house, she was told by the butler that defendant was engaged, and could not see plaintiff for an hour. Plaintiff waited, and, in about an hour, defendant appeared. According to the testimony of plaintiff, defendant undertook to forcibly take the waist from plaintiff, and, in doing so, struck her several times, and ordered her to leave the house. Defendant then ordered her butler to eject.plaintiff from the house. ■ The butler seized her and carried her out of the door and dropped her upon the-front steps. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and, from the judgment thereon, this appeal was faken.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an equity court, vacating a prior order granting leave to file a bill of review and denying leave to file the bill. The Court in tlie opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill to review a decree granting a divorce on the cross bill of the defendant.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants, a wife and co-respondent, from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an equity court, granting the plaintiff an absolute divorce from his wife, and requiring the co-respondent to pay the costs of suit and counsel fees to the plaintiff’s attorney.

<p>Affidavits of Defense; Negotiable Instruments; Fraud; Innocent Purchaser for Value.</p> <p>1. Statements in an affidavit of defense, of affiant’s belief, without a tender of proof, are insufficient.</p> <p>2. Where a promissory note was procured from the maker by the payee by fraud and decejition, nothing short of guilty knowledge of the fraud or deception on the part of a subsequent1 indorsee for value will defeat his right to recover upon it. Mere suspicion or knowledge of circumstances that might excite suspicion, or even gross negligence, is not sufficient. (Following Hutchins v. Langley, 27 App. D. C. 234.)</p> <p>3. Statements in an affidavit of defense in an action by the last indorsee of a promissory note against the maker, that “I am informed and believe and expect to prove at the trial, that the,plaintiff became the holder of said promissory note, if holder at all, in bad faith and without any belief that it was a valid obligation of mine, and that the plaintiff did not receive my note in the regular course of business,” — • are sufficient to entitle the defendant to a jury trial, — especially when such averments are accompanied by others tending to show close intimacy between the plaintiff and the original payee, who is the party charged with the fraud, as well as knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the payee’s alleged fraudulent method of transacting business.</p> <p>4. If the court on reading an affidavit of defense is convinced that it was made in good faith, and that a doubt exists as to the right of the plaintiff to recover, summary judgment should not be entered in favor oi the plaintiff. (Following Codington v. Standard Bank, 40 App. D. C. 409.)</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed bv the court at the close of all the evidence, in an action of deceit.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in an action for malicious prosecution. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appeal by tlie defendant, Joseph Auerbach from a judgment in the supreme court of the District in an action for malicious prosecution. The first of the two counts of the declaration alleges that the defendant caused the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff, William II.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an equity court, adjudging him in contempt of court for failure to obey a decree of the court in a divorce proceeding, requiring him to pay the plaintiff a fixed sum as alimony.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the .District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for a malicious prosecution.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from a judgment for $4,250, rendered on a verdict returned for the plaintiff, Percy R. Rich, in an action for malicious prosecution.</p> <p>The testimony on behalf of plaintiff, Rich, tended to show that he had a written agreement with defendant, Le Roy Mark, respecting the publication of a book known as an Automobile Register. Plaintiff was to contract for printing and to pay all the expenses of production of the said book, to print not less than 7,500 copies thereof, and to pay postage on not less than 6,000 copies, the said book to contain advertisements and to be issued prior to March 1, 1912. It was part of tlie contract with each advertiser in the said book that payment for his advertisement was to be made only upon and after tbe distribution of the book, and that no advertiser was to pay before tbe book was distributed. A number of persons, including a certain partnership known as the Empire Auto Top Company, consisting of one Ilooven and one Miller, advertised in the book, and the plaintiff collected from the persons so advertising amounts aggregating $490, including $12 collected from the said Hooven on account of the said Empire Anto Top Company on April 6, 1912, at which time the book had not been distributed, wbicb collection was tbe last made by plaintiff.</p> <p>On April 27, 1912, the said Miller, member of the said partnership, made oath in the police court of the .District of Columbia that plaintiff, when collecting the said sum of $12, had represented that the book had been distributed, and upon the strength of such representation procured the sum of $12 to be paid. On this affidavit a warrant was issued, and plaintiff was apprehended thereunder, and detained in a police cell five or six hours, when he was released on bond.</p> <p>Prior to the making' of the said affidavit, defendant, -who had been informed of the circumstances and inquired of by the said partnership in relation thereto, consulted an. assistant United States attorney for the District of Columbia, and was by the latter advised that, if plaintiff had collected the sum of $12 upon the representation aforesaid, and the representation was false, plaintiff was guilty of obtaining money under false pretenses. Subsequently, and after further conference with the partnership, defendant accompanied Miller to the office of the United States attorney, and, after an interview in which the three participated, and in which the attorney examined Miller as to the facts in the case, the said attorney authorized the issue of the warrant, which was issued upon the affidavit aforesaid, which affidavit was prepared by a clerk of the police court, after personal inquiry by him of Miller, from whose statements the clerk wrote the affidavit. This was on the day of the date of the affidavit, namely, April 27, 1912.</p> <p>On April 17, 1912, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter stating that he, plaintiff, was called out of town for a couple of weeks unexpectedly, and that in reference to postage on the books at that time it was entirely out of the question, concluding the letter as follows: “Consider the Auto Register incident closed between us.” On the said day plaintiff went to Maine. On April 22, 1912, defendant wrote plaintiff in Maine a letter stating that plaintiff had agreed with the advertisers to distribute 6,000 of the books by mail; that plaintiff had not done this, though he had collected the bills with that understanding, which was obtaining money under false pretenses; that the- matter had been referred to the United States attorney here, and a warrant would be issued for the plaintiff’s arrest at any time on request, and that unless $100 were received from plaintiff by April 24, steps would be taken to prosecute plaintiff to the fullest extent of the law. Defendant sent a copy of his letter to plaintiff’s mother by the same mail. Upon receipt of defendant’s letter plaintiff returned to Washington, and was arrested. Plaintiff went to court on the warrant April 29, 1912, and the case was continued by the assistant United States attorney until May 3, 1912, in order to allow plaintiff to straighten the matter out with the advertisers in the book, and on the latter date the assistant United States attorney, having been informed that the matter had been adjusted and there was no further desire to press it, entered a nolle prosequi of the case.</p> <p>There was also testimony tending to show that, when collecting the said sum of $12 from Hooven, plaintiff represented that the Register had been distributed, and testimony to the contrary was also given.</p> <p>Testimony that defendant instigated the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff, and that, in addition to making the affidavit, Miller had theretofore told defendant that, at the time of collecting the sum of $12, plaintiff had said the book had been distributed, was also given.</p> <p>At the close of the testimony the defendant requested the court to grant the following instruction to the jury, which was. granted: “You are instructed that in order to recover in this action the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, each and all of the following allegations of the declaration; namely, first, that the defendant induced and procured the certain Miller, named in the declaration, to make the complaint and obtain the warrant against the plaintiff in the declaration mentioned; second, that the said complaint was false; third, that it was made maliciously; fourth, that it was without any reasonable or probable cause; and if the plaintiff fails to establish any one of the said allegations your verdict must be for the defendant.”</p> <p>The defendant accompanied this with the following instruction, which the court refused: “You are instructed that, even though you should find from the testimony that the defendant procured the said Miller to make the complaint and obtain the warrant aforesaid against the plaintiff, and did so maliciously, you may yet not find for the plaintiff unless you also further find that the said complaint was caused to be made, and the said warrant to be obtained, without reasonable or probable cause therefor; and you are further instructed that by reasonable and probable cause is not meant the existence of facts sufficient in themselves to secure the conviction of the charge against the plaintiff, as set forth in the said complaint and warrant, but only a reasonable or well-grounded suspicion of the guilt of the plaintiff, based on circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonable belief therefor in the mind of an ordinarily cautious and prudent man. Accordingly, if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant w-ere engaged in' the enterprise of issuing the certain Automobile Register described in the testimony; that as an incident to said enterprise advertisements were procured to be inserted in the said Register, upon the condition that the same were to be paid for by the respective advertisers only when and after the said Register should have been distributed in accordance with the understanding and agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, as shown by the testimony; that on the 6th day of April, 1912, the said Register had not been so distributed; that the certain ITooven mentioned in the said complaint and warrant against the plaintiff, or the company with which he was connected, was one of the advertisers in the said Register, and on the said 6th day of April, 1912, the plaintiff collected from the said Hooven, or the said company, the sum of $12, for and on account of the advertisement of the said company in the said Register; and upon the representation that the same had [>een distributed; that on the 17th day of April, 1912, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant that he, the plaintiff, was then going out of town, and for him, the defendant, to consider the matter of the said Register between them closed, and that the plaintiff did so leave town; that at the time of the making of the said complaint and obtaining the said warrant against the plaintiff by the said Miller the defendant knew the foregoing facts as recited, and that, at the time the said complaint was made and the said warrant applied for, the defendant, either alone or in conjunction with the said Miller, stated to an assistant United States attorney for the District of Columbia the aforesaid facts as to the enterprise of the said Register, and the procurement of advertisements to be inserted therein upon the condition aforesaid; that on the said 6th day of April 1912, the said Register had not been so distributed; and that on that day the plaintiff had collected from the said Ilooven, or the said company, the sum of $12 as aforesaid, and upon the representation aforesaid; and that, upon such statement to him, the said assistant United States attorney advised that the said warrant might properly be applied for and issued; you are instructed that the defendant then had reasonable and probable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty, as in the said complaint and warrant alleged, and your verdict must be for the defendant.”</p> <p>The court refused to grant the instruction, stating that it was the province of the jury to inquire and determine from all the testimony whether there was any reasonable or probable cause for the defendant to have procured the issue of the warrant in question, if the jury should find that the defendant procured it, and that it was not the province nor duty of the court to indicate to the jury, in the manner appearing from the requested instruction, what facts, if found by the jury, would or ■would not constitute such cause; and to the action of the court in each instance the defendant, by his counsel, excepted upon the ground that the question of reasonable or probable cause on the facts found in such case is always a question for the opinion of the court, it being left to the jury to find the facts, and upon the facts, as assumed by the instruction, the defendant, if he procured the warrant to be issued, had reasonable and probable cause so to do; and that, in any event, it was the duty of the court to state to the jury what facts, if found, would or would not, as the case may be, constitute such cause.</p> <p>The charge of the court submitted the question whether it was reasonable or probable cause, to the determination of the jury, as follows: “Fourth, was it without any reasonable or probable cause ? I have said that the time at which that should be judged would be the time the affidavit was made. What did he know at that time as to what the probable right was to arrest this man and prosecute him for obtaining money under false pretenses, that is, getting this $12 with the intent of defrauding Hooven and Miller out of it % ”</p>

Bearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Patents; Interference; Evidence; Presumptions.</p> <p>Where the evidence in an interference proceeding involving an invention for decorating or “stroking” candies showed that the junior party, who filed two months after the senior party’s filing date, had manufactured and sold a machine three months before the senior party’s date of conception, and there was evidence on behalf of the junior party that such machine contained every element of the issue, and was in existence and accessible to the senior party, thus making it possible for the senior party to disprove his adversary's evidence if he could have done so; and it further appeared that the junior party,' after the sale of this machine, manufactured and sold other and similar machines embodying the invention, — it was held that the junior party was entitled to the award of priority. (Citing Schneider v. Driggs, 36 App. D. C. 116.)</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents sustaining a motion to dismiss an opposition to the registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents granting a petition to cancel the registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Appeal and Error; Judgment; Restitution.</p> <p>Where this court reversed an order denying a motion for restitution of property taken under an erroneous judgment, and remanded the cause, with direction to grant the order of restitution as moved by the appellant, and thereafter, on motion of the appellee to have the mandate recalled, it appeared that the motion for restitution included certain accrued payments of rent on deposit in the registry of the court, the motion to recall the mandate was denied, but the mandate was so amended as to apply only to the restitution of the property, leaving the fund in question subject to the order of the court below. (Citing Warder v. Newburgh, 40 App. D. C. 385.)</p>

Hearing- on an appeal by tbe petitioner from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a petition for the writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Patents.

Hearing on appeals by tbe plaintiffs from judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in two actions, one to recover damages for personal injuries, and the other by a husband to recover damages for the loss of the services of his wife, the plaintiff in the other action.

<p>Libel and Slander; Evidence; Pleading; Prejudicial Error; D motion oe Verdict; Punitive Damages.</p> <p>1. In an action of libel by a retail dealer against a manufacturer and a newspaper publisher, in which the latter is charged with having published an advertisement of the manufacturer to the effect that a prior advertisement of the dealer of the sale, at a reduced price, of the product of the manufacturer, was a fraud, it is not error for the trial court to admit in evidence, on the offer of the plaintiff, a telegram from the manufacturer's agents to the newspaper publisher, guaranteeing immunity if it should publish the manufacturer’s advertisement, as the sending of such a telegram and the publication of the advertisement after its receipt tended to show wilfulness on the part of the defendants in the publication of the advertisement; nor- is it error for the trial court to admit in evidence in such a case, on the offer of the plaintiff, a telegram and letter sent, before the publication of the alleged libel, by the attorney of the manufacturer to the plaintiff, threatening to proceed against him unless he immediately ceased cutting prices on such product.</p> <p>2. In ah action of libel by a retail dealer against a manufacturing company which claimed that the plaintiff was selling its product at cut rates, air advertisement in a newspaper that the plaintiff’s advertisement of the sale of such product at a reduced price was a fraud, advertising matter of the defendant, although subsequent to the publication of the alleged libel, offered in evidence by the plaintiff, is admissible when it is in reply to a plea of justification, and tends to show that the plaintiff had not attempted to infringe the defendant’s trademark, or to create a false impression in the minds of the public.</p> <p>3. The fact that the plaintiff in an action against a newspaper company for having published an alleged libelous advertisement was permitted by the trial court to testify to a conversation he had with the advertising agent of the defendant, to the effect that he, the agent, had received a copy of the advertisement, and had taken it to the business manager of the newspaper, who told him to hold it until the next day, is not prejudicial error, where the business manager had already testified to the same conversation with the advertising agent, without objection.</p> <p>4. Defamatory words falsely spoken, which prejudice a party in his business, trade, or profession, are actionable per se. (Following Marino v. Di Marco, 41 App. D. C. 76.)</p> <p>5. A newspaper advertisement by a manufacturer, reproducing an advertisement by a retail dealer of the product of the manufacturer under the heading, “The above ad. is a fraud,” followed by statements to the effect that statements in the dealer’s advertisements are false, is libelous per se.</p> <p>6. Where the defendants in an action of libel plead justification, and their evidence does not support the plea, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury, at their request, that if they, or either of them, believed the alleged libelous statements to be true, the jury should award nominal damages.</p> <p>7. A newspaper advertisement of a company manufacturing razors, reproducing a prior newspaper advertisement of a retail dealer, in wliicli tlie razors were offered for sale at a reduced price, and charging tlie dealer with making fraudulent statements in his advertisement, was held, in an action of libel against the manufacturing company and a newspaper company publishing the advertisement, in whic-h action the defendants pleaded justification, to be libelous per sc; and it was further held on a review of the evidence that there was nothing false or fraudulent in the dealer’s advertisement, and that the trial court properly instructed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants, and properly refused prayers offered by the defendants instructing the jury that they had no right to award punitive damages. (Mr. Justice Vast Obsdkl dissenting.)</p> <p>8. Punitive damages being given by way of punishment, it is not necessary that there should be actual damage, or something more than nominal damage, to justify their imposition; so that in an action of libel it it is not error for the trial court to refuse a prayer offered by the defendant, to tlie effect that if the jury should find the damages were nominal, and no more, they could not award punitive damages. (Citing Russell v. Washington Post Co. 31 App. D. C. 277.)</p>

Hearing- on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of tlie Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of the plaintiff’s intestate. The facts are stated in the opinion,

<p>PATENTS; INTERFERENCE; RES JUDICATA; CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIM'S.</p> <p>1. The dissolution of an interference on the ground that one of the parties had failed to overcome the references to a prior patent is not res judicata of the question of priority involved in a subsequent interference between the same parties, declared' after such party had amended his claims. (Citing Gold v. Gold, 34 App. D. C. 229, and Moore v. United States, 40 App. D. C. 201.)</p> <p>2. Where in an interference there is no ambiguity in the claims and they are capable of a broad construction, the court will not read into them a limitation not expressed therein. If one of the parties desires to limit their construction, he should have done so in making his application for a patent. (Following Geltz v. Crozier, 32 App. D. C. 324; Engel v. Sinclair, 34 App. D. C. 212; Western Electric Co. v. Martin, 39 App. D. C. 147; and Leonard v. Horton, 40 App. D. C. 22.)</p> <p>3. In an interference proceeding, where the rights of one of the parties to make the claims depends upon the words of the issue, “a governor controlling both valves,” and it appeared that while the governor of his device possibly did not directly control both of its valves, it did control one directly and the other indirectly, and that there was no prior art requiring a limitation to be put upon the word “controlling,” thus requiring the broadest construction to be put upon it, it was held that he had the right to make the claims, and was entitled to an award of priority.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing to register a mark as a trademark for flour. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents canceling the registration of a trademark. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents granting the cancelation of the registration of a trademark.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents canceling the registration of a trademark.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dismissing an opposition to an application for registration of a mark as a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from tbe decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents canceling tbe registration of a trademark. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dismissing an opposition to an application for the registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion by tbe appellees to -strike out a statement of tbe evidence in a transcript of the record upon the ground that •it was not presented to the trial court or signed within the time required by the rules of that court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion by appellees to affirm a decree appealed from. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This bill was filed June 8, 1913, by Albert B. Hines against Charles A. Hines, Cora T. Heider, LeBoy Gaddis, Jr., George H. Calvert, Jr., and Allan E. Walker, trustees, to recover the one-third interest in certain lands as heir at law of Abraham F. Hines.

Hearing on an appeal (specially allowed) by the defendant from an ordel’ of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, denying a motion to discontinue an action at law as to tbe amount claimed in excess of a judgment theretofore rendered for the plaintiff.

<p>Poor Suitors; Costs; Statutes.</p> <p>Sections 175, 176, D. C. Code (31 Stat. at L. 1219, chap. 854), relating to the prosecution of suits by poor suitors in courts of original jurisdiction, was repealed by the act of Congress of June 25, 1910 (38 Stat. at L. 866, chap. 435, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1626), permitting the prosecution of suits in such courts, and appeals and writs of error in courts of appellate jurisdiction, upon the filing of affidavits of poverty, without deposit for fees or costs, there being nothing in the latter act to show that the courts of the District of Columbia were to be excluded from its operation. (Citing McGrane v. McCann, 2 App. D. C. 221.)</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia in a suit in equity, dismissing a bill for an injunction; tbe lower court, however, having restrained tbe defendants as prayed during tbe pendency of tbe appeal.</p> <p>Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit in equity begun by Charles I. Burlingame, H. Oscar Huot, and George S. Engle, appellants, -who are hereinafter called plaintiffs; against Arthur Manchester and Harry N. Spooner, appellees, hereinafter called defendants.</p> <p>The suit is to restrain tbe defendants from filing or prosecuting applications in tbe Patent Office for certain claims, and divulging secrets obtained by them from the plaintiffs, and also to prevent them from doing any acts to embarrass or hinder plaintiffs in the prosecution of their claims in the Patent Office.</p> <p>The bill alleges that the said Engle for many years has been engaged in the making and perfecting of a certain invention for a primary electrical battery, which invention involves electro-chemistry, analytical chemistry, and chemical metallurgy, and that for seven years past has prosecuted his said inventions in the city of Cranston in the State of Xihode Island, and has expended thereon large sums of money, to wit, the sum of $32,000 in experimental work, the maintenance of a shop, hiring of mechanics, purchasing of materials, etc., incident to the prosecution and development of his said inventions.</p> <p>That during five or more years past, defendant Spooner has been employed by Engle to assist the said Engle as a general assistant in the development of his said inventions, and that during the period that the said Spooner lias been in the employ of Engle be has been fully paid and recompensed by the said Engle for the work done by him, and that the said Spooner has been taught by the said Engle some electrical knowledge, so as to enable him to set up and demonstrate parts of the said primary battery; and that all work and services performed by the said Spooner for the said Engle have been entirely under the direction of the said Engle as an assistant to the said Engle, and of an auxiliary and ancillary character, and have been a mere aid in tbe development of the original ideas of the said Engle; and that the defendant Manchester, who has some chemical knowledge, has been employed for the three months past to assist the said Engle in the thickening of a certain fluid used in his said inventions; and that all the materials used by either of the said defendants were provided by the said Engle; and that tbe said work performed by defendant Manchester "was fully paid for by said Engle, and was wholly confined to the developing of the original ideas of the said Engle.</p> <p>That in, to wit, the month of June, 193 2, the said Spooner and the said Manchester, while in the employment of the said Engle, respectively represented to Huot and to Burlingame that the said Engle was the sole owner of the primary battery and of ideas and inventions embodied in the same, and that the same were of great value and approaching a state of com-( pletion, and urged and persuaded the said Huot and the said Burlingame to advance large sums of money for the further carrying on of the work, and for the perfecting of the' necessary patents upon the said inventions, and they further represented that the said Engle was a man of honesty of purpose, and reliable, and that they, the said Huot and Burlingame, would be perfectly safe in investing their money, and that the said Engle had applied for and been granted other patents, and was about to make further applications for further patents upon the same inventions; and that the said-Huot and the said Burlingame, relying upon the statements aforesaid, that the said inventions were the sole property of the said Engle, did in fact invest large sums of money, to wit, the sum of $8,000 in the said inventions; and further the said Spooner witnessed a contract between the said Engle and the said Huot and Burlingame in the month of June, 1912, for the payment of $2,000 by the said Huot and the said Burlingame to said Engle on account of the said inventions; and that in the first week of the month of October last past, the said Engle, who had already applied for jiatents upon certain parts of. the said battery, came to the city of Washington accompanied by the said Manchester, the expenses of the said Manchester being fully paid by the said Engle, and that the said Engle made three applications for further patents in connection with his said inventions, and that the said Manchester was present when the said Engle swore to the three applications in the presence of one Hyer, and nodded assent to the statement of Engle that he, the said Engle, was the sole owner of the said primary battery and all its parts, for the patents upon which the said three last named applications were made. The applications are numbered serially, — Serial No. 724,605; filed October 8, 1912, for primary batteries; Serial No. 724,606, filed October 8, 1912, for double copper oxide plate and process of producing same; ami Serial No. 724,607, filed October 8, 1912, for-process of making alkaline gelatinous electrolyte.</p> <p>Tlie plaintiffs further say that recently, to wit, in tlie present month, notwithstanding the facts hereinbefore set forth, all of which were well known to the said defendants and to* each of them, they, the said defendants, corruptly and fraudulently conspired and agreed together to rob the said Engle of his inventions, and to claim the same for themselves; and they, tlie said defendants, corruptly and fraudulently conspired and agreed to defraud the said Huot and the said Burlingame of the money invested by them, the said Huot and Burlingame, in reliance upon the statements of the said defendants; and that, in pursuance of the said fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy, the said Manchester threatened the said Engle, in substance, that he, the said Manchester, would smash the said Engle’s business, and prevent bis ever doing anything with it, and the said Manchester further stated in the presence of the said Engle that in “Smashing his business,” he, the said Manchester, would make public the secret of the said Engle’s inventions, and would apply for patents for Spooner and himself thereon, if ho could obtain the necessary money, and that he, the said Manchester, would thus cause delay and litigation in the allowance of the applications of the said Engle above referred to; and the said Manchester demanded for himself an interest in the said patents, and an interest in the said patents for Spooner, and in further pursuance of tlie corrupt conspiracy the said Manchester and the said Spooner called upon the said Huot and the said Burlingame together in Burlingame’s office in the city of Providence, and demanded of them the sum of $1,000 for the purpose of obtaining patents in their own names upon the inventions of the said ‘Engle, and the said defendants further threatened that if the said Huot and Burlingame refused the defendants the sum of $1,000, they, the said defendants, would cause the said Huot and Burlingame to lose the sum of $8,000 which they had invested in the said inventions upon the said representations of the defendants; and they further threatened that if they did not obtain the sum of $1,000 from them, the said Huot and Burlingame, they, the said defendants, would procure the sum elsewhere, and that they would proceed to Washington and file applications in their own names for patents upon the inventions of the said Engle, as herein-before set forth; and that in;further pursuance of the said corrupt and fraudulent conspiracy, the said defendants have in fact come to Washington, and are now in the city and District, for the purpose of filing in their own names applications for patents covering the inventions of the said Engle, and thereby to harass, annoy, and defeat the development of the said inventions of the said Engle, Huot, and Burlingame.</p> <p>, Plaintiffs further show that the said inventions of the said Engle of the primary battery are of very great value, and that the said battery is nearing a state of completion, and that the filing of the false and fraudulent applications of the defendants will prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining the necessary money to develop and complete the said inventions, and will, cause a multiplicity of suits to determine the title to the said inventions, and will work irreparable injury to each of the three plaintiffs, and will destroy the value of the investments of the said Iiuot and Burlingame, made in the manner aforesaid; and that the defendants are wholly without means, and are financially irresponsible, and that the said plaintiffs are without remedy at law, and that the said plaintiffs Huot and Burlingame would have no status in the Patent Office to defend and prosecute their interests in the said inventions, and that all of the said plaintiffs, being advised of the corrupt and fraudulent conspiracy, are compelled to seek the relief of the equity court.</p> <p>They pray for a temporary restraining order to issue enjoining each of the defendants from filing and prosecuting applications in the Patent Office for any claims to inventions set forth in the applications numbered 724,605, 724,606, and 724,-607, filed on October 8, 1912, and further enjoining them and each of them from divulging any secrets obtained from the plaintiffs, and further enjoining and restraining the said defendants, their agents, assigns, and attorneys, from doing acts to embarrass or hinder the said plaintiffs in the prosecution of their said claims numbered as aforesaid, until further order of this honorable court; and that upon final hearing the said temporary restraining order be made permanent. And also a prayer for general relief.</p> <p>On the same day the restraining order was issued as prayed and an injunction undertaking approved and filed.</p> <p>Subpcenas for the defendants were returned not found.</p> <p>January 20, 1913, cotmsel for defendants entered a special appearance for the purpose of moving to quash the subpoena, and to vacate and set aside the order directing the restraining order to issue.</p> <p>On the same day, specially appearing by attorneys, they moved that the subpoena issued against the defendants be quashed, and, second, that the order directing the restraining order against them be vacated and set aside.</p> <p>The court denied this motion January 31, 1913, and 'held that the motions therein are equivalent to a general appearance by the defendants; wherefore they were given ten days within which to plead.</p> <p>Defendants answered denying the specific allegations of the bill, and specially denying that Engle had invented said battery, or that defendants had been employed by him to assist, as general assistants, or had been paid by him, or had been taught any electrical knowledge by him, or that any work had been performed under the direction of said Engle, or that they had been engaged in the development of any original ideas of the said Engle.</p> <p>They deny that they advised the said Huot and Burlingame to advance any sums of money for the further carrying on of the work, and for the perfecting of the necessary patents upon said inventions; and they deny that by any representations of theirs the said Huot and Burlingame made any advances to said Engle.</p> <p>They admit that defendant Spooner witnessed a contract between the said Engle and the said Huot and Burlingame in the month of June, 1912, for the payment of $2,000 by said Huot and Burlingame to said Engle, but deny that the said contract had relation to any invention of said Engle.</p> <p>They admit that in or about the first week of October, 1912, -the said Engle and the said Manchester went to the city of Washington, as in said bill of complaint alleged, but deny that -the expenses of said Manchester on that occasion were fully paid for and borne by said Engle. They admit that on the occasion of the trip to Washington, said Engle made three applications for patents through James L. Norris, a patent attorney of the said city, and' that in the presence of said Manchester said Engle swore to said three applications, same being those mentioned in the bill of complaint. They deny said Manchester ever assented to any statement of the said Engle that he, the said Engle, was the sole owner of the said primary battery or of any of its parts covered by the said three applications, or any one of them; and they particularly deny that in the office of Mr. Norris, where said three applications were prepared, the said Manchester, in the presence of one Hyer, nodded assent to the statement of said Engle that he, the said Engle, was the sole owner of the primary battery and all of its parts, set forth in said three applications; and they deny that at any time the said Manchester declared or admitted that the said Engle was the inventor of anything embodied in any of said applications.</p> <p>They deny any disclosure of the subject-matter of either of the said three applications by the said Engle to 'them, or either of them.</p> <p>They deny the charge of conspiracy to attempt to rob Engle of any of his inventions, or to defraud the said Huot and the said Burlingame of the money invested by them. They deny that they threatened to smash the said Engle’s business, or that the said Manchester would make public the secrets of the inventions of said Engle, or would apply for patents in the name of defendant Spooner and himself thereon, or that he would cause delay and litigation in the allowance of the patent to said Engle. They deny that defendant Manchester demanded from said Eng’le for himself and Spooner an interest in any patents to be secured by said Engle.</p> <p>They say that they have jointly and severally been associated with the said Engle in the development of certain inventions of their own in which the said Engle has taken no inventive part, and because of the association of these defendants with' said Engle in the development of the said inventions of these defendants, the said Engle has presumed not only to be the sole owner of said inventions, but the sole inventor of them, and has filed in the United States Patent Office, in his own name, the three applications covering the said inventions set forth in the bill of complaint. They further say that while it was known to them, the said defendants, that the said Engle was to apply for patents for the said inventions, they thought, being then ignorant of the patent laws and of the rights and duties of inventors thereunder, that such procedure was proper in view of the community of interests that they and the said Engle had in said inventions; and it was not until after the said applications had been thus filed by said Engle in his own name that they discovered that valid patents could not be granted upon said inventions except upon applications made in the names of the true inventors; whereupon, and before the filing of the bill of complaint in this cause, they caused to be prepared and filed in their own names an application for patent covering the said inventions included in the said three applications filed by said Engle, the said application filed by these defendants being known and designated as Serial No. 736,909, and filed in the Patent Office of the United States on the 16th day of December, 1912, and being entitled “An Improvement in Batteries.”</p> <p>Testimony was taken in the case, and on final hearing, November 7, 1913, a decree was rendered dismissing the bill at plaintiffs’ cost. It was also ordered that during the pendency of the appeal, and until the determination of the questions presented thereby, the defendants be and are hereby restrained from divulging otherwise than in the prosecution of their claims for letters patent, any secrets obtained from the plaintiffs herein, and the defendants are further restrained from doing any act to embarrass or hinder the plaintiffs otherwise than aforesaid.</p> <p>This appeal is taken by plaintiffs from that decree.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by a garnishee from a judgment of condemnation of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the judgment having been entered after an oral examination of the garnishee.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiffs from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia entered upon an agreed statement of facts, in an action against attorneys to recover tbe price of tbe printing of briefs ordered by them.

<p>Pleading; Variance; Exchange.</p> <p>Where, in a action to recover a balance claimed to be due_ the plaintiff from the defendants on an exchange of properties, the plaintiff claimed in her declaration that under a change of the original contract of exchange, which change had been agreed upon by herself and the defendants, the transaction was to have been consummated so as to entitle her to the balance claimed, but her evidence showed that the change contemplated was abandoned, as indicated by her act in carrying out the transaction in accordance with the original contract, the effect of which was to leave no balance due her, it was held that the trial court erred in overruling a motion by the defendants to direct a verdict in their favor, on the ground that there was a fatal variance between the plaintiff’s allegations and proof.</p>

Hearing on two separate appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: These are appeals from the decision of the Commisioner of Patents in an interference proceeding involving an improvement in rotary web printing presses. The issues are embraced in the following two counts: “1.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing an action to recover damages for personal injuries, a demurrer to the declaration having been sustained, and the plaintiff having elected not to amend. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries, brought by Anna Connor against the Washington Railway & Electric Company.

Hearing oh an appeal by the surety on an undertaking given to secure the release of attached property, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered for the plaintiff after a motion by the surety to quash the attachment, on the ground that the affidavits in support of the writ were defective, had been overruled.

<p>Statutes ; Repeals ; Extra Compensation for Municipal Court Judges .</p> <p>1. Repeals by implication are not .favored, and when two statutes cover in whole or in part the same matter, it is the duty of the court to give effect to both, unless they are irreconcilable.</p> <p>2. While the annual appropriation acts of Congress appropriating money for expenditures authorized by other acts are not controlling, in the determination of the construction to be placed upon the latter acts, they are proper to be considered when they indicate the contemporaneous construction placed upon such acts by Congress.</p> <p>3. Tlie act of Congress of February 17, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 023, chap. 134), creating the municipal court of the District of Columbia, and providing that it shall be constituted of the existing justices of the peace, with the power on the part of any one of the judges of the supreme court of the District of Columbia to designate one of the municipal court judges to act as judge of the juvenile court in event of the sickness or disability of the latter judge, did not by implication repeal sec. 3 of the act of Congress of March 19, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 73, chap. 960), providing that a justice of the peace might be so designated to act as judge of the juvenile court under a similar condition, in which event he should be entitled to receive .$5 per day in addition to his salary as justice of the peace; and therefore a municipal court judge so acting is entitled to such extra compensation.</p>

<p>Patents,- Amendments.</p> <p>' Permission to an applicant to amend by presenting new and broader claims is properly refused by the Patent Office, when the amendment is sought to be made after the dissolution of an interference between his and another application. Amendments must be made during the time fixed by rule 109 of the Patent Office, or when a motion for dissolution is made, — not later than that time.</p>

Hearing oh an appeal by the District of Columbia from an order of the Supreme Court of the District dismissing its petition for the condemnation of land.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for the plaintiff, a demurrer to the declaration having been overruled, and the defendant having declined to further plead. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appellee, George Koehler, brought suit in the supreme court of the District of Columbia to recover from defendant, Mary A. I1'owler, the value of an alleged interest in a party wall.

<p>Hkaiung on an appeal by tbe defendants from a judgment of the Supreme Court of tlie District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for false arrest and imprisonment.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is ■ an action for false arrest and imprisonment brought by Jackson G. Parry, an infant, by his next friend, Richard L. Parry, against Harry R. Carroll and Louis D. Carroll, composing the Carroll Electric Company, charging in a declaration in three counts substantially that, for no reasonable or probable cause the defendants caused the plaintiff to be arrested upon the false charge of larceny, and caused the police officer to take the plaintiff under such arrest to Number 1 Precinct Station; and there detained for the space of two days, after which he was discharged from imprisonment. The plaintiff alleges he was brought into public scandal, infamy, and disgrace, and suffered and underwent great pain both of body and mind; claims $10,-000 damages.</p> <p>Defendants pleaded not guilty, and facts constituting probable cause for the arrest.</p> <p>Plaintiff testified that he had lived in Washington all his life, and had been employed by defendants fo1* ten months, and was in charge of their electrical supply store and store-room, receiving a salary of $40 per month. That the defendants were copartners. That on January 6, 1912. Detectives Springman and O’Brien brought Arthur Tyler, a colored driver employed by the defendants, into the defendants’ store and took him tipstairs; that later plaintiff was sent for, and upon arriving Louis D. Oar-roll, one of the defendants, asked Tyler if tin plaintiff knew anything about the stealing of the defendants’ cable from the wavhouse. That Tyler replied “No, nothing at all.”</p> <p>Plaintiff was then asked how long it had been since he had been at the warehouse, and he said, “A month or so.” “Q. You don’t know anything about this colored fellow being crooked ? A. No, sir.” Plaintiff was then sent down stairs again. In about half an hour he was called upstairs again, and Louis Carroll asked the driver, Arthur Tjder, “Are you positively sure j\!r. Jackson (meaning plaintiff) knew nothing of this affair ?” Tyler answered “No, sir.” The driver was asked again by Louis Carroll, “Are you-sure and the driver replied “No, sir, lie doesn’t know anything about it. Plaintiff then turned to Ilarry Carroll, and said, “'Mr. Carroll, do you think I am guilty ?” and Ilarry Carroll said, “I don’t know,” and plaintiff said, “Whoever says so is a liar,” and Ilarry Carroll said “I will prove that.” Plaintiff then went down stairs and resumed his duties. About 4:30 o’clock Louis Carroll went out, and left a man there in charge, and locked the door; left a Mr. Tyler there to see that plaintiff did not run away; that plaintiff knew that Mr. Tyler was there to watch him to see that he did not run away, because Tyler said nothing, but walked up and down the floor all time he was there, until Louis Carroll came back with a bicycle policeman, and locked the door behind him, and said to plaintiff, “I want you,” and plaintiff said, “What do you want me for ?” and Louis Carroll said, “They say you are in it, all of them say you are in it,” and plaintiff said, “I don’t know anything about it. I will go down and tell you or anybody else you want to have investigate this thing,” and plaintiff said, “You ought to know me, I have worked for you people too long and handled too much of your stuff to be accused of anything of this kind.” That lie was taken away from the place of business of the defendants by a bicycle policeman named Connors, and to Number One Precinct, where lie was searched and everything taken from him; he was put behind the bars, and about 9 o’clock at night he was taken out of his cell into a room, and questioned by Detectives Spring-man and O’-Brien in the presence of the Carroll Brothers and Arthur Tyler, and the colored man said to plaintiff, “You know something about it,” and the detectives began questioning Arthur Tyler about his movements the morning the cable was stolen, and then Arthur Tyler was taken away, and .Detective O’Brien said to plaintiff, “Jackson, do you deny all these allegations?” to which plaintiff said, “Yes, sir,” and he said, “You know absolutely nothing about this thing?” and plaintiff replied “No, sir,” and asked Harry Carroll if he was going to hold him for this thing, and Carroll replied “Sure, I am going to hold you.” He pulled plaintiff in the toilet room, and said, “Now, Jack, if you ’fess up we will turn you loose,” and plaintiff said “No, I will not ’fess up to a lie, and I will not own up to a crooked lie,” and thereupon plaintiff was put' back in the cell and remained there from Saturday night until Monday morning; that plaintiff suffered in the cell from cold, and plaintiff asked for bedclothes to keep him warm, but suffered from cold for want of adequate bedclothes ; that at about 12 o’clock at night a prisoner was brought in and put in the cell with plaintiff, making the situation more disagreeable; that he asked Detectives Springman and O’Brien to notify his people, but no one notified his father or mother, who found him in a cell on Monday morning and tried to get him out. That he was taken to the police court between Detectives Springman and O’Brien, and marched up the street from the First Police Precinct on Twelfth street to the police court on D; that when first arrested by Policeman Connors he was marched down Twelfth street, with Connors on one side and one of the Carrolls on the other, and put in a cell at the First Precinct; that he was in charge of Detective Spring-man at the police court, and was released without being tried; that plaintiff never went back into the employ of the defendants; that after his arrest he was out of employment for four months.</p> <p>Cross-examination: He testified that prior to his arrest his relations with the Carrolls seemed to be friendly, and that he had no trouble with them, and they were satisfied with his work; that he had carried the keys to the store and warehouse until they had moved to the new store, and that he did not have the keys to the warehouse after that; they were hung on a nail beside him by Loiiis Carroll, who put the nail up and hung the key there, and that after the Carroll Brothers moved into the Twelfth street store the key to the warehouse was in the custody of whoever was in the store at the time, and Louis Carroll and his brother both had duplicate keys to the warehouse and every place in the building. He further testified that the keys were under his charge. They were put on a nail beside him.</p> <p>Patrick O’Brien for plaintiff testified that he was. a detective sergeant on the Metropolitan Police Force; that Louis Carroll called at detective headquarters, and reported that his goods were being stolen, and that witness and Springman were assigned to the case; that they followed Tyler, the driver, and found where he had sold goods stolen by him from the defendants ; that they arrested him and brought him to the defendants’ store, where he admitted that he had been stealing and selling the goods; that he and Springman in the presence of the defendants asked Tyler if the plaintiff was connected with the stealing, and Tyler replied in the negative. Then witness told Mr. Carroll he would not arrest the boy. Had nothing against him. Insisted that his attorney told him that he would have to to refuse to arrest anybody, he said on suspicion. He had nothing to do with the arrest of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Springman testified that he and O’Brien were detailed to watch Tyler, who was under suspicion of stealing lead cable and electrical fixtures from the defendants’ store; that they arrested Tyler on January 6, 1912, took him to defendant’s store, where he confessed to stealing their goods from the warehouse. O’Brien brought the plaintiff up, and Tyler positively stated that defendant had nothing to do with the stealing.</p> <p>Joseph Carter, a police sergeant, said he was acting as chief inspector, on January (5, 1912, and received a telephone message purporting to come from the defendants’ store to the effect that Tyler had made a confession, implicating the plaintiff in the stealing, and requesting that the plaintiff be arrested; that he informed the person calling that it was Springman and O’Brien's case, and that he would get into communication with them. He did not authorize anyone to make the arrest.</p> <p>Joseph A. Connors testified that he was a bicycle police officer at Nunber One Station. That Officer Edwards, acting on orders from police headquarters given him by Sergeant Carter, had instructed him to go with Louis Carroll to his store, and arrest plaintiff. Carroll and he went to the defendants’ store, and Carroll pointed out plaintiff, stating that he was the man he wanted arrested. That plaintiff denied having anything to do with the stealing, and voluntarily went with him and Louis Carroll to Number One Police Station, where Carroll put a charge of larceny against the plaintiff on the blotter; that the arrest was made without a warrant.</p> <p>Richard LeRoy Parry, plaintiff’s father, was introduced as a withness. He was asked by his counsel.</p> <p>Q. Did you get a telephone message upon the evening of January 6th, 1912, relative to your son?</p> <p>A. Yes, sir, between 7 and 8 o’clock.</p> <p>Q. From whom was this message ?</p> <p>A. From Mr. Carroll’s office, but who directly sent the message, I don’t know.</p> <p>Q. Was it a man talking over the phone ?</p> <p>A. Yes, sir, it was a man’s voice.</p> <p>Q. Who did this party represent himself to be ?</p> <p>Counsel for the defendants objected to the witness stating this telephone communication unless he could identify the defendant, or one of the defendants, as the party talking ever the phone. The court overruled the objection, and exception was noted.</p> <p>Counsel proceeded with the interrogation.</p> <p>Q. Who did the party at the telephone represent himself to . be ?</p> <p>A. From Mr. Carroll’s office.</p> <p>Q. Who did the party talking to you over the telephone say he .was ?</p> <p>■A. He did not say.</p> <p>The court asked:</p> <p>Q. What was the call, what did he say to you over the telephone ?</p> <p>A. He called up and said Jackson would be working late that evening.</p> <p>Counsel said, that is his son, the plaintiff.</p> <p>Q. Tell what this voice said over the telephone ?</p> <p>A. He said that Jackson would be working late, and would be late getting in. Of course, we had had him late home to supper before. He was late getting home before, and we thought nothing of it.</p> <p>Q. Did you know the voice, or do you know the voice of-either of the Carrolls ?</p> <p>A. I do not know one of them when I see them. I do not know a thing- about their voices.</p> <p>That on the day following, which was Sunday morning, witness called up the office of Carroll Brothers, and asked for Mr. Carroll, and someone talked with him on the phone in a man’s voice; did not know who was talking, but it was the voice of the person who answered the phone; that witness inquired about his son, saying, “Have you seen Jackson this morning? Is he still at work?” and the man’s voice said he supposed so. Witness did not know whether the voice said he was working or not, but took it for granted he was, and thereupon remarked that “it is rather hard to work all day Saturday and Saturday night and then work Sunday, and if it is his own choice, I have no word to say about it;” and it was between 8 and 9 Sunday night before witness knew that his son, the plaintiff, was under arrest, and he received the notice of his son’s arrest at that time from the office of Carroll Brothers.</p> <p>Plaintiff closed, and one of the defendants, Harry B. Carroll, testified that Tyler -was arrested by Spring-man and O’Brien, and brought to his store, and asked if any other employee was implicated with him in the stealing; that neither he nor Louis Carroll asked him anything about plaintiff’s connection with the stealing; that he did not request O’Brien or any other person to arrest plaintiff ; that he did not state that Mr. Higgs had told him that the officer -would be compelled to arrest any person he desired arrested; that he never at any time ordered or authorized the plaintiff’s arrest; that Tyler stole cable from his store to the value of $85, for which offense lie was arrested. That plaintiff had the custody of the key to the warehouse from which the goods wrere stolen.</p> <p>On cross-examination he said thatx>n the statement of Tyler he believed plaintiff to be guilty of participating in the crime with Tyler; that he did not prosecute plaintiff in the police court, because Officer O’Brien told him Tyler bad denied what he had previously said respecting plaintiff’s guilt; that he did not telephone plaintiff’s father on January 6th; 1912; that he and his brother, Louis Carroll,. were under the impression all the time that the police department was conducting the case, as they had applied to it for assistance in detecting the person guilty of stealing their goods; that neither O’Brien nor Spring-man ever told him there was no evidence against the plaintiff upon which to base his arrest. That plaintiff had been working for the firm for eight or nine months; that he was an absolutely satisfactory clerk, and that the witness had always found him honest; that he knew that the plaintiff had a father who would be interested in the arrest of the plaintiff, but that he did not telephone him on Saturday, but did telephone him on Sunday of his son’s arrest; telephoned plaintiff’s father between 10 and 12 o’clock Sunday morning, and told him that his boy was in trouble, but did not mention the kind of trouble; that plaintiff had told the witness that he did not have anything to do with the stealing, but that after that witness made no effort to have the plaintiff released. After the plaintiff was released the witness told the plaintiff that he might have his position if he wished it.</p> <p>Defendant Louis D. Carroll testified that Springman and O’Brien were endeavoring to ascertain the persons who were stealing their goods; that on the morning of January 6th, 1912, he, in order to assist them, followed Tyler, saw him approach their warehouse, take out a key, unlock the door of the warehouse and enter, and shortly afterwards reappear with cable belonging to the defendants of the value of $80; that plaintiff was the sole custodian of the.key to the warehouse; that Tyler was arrested and brought into their store; nothing was said at the store concerning plaintiff’s connection with the crime; during the afternoon of January 6th, 1912, a Mr. Schlegel came into the defendants’ store and stated he had been to Number One Police Station to see Tyler, who was being held there for stealing defendants’ cable, and that Tyler had stated that the plaintiff was implicated in the crime, and that, acting on this information, he went to see Tyler, and was told by him that plaintiff and he had divided the proceeds of the crime; and that after the confession of Tyler, Officer Edwards directed Officer Connors to arrest plaintiff; that he accompanied Connors to the store and pointed out the plaintiff. That he did not order his arrest. Did not call plaintiff’s father over the telephone on January 6, 1912.</p> <p>Cross-examined, he said that when the colored boy Tyler was sent to the warehouse by the plaintiff, there was no objection to Tyler having the keys of the warehouse, and that for any proper purpose the plaintiff had a right to give Tyler the keys to the warehouse. When asked if he did not place on the blotter at Number One Precinct a charge of larceny against the plaintiff, witness answered, “I cannot recall that I- did. Does the record show it ? ” That he saw plaintiff on Saturday at the police precinct; that he did not at any time after the arrest of plaintiff notify plaintiff’s father or call up the house where plaintiff and his father lived. Plaintiff had worked for him about eleven months. Did not know that a charge of larceny had been made against the plaintiff on the blotter at Number One Precinct.</p> <p>Harry E. Schlegel testified that he had some business with Tyler, and learned he was locked up at Number One Police Precinct; that he called there, saw Tyler, aud was told by him that a young white man was implicated with him in the stealing of defendants’ goods, and that this young white man had fixed the stuff so he could get it; that he communicated this fact to Louis D. Carroll.</p> <p>Arthur Tyler testified that he was formerly employed by defendants; that after he was arrested for stealing their goods, he was locked up in Number One Police Station, and Mr. Schlegel called to see him; that afterwards Louis D. Carrol! called, and witness told him that witness and the plaintiff were acting together in stealing the cable; that he stole the cable from the warehouse, and got the key from the plaintiff; and thal plaintiff was the only one who had the custody of the key.</p> <p>Cross-examined, he said that Parry was in with him.</p> <p>Q. TIow was he in with you ?</p> <p>A. We were both working together on this stuff.</p> <p>William J. Kerns testified that he was a police officer stationed at Number One Police Station; that Louis Carroll called at the station between 3 and 4 o’clock January 6th, 1912, that he and Carroll went to Tyler’s cell, and that Tyler then and there confessed that he had been stealing defendants’ goods, and that he and the plaintiff were acting together in dividing the spoils.</p> <p>Louis IT. Edwards, police officer, stated that Louis D. Carroll called at the station, and asked for the arrest of the plaintiff; that he called up Sergeant Carter, who asked if he had heard the confession of Tyler; upon his answering no, he left the phone and talked with Tyler, and then went back to the phone, and told Carter that he had talked with Tyler, who had stated that plaintiff was his confederate in the crime. Carter ordered plaintiff’s arrest, and that, acting on the authority of Carter, he directed plaintiff’s arrest.</p> <p>On cross-examination witness said he had never seen Louis Carroll before January 6, 1912, and that Carroll came to the station that day for an officer to go to his place of business and arrest the plaintiff. That was the first he knew about the ease.</p> <p>In rebuttal, plaintiff offered Edwin B. Hess, who testified that he was chief clerk of the Police Department. He was shown a book, and stated it was a record of the arrests kept in the detective bureau at police headquarters. That he had a record there of the arrest of Arthur Tyler. This is a book of original entry. Witness is in charge of the records. Did not make the entry. His attention was called to an entry dated January 6th, 2.20 p. m., “Arthur Tyler, 1912 Tenth street, was arrested on charge of petit larceny, 24, black, H. S., married, can read and write, complainant Louis Carroll, 514 Twelfth street, N. W. Officers Springman and O’Brien.”</p> <p>Shown another record that Arthur Tyler was convicted of larceny in eight other cases arising out of the same offense. lie was then asked to look for the name of Parry. He said, “I find on January 6th, at 6 o’clock p. m. Jackson G. Parry.” Memorandum is “Jackson G. Parry, 712 P street N. W., arrested on charge of grand larceny, 20 years old, white, U. S. clerk, single, can read and write, complainant Louis D. Carroll, 514- Twelfth street N. W. Officers Springman and O’Brien, disposition dismissed.”</p> <p>Asked who was the prosecutor or complainant in each case, he said Louis D. Carroll.</p> <p>.Defendants objected to the introduction of this record, because it was not shown to be made by them or either of them.</p> <p>Jackson G. Parry, being recalled, testified that the colored boy Tyler had stated to him that he got in the warehouse to steal the cable by pulling the staple, and that Tyler had made this statement in the presence of both of the defendants, Ilarry and Louis Carroll.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for $5,000. On motion for new trial, the plaintiff consented to a remittitur of $2,500. The motion was overruled, and judgment entered for that amount. Defendants have appealed.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference; Diligence.</p> <p>I. Where in an interference proceeding the junior party relied upon a former application as showing constructive reduction to practice, it was held that the drawings attached to that application did not clearly disclose the invention as claimed, and that his conduct after the filing of his earlier application, in negotiating the purchase of the invention of a third party, and assisting him in an interference which had been declared between the latter and the senior party, indicated that the junior party knew his earlier application did not disclose the issue.</p> <p>2. Where one of the parties to an interference was the first to conceive, but the last to reduce to practice, he is not entitled to an award of priority, unless he shows that he was diligent at the time the other party entered the field.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an interference proceeding having the following issue in three counts: “1.

Hkartng- on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents sustaining an opposition to an application for tbe registration of tbe word “Mazda” as a trademark for incandescent gas mantles. The facts are stated in tlie opinion.

<p>Patents; Interference; Divisional Applications; Evidence; Master and Servant; Originality.</p> <p>1. In an interference involving an improvement in automobile tire casings, in which one of the applicants relied upon an earlier application filed prior to the issuance of a patent to his rival, as divisional of his later application, it was held that one of the claims of the earlier application constituted the broad claim of the invention of the issue, and therefore the earlier applicant had only the burden of establishing his case by a preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Where it appeared that one of the parties to an interference involving an improvement in automobile tire casings employed the other to make a tire for him; that the employee wrote to his employer that he would do so, but would not assume any responsibility for the wear and stability of the work, as it was entirely experimental, and thereupon made three casings which embodied the invention of the issue; and that the employer then organized a company for the manufacture of the casings,- — it was held that the emplower was entitled to ,an award of priority, although the employee was the first to file his application.</p>

<p>IIkarino on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as an equity court, dismissing a bill to require the Secretary of the Interior to cause to be paid to the plaintiffs the accumulated rents and profits of certain Indian lands, and directing him to carry into effect a former decision by him relating to the right of the plaintiffs in such lands.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as an equity court, granting the relief prayed for in the bill for the appointment of a receiver and for an injunction.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>Appellee, Albert J. Lee, brought this suit by bill in equity in the supreme court ’of the District of Columbia against appellant, Webster Ballinger,- alleging that, in August, 1907, plaintiff and defendant entered into a -written partnership agreement to prosecute certain claims to an interest in the common property belonging to the Chickasaw and Choctaw Tribes of Indians, which contract was subsequently extended by parol agreement to include the prosecution of similar claims to the common property of the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Indian Tribes.</p> <p>The partnership contract, after reciting a number of inducements, is embraced substantially in the following provisions: “In consideration of the services rendered by the said Webster Ballinger as hereinabove mentioned, and in consideration of the separate undertakings hereinafter agreed upon, Albert J. Lee and Webster Ballinger, the parties hereto, have this day formed this partnership agreement for the purpose of prosecuting as attorneys at law the claims of all the persons now represented by Albert J. Lee, and such additional persons claiming any rights of whatsoever nature in the common property of the Choctaws and Chiekasaws resulting from the grant made to the Choctaws under and by virtue of the treaty of September 27th, 1830, between the Choctaws and the United States, as may contract with said Ballinger & Lee, or either of them, for their services.”</p> <p>The agreement then provided that the contracts should be taken in the name of Ballinger & Lee. It prohibited any assignment of an interest in the fees, except upon the written consent of the partners. It further provided “that all checks, drafts, notes, or other negotiable instruments received by said firm shall be indorsed in the firm name by Albert J. Lee, and no check, draft, or other negotiable paper shall be deposited in any bank or other institution for collection without first being countersigned by said Albert J. Lee, and all moneys received or collected by either of the parties to this contract, their agents or representatives, derived from any contracts of employment taken by said firm, shall be deposited in such bank as may be mutually agreed upon, to the credit of Ballinger & Lee, the same to be disbxirsed or paid out only upon the check of said Ballinger & Lee, when countersigned by Albert J. Lee.” Provision was also made for the keeping of books of account and for a general accounting every six months.</p> <p>It is alleged in the bill that, as a result of their parol agreement, “during the prosecution of the claims of said Choctaw and Chickasaw claimants the said firm became aware thereof and interested in similar claims of citizens of the United States with rights to share in the privileges and property of the Oherokees, Creeks, and Seminole tribes or nations of Indians; and their contract of copartnership was, by mutual consent, so broadened in its scope as to embrace and include the same.”</p> <p>The services of the firm in prosecuting these claims before Congress and the courts are detailed at length in the bill, which services, it is alleged, resulting in the enactment of a law by Congress whereby “provision was made for the recognition of and payment to certain of the clients of the firm of the plaintiff and the defendant, as well also as other persons belonging to classes of claimants in whose interest and behalf said firm had succeeded in securing, by Congress, the recognition of their rights.”</p> <p>By the act of Congress of June 30, 1913 (38 Stat. at L. 97, chap. 4-, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 4077), it was provided: “No contract made with any Indian, where such contract relates to the tribal funds or property in the hands of the United States, shall be valid, nor shall any payment for services rendered in relation thereto be made unless the consent of the United States has previously been given.”</p> <p>By the act of Congress approved August 1, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 601, chap. 222), provision was made for the enrolment on the proper respective rolls of the Five Civilized Tribes cei-tain persons, among whom were clients of the firm of Ballinger & lee. The act then provided that, “unless the consent of the United States shall have previously been given, all contracts made with any person, or persons, now or hereafter applicants for enrolment as citizens in the Five Civilized Tribes for compensation for services in relation thereto, are hereby declared to be void and of no effect, and the collection or receipt of any moneys from any such applicants for citizenship shall constitute an offense against the laws of the United States, punishable by a fine of not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for not exceeding-six months, or both.”</p> <p>It was also provided (38 Stat. at L. 600, chap. 222) “that the Secretary of the Interior is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to determine whether any attorney or attorneys have actually rendered services of value to any of the persons herein enrolled, and to allow compensation therefor, including- proper and necessary expenses incurred in connection with services rendered, in such amounts as he may deem proper, and to pay the amount so fixed and found to be due such attorney or attorneys and deduct the same from the amount paid to the person enrolled as herein authorized, by and with his consent and approval: Provided, That before payment is made to any attorney or attorneys there shall be filed a receipt in full of all claims or demands on the part of such attorney or attorneys in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.”</p> <p>In pursuance of this act, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated certain rules and regulations, among which was the following: “Before any compensation and expenses are allowed any attorney or attorneys, * * * said attorney or °attorneys must, within thirty days from the date of the approval of these regulations, file with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, District of Columbia, the contract or agreement entered into with such enrolled person or persons, or someone lawfully authorized to act for him or her, setting forth what compensation was to be paid thereunder to such attorney or attorneys, for sei-vices rendered in his or her behalf, or other written evidence sufficient to establish an implied contract to ' pay for such services, together with a verified itemized statement of services rendered and expenses incurred, giving the character and extent of such services and expenditures, and the dates when, and the places where, same were rendered.”</p> <p>The material allegations of the bill, however, upon which plaintiff must stand or fall, read as follows:</p> <p>“Fifteenth. That, although no formal claim has yet been filed by the defendant under and pursuant to the terms of said regulations of the Interior Department, defendant has advised the plaintiff that it is his purpose, in the presentation of the claim, to ignore the copartnership claims and the rights of the plaintiff and the subcontractors of the firm of the plaintiff and the defendant thereunder; and to stand as an individual for such compensation as he may be enabled to secure by way of award to defendant as such individual; and that the defendant has further advised the plaintiff that he would contend, in filing and prosecuting said claim, that he individually had secured the passage of the remedial legislation, and that he, and he alone, was entitled to any and all compensation which might be awarded in consideration for the professional services performed in the interest of the Indian claimants.</p> <p>“Sixteenth. That there is in the possession of the defendant the books, papers, and documents of the firm, including the contracts with the Indian claimants, required by the regulations to be filed with the application for compensation of counsel; that without said documents, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to properly comply with the regulations in making’ the application on behalf of the firm for compensation; that the defendant denies to plaintiff access to said firm records and contracts; that even if the plaintiff were in position to present such claim without the aid of said records, it would be greatly to the detriment to all concerned for the matter to be presented to the Department by contending factions of the same legal entity, alone entitled to the ultimate result of such award as the Secretary of the Interior may make, it being manifestly to the interest of all concerned that, without schismatic spirit or division, the claim of said firm, including all elements thereof, should be presented in a manner in consonance with the basic equities and rights on which the claim can properly be presented.”</p> <p>The plaintiff prayed for the appointment of a receiver who should be directed to represent the partnership before the Secretary of the Interior in reference to allowance for services rendered, and to receive the sums allowed therefor; and that defendant be enjoined from interfering in any way with the receiver in relation to said claims, and from setting up or presenting any claim in hostility to said firm.</p> <p>A temporary receiver was appointed, and defendant was directed to show cause why the prayer of the bill should not be granted. The defendant answered the rule, and also moved to dismiss the bill. A hearing was had upon the rule and motion ro dismiss, and the court entered a decree in -accordance with the prayer of the bill. From this decree the case comes here on appeal.</p>

<p>Street Railroads; Transfers; Passengers; Trespassers; Evidence.</p> <p>1. A street railway passenger holding- a transfer, and the conductor to whom it is presented, are bound by what appears on the face of the transfer; and if a mistake has been made by the conductor issuing the transfer, the passenger has his right of action therefor against the company. (Following Shortsleeves v. Capital Traction Co. 28 App. D. C. 365.)</p> <p>2. Where a passenger of a street railway company, holding an overdue transfer, which the conductor to whom he presents it refuses to aceept, persists in declining to pay his faro, until after the conductor has rung his bell and called upon the motorman to assist in ejecting him, and the ear has been stopped for that purpose, the passenger becomes a trespasser, and liis ejection may be completed even if he then oilers to pay his fare. (Citing Shortsleeves v. Capital Traction Co. supra,.)</p> <p>3. Where, in an action by a former passenger of a street railway company against the company for his alleged unlawful ejection from one of the defendant's cars, it is claimed by the plaintiff that he presented an overdue transfer in good faith and within ten minutes after the car liad reached the transfer point, while the company contends that it was not presented until over half an hour after the car reached that point, the regularly kept transportation records of the company, offered by it, are admissible in evidence, to show that twenty-six ears passed the transfer point between the time the ear on which the plaintiff was riding reached that point and the time he boarded the ear from which he was ejected.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in favor of the defendant, entered after the failure of the plaintiff to comply with two orders requiring an amended bill of particulars to be filed.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding and on a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for the defendant, the court, on a motion by the plaintiff for a summary judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, having determined, without considering the sufficiency of the defendant’s affidavit, that the contract sued on was against public policy and void, and that the plaintiff accordingly had no standing in court.

Hearing on an appeal by the United States from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a criminal term, vacating a forfeited recognizance. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appeal by the United States from an order vacating a forfeiture on a bail bond.

IIkarixg on an appeal by tlie petitioner from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the .District of Columbia discharging a rule to show cause issued on the filing of a petition for the writ of mandamus, and dismissing the petition after an answer had been filed thereto. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for mandamus.

Hearing on an appeal by the petitioner from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a petition for the writ of mandamus heard upon a petition, a rule to show cause, and an answer. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing an action to recover damages for personal injuries, a demurrer to the declaration having been sustained, and the plaintiff having elected not to amend. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiffs declaration. The action is in tort.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, in a suit for an accounting.

Hearing on au appeal by the relator from a judgment of the Supreme Oourt of the District of Columbia overruling a demurrer to an answer to a petition for the writ of mandamus, and, the relator electing not to further plead, dismissing the petition.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity against the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin him from compelling the plaintiff to make a deposit for the cost of surveying unsurveyed public lands.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing an action to recover damages for an alleged assault, a demurrer to the declaration baring been sustained and the plaintiff having elected not to amend. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows : This is an action in trespass on the case for damages for an alleged assault.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action of trespass by a tenant against the landlord.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from a judgment for damages for the invasion of plaintiff’s leasehold and injury done his possession. The case was tried upon the fourth count of the declaration, which reads as follows:</p> <p>“The plaintiff, Gelsomino Cerrone, sues the defendant, American Home Life Insurance Company, a corporation having offices and doing business in the District of Columbia, for that the said plaintiff was lawfully possessed of a leasehold interest in the first floor of 503 G street, northwest, city of Washington, District of Columbia, for a period of five years, and had rented the same from the defendant for the purpose of carrying on a barber shop, and had placed in said premises certain fixtures necessary for the purpose of fixing up said premises as a modern barber shop, said fixtures consisting of certain plumbing fixtures, gas fixtures, pipes, aud said premisos iyere in the proper condition for placing therein barber chairs, basins, tables, and everything necessary for a modern barber shop; that while said plaintiff was so lawfully in possession thereof, the said defendant, with force and arms, on the 2d day of December, 1912, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, broke and entered the said premises, destroyed the said fixtures therein, including the said pipes and everything mentioned aforesaid, and since said day aforesaid has continued to keep the said plaintiff out of possession thereof.</p> <p>“Wherefore the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), and plaintiff claims the said sum, besides costs of suit.”</p> <p>Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that he is a barber and entered into negotiations with the defendant for the leasing of premises 503 G street, northwest, and that a lease was executed to him November 15, 1912, for five years from December 1st, at $50 per month, for two and one-half years, and $55 per month for the remaining two and one-half years, with privilege of subletting upon the consent of the lessor. He paid the first month’s rent of $50, and took a receipt therefor and received the lease. He borrowed $500 to fix up his place, paid the plumber $15 for work, and deposited in the gas office $10. He bought fixtures for the shop in the form of barber chairs. The lease was worth every bit of the $50 which he paid. Barber shops in the neighborhood rented for $35 per month. Witness had paid $22.50 for one place. Witness paid $280 for chairs, which he now has stored in his shop to keep them from rotting. That he agreed with the agent of defendant to lease number 507 if he would rent it for $45 per month, otherwise would retain number 503.</p> <p>Other testimony tended to show that plaintiff had leased 503 G street and put up a notice on Saturday night that he would open a barber shop there. On Monday workmen -were tearing-down partitions and the sign was down.</p> <p>Plaintiff offered in evidence a lease executed by the defendant to the White House Lunch Boom people on November 30, 1912, for premises 501, 503, and 505 G street, northwest, for two and one-half years at $180 per month, and the remaining two and one-half years at $200 per month.</p> <p>Counsel for defendant objected to this lease and excepted to its introduction.</p> <p>Defendant’s agent, called by plaintiff, testified that he knew when lie leased the premises to tbe White House Lunch Room people that it would be necessary to move the partition.</p> <p>A plumber testified that he undertook to install a boiler and hot water heater for plaintiff in premises 503 G street, charging $25 for the job. Did not finish the job because defendant’s agent stopped him; was paid $15 for work done.</p> <p>Defendant’s testimony tended to show that he agreed to let plaintiff 503 G street, which had been a drug store; that between 501 and 503 he had run a partition. Agreed to let 501 for $80 per month, and 503 for $50. 505 and 507 were worth $50 each per month. Retween the time that the lease was executed to the White House Lunch Room people and their taking possession, defendant talked with plaintiff about fixing up 507 for him. The White House Lunch Room people were in the corner a week before taking possession of 503. After plaintiff declined to take 507, defendant tendered him $50 back, which he declined, saying he would let defendant out of it for $200, which defendant refused. Premises 503, 505, and 507 were exactly of the same size. 507 had been rented at.$45 per month. Plaintiff had locked the premises 503 when defendant tore out the partition between it and 501. On the trial defendant tendered back the $50 paid by plaintiff, which his counsel received. This had not been claimed as damages in the fourth count.</p> <p>Counsel for defendant requested the court to charge the jury that they could only find nominal damages, because there was no evidence that the lease was worth more than $50 per mouth.</p> <p>The court refused this instruction.</p> <p>The court left to the jury the question of whether the plaintiff’s lease was for 503 or 507, and charged them that the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the leased premises and what plaintiff had agreed to pay. The jury were permitted to find exemplary damages, if they found that defendants had acted in a high-handed way in entering upon 503, and had acted wantonly and with a reckless disregard of the rights of plaintiff. This was objected to also and exception taken.</p> <p>The jury were then instructed to assess the actual damages and exemplary damages in separate sums.</p> <p>They returned a verdict for $650 actual, and $500 exemplary, damages.</p>

Hearing on separate appeals by the respondents from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbiá, sitting as a court of equity, requiring them to account as trustees of a trust estate created by will. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment for damages for -personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents canceling the registration of a trademark. After the docketing of the appeal in this court by the filing of the transcript of the record, the appellee suggested the diminution of the record, and asked and was allowed the writ of certiorari to' the Commissioner of Patents requiring him to transmit to the court the parts of the record set forth in the appellee’s petition.

Hearing on an appeal by the accused from a judgment of conviction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on an indictment of the accused for having had carnal knowledge of an infant. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appellant, Hugh W. Honey, was convicted in the supreme court of the District under an indictment charging him with having carnally known Marian V. Hagan, a girl of twelve years.

Hearing on an appeal by one of two defendants from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This suit was brought in the supreme court of the District of Columbia to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by appellee, Susan Linguist, plaintiff below’.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in an action by a landlord against his tenant to recover possession of the leased premises. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Mary V. Joseph is the owner in fee of lot 34, block 16, in Deanwood Heights,' by purchase from Robert W. Gilliam, and is also the assignee of a lease made by Gilliam to Zantzinger.

Hearing on an appeal by an intervener from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a probate term, made on a petition by the widow of a decedent, authorizing the trustee of the decedent’s estate to make her a loan from the estate, which should be a first charge or lien upon her interest therein.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting the relief sought in a bill in equity to require the defendant to make an abatement of the purchase price of land because of a shortage in the number of acres called for in the deed.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>Appellee, James Sharp, plaintiff below, filed a bill in equity in the supreme court of the District of Columbia seeking an abatement on the purchase price of a farm purchased from appellant, Mary E. Dulin, because of a shortage in the number of acres called for in the deed.</p> <p>It appears that in May, 1911, defendant conveyed to plaintiff a farm in Virginia described in the deed as follows: “All that certain tract or parcel of land, with all improvements thereon and all of the appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, situated in Brentsville magisterial district, Prince William county, 'Virginia, on the road leading from Bristow to Greenwich, and bounded by the Greenwich and Brentsville road, the lands of Michael House, George Hun-ton, and Samuel Simpson and Broad Run, containing 500 acres, more or less.” The consideration in the deed was $15,000, of which $5,000 was paid in cash and the balance in deferred payments.</p> <p>After plaintiff entered into possession of the land and made considerable improvements thereon, he caused a survey to be made, which disclosed a shortage of over 100 acres. Not satisfied with the accuracy of this survey, he had another made, which showed that the farm contained 422 acres, which was 78 acres short of the amount called for in the deed. The court below decreed an abatement of the purchase price for 78 acres at $30 per acre, or $2,340. From the decree defendant has appealed.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by tbe Court, in an action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an action by William F. Roche against the Washington Gas Light Company, a corporation, to recover damages for malicious prosecution. There was a plea of not guilty.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment' of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action by a real estate agent to recover a commission on a sale of the defendant’s land. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is the second appeal by Mortimer DuPerow from a judgment rendered in an action by Leonard W. Groomes to recover commission on the sale of a lot of which DuPerow was the owner1.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of ■the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for an alleged libel. Affirmed on condition that the appellee should remit a part of the judgment recovered.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an áction for damages brought by plaintiff, George W. Ingham, against the A. S. Abell Company, publishers of the Baltimore Sun, for the publication of a libel in that paper December 14, 1912. The publication complained of is as follows :</p> <p>Ingham is Removed.</p> <p>Impending Insurance Scandal in Washington Causes Dismissal.</p> <p>House to Sift Alleged Fraud.</p> <p>Congressman Johnson Introduces Resolution for an Inquiry After Quiet Personal Investigation.</p> <p>(From the Sun Bureau.)</p> <p>Washington, December 13. — A casual inquiry made some months ago by a wary constituent of Representative Ben Johnson, residing at Painesville, Meade county, Kentucky, began an investigation that has ended in an impending insurance scandal, which promises to reach out into high political and.social circles in the District of Columbia.</p> <p>As a culmination of a private inquiry, Mr. Johnson, in his capacity as chairman of the District committee, introduced a resolution to-day providing for a drastic investigation into the affairs of two insurance companies here; and, just as he was taking this action, Commissioner Judson, in the Municipal Building, was signing an order removing from office Superintendent of Insurance Ingham.</p> <p>The resolution will come up under special rule to-morrow, and the House is expected to order an immediate investigation. Developments are expected to entangle a United States Senator, a member of the District bench, an official of the District other than the insurance superintendent, candidates for the inaugural chairmanship, and many others prominent in financial and social affairs here.</p> <p>Mr. Johnson’s resolution provides that the two companies and all their affairs be investigated, and that the same inquiry be made into the affairs of the superintendent of insurance and a firm of Washington real estate brohers. The resolution gives the District of Columbia or any of its subcommittees power to examine the books, records, and documents of all named in the resolution, to appraise their property and examine witnesses in public hearings.</p> <p>Rigid Penalty for Perjury.</p> <p>It provides a rigid penalty for perjury in the case, and specifically provides that no official or private person be called as a witness before the examiners shall be excused from testimony, either because such testimony would incriminate him or because he learned facts as a private counselor or public official.</p> <p>While Mr. Johnson and several of his colleagues were preparing to set the machinery for this inquiry in motion to-day, the atmosphere around the Capitol was tense, and it was no less exciting at. the Municipal Building. It was reported that Commissioner Judson, after signing the order of removal., was informed by one of his associates, Commissioner Cuno Rudolph, that he declined to affix his signature to the order. Mr. J udson was therefore compelled to seek Commissioner John A. Johnston in order that a majority of the Commissioners might sign the order, making it valid. Superintendent Ingham is a nephew of Senator Gallagher, of New Hampshire, chairman of the District committee of the Senate.</p> <p>It is understood that one of the insurance companies is accused of buying a building in Washington, and a few days later having this property appraised for $500,000 more than the purchase price. This inflated value, it is charged, was put into the insurance company as a “surplus” and shares sold upon its guaranty. The names of prominent men were sought and used upon the letter heads, and alluring stock offers sent out hv mail. The success resulting from this campaign was said to be so great that, it is charged, the price of the stock was doubled.</p> <p>Johnson in Quiet Probe.</p> <p>Early in the summer, the Painesville (Kentucky) man wrote Mr. .Johnson asking the Congressman’s advice about the company, and asking for a recommendation concerning an investment in its stock. After an inquiry, Mr. Johnson replied, advising against such an investment, and since that time has been quietly gathering information about the company.</p> <p>A few days ago a prominent Washington financier, who has been seeking from President-elect Wilson the appointment of inaugural chairman, resigned from connection with the company; and another financier, who has been equally active in making a campaign for appointment as inaugural chairman, is said to have been one of tbe original promoters of the venture. All these facts can be proved, according to Mr. Johnson, and the letter heads of the company hear names prominent in congressional judicial, and financial affairs of the District.</p> <p>Plaintiff offered testimony tending to show publication of the foregoing in the Baltimore Sun of December 14, 1912, and that the circulation of the paper on that day was 86,776; that the defendant had an office in the city of Washington from which orders could be had at the Sun Bureau on Fourteenth street; that plaintiff was superintendent of insurance of the District of Columbia; that he knew many people in the city of Washington and the city of Baltimore; that the Commissioner referred to in the above article was Colonel William V. Judson, Engineer Commissioner; that the Municipal Building was the District building where the Commissioners have their offices, and where the office of plaintiff as superintendent of insurance is located; that the Cuno H. Rudolph referred to is the president of the Board of Commissioners. John A. Johnston was the other civilian Commissioner. That there is no Senator Gallagher of New Hampshire, but the article meant Senator Gallinger; that he is not a nephew of Senator Gallinger, but a distant relative; that the Congressman Johnson referred to is Representative Ben Johnson, Chairman of the District committee of the House of Representatives. That plaintiff on his way to his office on December 14, 1912, had his attention called by several persons to the article in the Baltimore Sun, and bought a copy at the first news stand; that it was a great shock when he was told of and saw the article; that plaintiff had never been removed or suspended from office.</p> <p>J. Fred Essary, called by defendant, said he had been correspondent of the Baltimore Sun about three years. While in the press gallery of the House of Representatives he heard the resolution offered by Representative Johnson. This resolution was then read. It contained a recital of a resolution committing to the District committee the investigation of the conduct, management, and affairs of certain fire insurance companies, certain individuals, and to examine the papers, etc., of the superintendent of insurance of the District of Columbia. That after reading the resolution witness made notes of it with the idea of writing an article upon it. That about 7 o’clock that day, Arthur B. Crock, of the Courier Journal, came to witness’s office and told him he had written a story bearing on the investigation, and would relieve him of the trouble of writing it. Crock did this under what is known in Washington as a sort of co-operative arrangement whereby newspaper men work together, it being impossible for one or two men to report all of the business of Washington in a day. Witness read the story and it was printed in next morning’s Sun just as Crock wrote it. Witness did not accept the story, however, without making particular inquiry as to the source of Mr. Crock’s information. lie had no reason to question its accuracy, as he had co-operated with Crock for two or three years and found him to be an intelligent and conscientious newspaper man. Knowing the fact of the investigation, witness asked Crock where his information came from. Crock replied that he had gotten it from Representative Johnson, of Kentucky; he had told him the District Commissioners had suspended Ingham pending the investigation. Witness further read an article communicated by him to the Sun, January 26, 1913, relating to this investigation, and giving an account of the examination of a Washington judge. About the middle of this article appears the following sub-headline :</p> <p>“Tends to Vindicate Ingham.</p> <p>“At the time the report was current t-liat District Insurance Commissioner Ingham had been suspended. This proved later to he untrue, and the more recent developments in the inquiry have tended strongly to vindicate Mr. Ingham.</p> <p>“He was made a target of, it is now believed, for the reason that he was connected -with the family of Senator Gallinger, chairman of the District committee of the Senate.”</p> <p>Witness testified further that at the time he wrote the article of January 26 he had had no complaint from plaintiff or from any source of the article of December 14; that it came to his notice some time after the first article was written; that there was an error in it inasmuch as plaintiff had not been removed pending the investigation, but in the rush of business he had given no attention to the matter until the investigation had proceeded some two or three weeks. lie followed the testimony in the case from the Washington papers, and at the first opportunity wrote his second article with the view of setting right the former error, if one had been committed; felt the impulse to right the injury that had been done plaintiff whether complained of or not.</p> <p>Defendant read a letter from plaintiff’s counsel to O. H. Grasty, president and general manager of the defendant corporation, dated March 3, 1913, in which he called attention to the article announcing the dismissal of plaintiff, and of his employment by plaintiff to bring action for the libel, and inquiring if he desired to make amends or compensation without litigation.</p> <p>A reply to this letter was read, dated March 5, 1913, which said: “If we have done an injustice to Mr. Ingham, as stated in your letter, we shall make thorough correction regardless of ■whether you bring a suit or not. Any such errors in the Sun are made in the effort to print the news, and when we make them it is our settled practice to correct them promptly, frankly, and without reserve, and with -the view of making the fullest reparation possible.”</p> <p>Plaintiff then read the following letter from Grasty to the correspondent Essary:</p> <p>March 5, 1913.</p> <p>My Dear Mr. Essary:—</p> <p>I send you, herewith, copy of letter from Mr. Easby-Smith, together with my reply thereto.</p> <p>Please immediately proceed to investigate this matter, and if the facts are as stated by Mr. Easby-Smith, I want to set his client right, thoroughly and promptly and without any regard to the question of libel suit. Kindly let me hear from you at once in this matter, and if we are in error give me full explanation.</p> <p>Another letter from plaintiff’s counsel to .Grasty, dated March 31, 1913, was to the effect that he had been expecting to hear from him since Mr. West called a couple of weeks before, as to proposition for settlement, and saying that sufficient time had been given, and that lie would be compelled to file suit unless lie heard from him within a few days.</p> <p>Defendant offered in evidence an article which Essary testified was written by him and published in the Baltimore Sun next day, under the following headlines:</p> <p>Mr.' Ingham Exonerated.</p> <p>Congressional Committee Repudiates all Charges Against Him. Effort to Oust Him Railed.</p> <p>Superintendent of Insurance in Washington is Eully Vindicated After Official Investigation.</p> <p>(From the Sun Bureau.)</p> <p>The article contained a statement of the facts about the attack on plaintiff; that the motion to suspend him by Commissioner Judson had failed, and the conclusions of the committee that there can be no serious criticism of plaintiff, and that the accusations should be promptly dismissed.</p> <p>On cross-examination witness Essary testified that he asked Crock where he got his information about plaintiff, and was told that he got it from Representative Johnson; that he specially asked as to plaintiff’s suspension, and -was told that the Commissioners had suspended him; that the article did not state that plaintiff had been removed, but that the headline does so state. The responsibility for the headline rests in the city or news room in Baltimore. That he had nothing to do with the headline of the article, but that the article gives the impression which the headline states.</p> <p>Charles IT. Grasty, for defendant, was president and general manager for the defendant when this matter occurred. Did not know plaintiff, and had no knowledge of the publication until he received the letter from plaintiff’s counsel. That he had no malice or ill-will against plaintiff. Defendant read in evidence from the records of the District Commissioners a motion by Commissioner Judson that the office of superintendent of insurance be declared vacant. This motion was not carried. Also a letter from Grasty to II. West, of the Sun Bureau, in Washington, asking his advice about the letter from plaintiff’s counsel.</p> <p>West testified that he consulted with Essary, called on plaintiff’s counsel and offered to make a correction, and was told that the time had gone by when a correction would be satisfactory. Witness submitted a form of correction to counsel, who said the time had gone by in which it would be satisfactory. Witness wrote a correction, which was published in the Baltimore Sun If arch 22, 1913. This article is as follows:</p> <p>Ingham Still in Office.</p> <p>Superintendent of Insurance Not Bcmoved as Stated in the Sun.</p> <p>The attention of the Sun has been called to the fact that in its issue of December 14, 1912, in a report of the recent congressional investigation of two insurance companies of the District of Cohunbia, it was stated that Superintendent of Insurance Ingham had been removed.</p> <p>Superintendent Ingham was not removed or suspended during the investigation, and the Sun desires to express its regret that this error in its report should have occurred.</p> <p>Defendant then read the report from the congressional committee toward exonerating the plaintiff.</p> <p>Plaintiff asked an instruction to the effect that, in estimating the damages to be awarded the plaintiff, you should render a verdict for such sum as you believe from the evidence will fully and fairly compensate him for the injuries suffered by him by reason of the publication by the defendant of the libel complained of, including the mental pain, distress, and humiliation which you may find he suffered as the result of the publication, and for the detraction from his good name and reputation which the publication of the defamatory article may have occasioned, or may hereafter occasion; and in this connection you may consider the extent of the circulation of the publication.</p> <p>Defendant excepted to this instruction.</p> <p>Plaintiff offered instruction number eight, which was given over the objection of the defendant, and exception reserved. It reads as follows:</p> <p>“Tou are instructed that the publishers of newspapers are held by the law to the highest accountability for unreliable publications, and that it was the duty of the defendant as the publisher of a widely circulated newspaper to exercise reasonable caution against the false defamation of the innocent, and to take reasonable care to ascertain the truth of the defamatory matter affecting the character, good name, and reputation of the plaintiff; and if you believe from the evidence that the defendant failed to exercise such reasonable care, and that the libel complained of was published without taking reasonable precautions to ascertain the truth of the allegations concerning the plaintiff; and if you further find from the evidence that the libel complained of was published by the defendant with reckless indifference to the injuries which it might occasion to the plaintiff, then such failure to take reasonable precautions and such reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff is equivalent to an intentional violation of the plaintiff’s rights, or to malice in fact, and sufficient to justify the jury in awarding the plaintiff punitive damages.”</p> <p>Defendant offered the following instruction, which was refused, and exception reserved. It reads as follows:</p> <p>“The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence that the defendant’s correspondent Essary honestly and in good faith believed the statements in the newspaper article set forth in plaintiff’s declaration to be true, and had the grounds for such belief sufficient to satisfy an ordinary prudent and cautious man that such statements were true, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages in this case.”</p> <p>Defendant then offered the following instruction, which was refused, and exception reserved:</p> <p>“The jury are instructed that if they find that the defendant’s correspondent Essary was prompted by actual malice, or acted with reckless or careless indifference to the rights and feelings of the plaintiff in the publication of the newspaper article set forth in plaintiff’s declaration, that such actual malice or reckless or careless indifference cannot be imputed to the defendant on the evidence in this case.”</p> <p>The court in the general charge stated to the, jury as follows: “You will consider all the circumstances of the case, and assess those damages at what you believe is a fair and just sum, merely with a view to compensating the plaintiff, so far as he can be compensated by money damages, as is stated in the instruction which has been read to you. Those are all the damages which a plaintiff is entitled to recover in his own right strictly as a matter of law, but in this class of, cases, if the jury find certain other elements to be present, the jury has a right to award punitive damages. These damages are to be awarded, if at all, as a punishment to the defendant, and by way of an example to the defendant and to the community in the interest of law and order; and consequently they rest entirely in the discretion of the jury, not only as to the amount, but as to whether any shall be awarded at all. It is my duty to call your attention to the elements which would justify you, if you find them to exist in the case, in awarding such damages.”</p> <p>This was excepted to.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages by reason of the premises in the sum of $6,000; $5,000 of which they assess as compensatory damages, and $1,000 as punitive damages.</p> <p>The court overruled a motion for a new trial and entered judgment upon the verdict for the whole amount, and defendant has appealed.</p>

<p>Aepeat. and Error; Patents; Interference; Reduction to Practice.</p> <p>1. Unanimity of decision by the Patent Office tribunals in favor of the senior party to an interference increases the burden of the junior party.</p> <p>2. Where, in an interference involving the invention of an attachment to an adding machine designed to perforin multiplication, it was claimed by the junior party that a plate model constructed by him was a reduction to practice, but it appeared, among other things, that the numbers on the dial wheel of the model were upside down and could not bo conveniently read; that there was no mechanism for bringing the registry wheel back to zero after a computation had been made; that the most the model could do was to multiply digit by digit; that the various hand operations which this operation necessitated did not constitute the automatic operation contemplated by the issue, and that the only way in which the accumulating wheels could be cleared was by adding the necessary complementary numbers to them; it was held that the device did not come within the class of crude devices capable of use sufficient to demonstrate their practical efficacy and utility, and did not constitute a reduction to practice. (Citing Paul v. Hess, 24 App. D. C. 462, and distinguishing Coffee v. Guerrant, 3 App. D. C. 497.)</p>

The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is a writ of error to the juvenile court to determine the question whether that court has the power to remove a child from the custody of the Board of Children’s Guardians before the expiration of the- term of commitment. On August 28, 1914, an information was filed in the juvenile court against George Roat, a boy of fourteen, charging him with petty larceny.