Volume 43 — Connecticut Reports

Trespass on the case for fraud in the sale of a horse; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Foster, J. On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that the horse sold by the defendant was not safe, kind, and gentle.

Bill to foreclose a subcontractor’s lien for materials furnished for a building of the respondent; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County. Facts found and case reserved for advice. Tlie case is fully stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, for money had and received; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County. The plaintiff was a minor and sued by her next friend Margaret Kerrigan.

Trespass for taking and carrying away a quantity of cotton yarn, with a count in trover; brought to the Superior Court in New London County. The defendants were George W. Carver, Thomas Pray, Jr., and Fernando 0. Jacques.

Trespass on the case for an injury from the negligence of the defendants in not keeping the track of their road in proper repair; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and heard in damages, after a demurrer of the defendants overruled, by Martin, J. The case was heard at the October term of the court, 1874.

<p>To a suit against a town for an injury from a defect in a highway, where the alleged defect was the want of a railing along an elevated part of the road, and the injury occurred in a manner so peculiar and exceptional as to put the necessity of the railing to a test that ordinary travel would not furnish, it was held that the experience of others who had passed safely along the same road was not pertinent, and evidence of it inadmissible in behalf of the town.</p> <p>Professional road builders, of experience in the business, who had examined the road, held to he proper witnesses as experts, and their opinions admissible, in connection with the facts sworn to'by them, as to the necessity of a railing and the safe condition of the road.</p> <p>The true test of the admissibility of such testimony is not whether the subject matter is common or uncommon, or whether many persons or few have some knowledge of it, hut whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or jury in determining the questions at issue.</p> <p>The elements that enter into the question of the reasonably safe condition of a highway or bridge are numerous and often difficult to bo described; and for this reason it has long been the practice in this state to admit upon such a question the opinions of those who aro not experts, hut who have personal knowledge of the place in question, in connection with facts stated by them.</p> <p>The plaintiff alleged in her declaration “that she had been prevented from attending- to her ordinary business.” Held that under this allegation she could not show, for the purpose of enhancing damages, the loss of earnings in a special employment requiring skill and training.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, upon the common counts; brought before a justice of the peace, and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Common Pleas. In that court the plaintiff filed the following bill of particulars:</p> <p>“1874, June. To cash, $10; one wagon, $40; work, $5; money had and received, $35 = $90.”</p> <p>He also at the same time filed two additional counts, the first of which was as follows (the second not varying from it in any thing essential to the case):</p> <p>And the plaintiff further declares, in a plea of the case, that on or about the 23d day of June, 1874, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the defendant, would deliver to him a wagon, the property of the plaintiff, in exchange for a certain horse of the defendant, he, the defendant, undertook and then promised the plaintiff to deliver to him the said horse of the defendant, and to pay him the sum of ten dollars, in exchange for the said wagon of the plaintiff; and the plaintiff says that, confiding in the said promise and undertaking of the defendant, he did after-wards, on or about said 23d day-of June, 1874, deliver to the defendant the said wagon of the plaintiff. Yet the defendant, not regarding his said promise and undertaking, though often requested, has neither delivered to him the said horse of the defendant, nor paid to him said sum of ten dollars, or any part thereof, but has hitherto wholly neglected and refused, and still wholly neglects and refuses so to do, to the damage of the plaintiff, etc.</p> <p>The defendant, before entering his plea, filed a motion that the amendments be disallowred and stricken out as not authorized by law, upon the ground, first, that the declaration could not be amended after the appeal, and second, that the ground of the action -w;as changed by them.</p> <p>The court (JDe Forest, J".,) found that “the two additional counts which the plaintiff had filed as an amendment to his declaration, and which the defendant moved to erase, set out the same transaction upon which the plaintiff had sued and sought to recover upon the common counts alone upon the trial before the justice; that the plaintiff had' claimed to recover before the justice upon the common counts, upon the ground that he had fully performed his part of the contract set, out in said additional counts, and that the defendant had failed to perform his part of said contract, and that ho, the plaintiff, could therefore recover back upon the common counts the value of the property and the money which he had delivered to the defendant pursuant to said contract.” The court therefore denied said motion to erase.</p> <p>' The case was then tried to the jury, upon the general issue, with notice, and a verdict returned and j udgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant then brought the record before this court by a motion in error, assigning as error the allowance of the amendments by the court and the denial of the defendant’s motion to strike them out.</p>

<p>The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 15, chap. 2, part 1, sec. 4,) provides that “no individual shall have any claim against a town for assistance furnished to a pauper before he has given notice of the condition of such pauper to one of the selectmen of the town where the pauper resides.” A physician attending upon a pauper, called at the house of one of the selectmen to give him notice of the pauper’s condition and of his professional attendance upon him, but not finding him at home, stated the facts to his wife and son who were there, telling them that he had called for the purpose of notifying the selectman, and that he should look to the town for compensation; which information they on the same day conveyed to the selectman. • Held to be a sufficient notice under the statute.</p> <p>The wife and son might he regarded as messengers employed to convey the information to the selectman, and the delivery of the message by them as notice given by the party himself.</p>

<p>Under the .statute of limitations, which provides, with regard to promissory notes, that no action shall he brought hut within six years next after the right of action shall accrue, the day on which the note matures is to be excluded from the computation.</p> <p>And it makes no difference that the note is payable at bank, and that a right of action accrues upon it at the close of hanking hours on the day it matures.</p> <p>As a general rule in all cases where a period of time is to be reckoned from a particular date or event, whether under a contract, will, or statute, or in legal proceedings, the day of such date or event is to be excluded from the computation.</p> <p>Where however a different intent appears in a particular case, the intent is tó prevail.</p>

<p>The right of a plaintiff to withdraw his suit or to be non-suited, at any time before the issue is decided, is not affected by the fact that the defendant has filed a plea of set-off and claims judgment for a balance in his favor.</p> <p>Where, after the filing of such a plea, and the non-suiting of the plaintiff, the court rendered judgment for the defendant for a balance claimed by him, it was held that the judgment was no bar to a suit afterwards brought by the plaintiff upon his original claim.</p>

<p>Where one of two partners has advanced to the partnership more than the other, he can not maintain assumpsit against the other partner for his proportion of it, so long as the partnership debts are not paid.</p> <p>Until the affairs of the partnership are settled, its assets disposed of, and the avails applied to the payment of all demands against it, it can not be known what balance will be due from the partnership to such partner. When this balance is ascertained, then, and not before, the law implies a promise on the part of the other partner, to pay his proportion of it.</p> <p>The act of 1867 (Uen. Statutes, p. 423, sec. 5,) does not affect the case.</p>

Debt on a probato bond, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried to the jury, before Hitchcock, J. The bond was executed by the defendants as sureties, with one William E. Bisscll as principal, and was given -by the latter as guardian of William E. Bisscll, Jr., bis son. The bond was dated July 28th, 1856, the said Bisscll, Sr., having been on that day appointed guardian.

Assumpsit by the plaintiffs as late partners under the name of Meeker & Shelton, for the recovery of a partnership claim; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The defendant pleaded the general issue, -with notice of a set-off of a claim held by him against Meeker individually.

The case was tried to the jury, before Sanford, J., and a verdict rendered for the appellees. The appellant moved for a new trial for error in the rulings of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, upon a subscription to the stock of the plaintiff corporation; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Pair-field County and tried to the court, upon the general issue, before Be Forest, J. The court found the following facts: The plaintiffs were incorporated as a railroad company at the May session of the General Assembly in the year 1867, with a capital of $450,000, to be increased at the pleasure of the corporation to $750,000, the same to be divided into…

<p>0, in 1855, agreed with S, the husband of his daughter, that if 5 would convey his homestead to him he would convey it to his daughter and build a new house on it worth $1,000. S conveyed the land to O and 0 conveyed it to his daughter, but did not build the house. In 1858 O and S agreed that in the place of building the house 0 should transfer to his daughter $1,000 in bank stock. This however was never done, though the promise was frequently renewed. In 1869 the daughter died, and O in 1871. .S’presented a claim , against O’s estate in his own name for the $1,000 and interest, which was disallowed by the commissioners, and he appealed to the Superior Court, which likewise rejected the claim. Held, in reversing the judgment of the latter court—1. That the agreement of O to transfer the bank stock was a mere accord, which not having been performed, left the original agreement unaffected. 2.. That the claim upon the original agreement was a valid one. 3. That it was properly presented by <S in his own name, as he had a beneficial interest, by reason of his life estate in the land, and in the house if it had been built. 4. That the appeal was properly taken in his own name. 5. That when the money was received by S the principal would be held by him as trustee for his own benefit and that of the children left by his wife, and the arrearage of interest would belong to him personally.</p>

<p>A creditor of tho insolvent estate of a deceased person appealed to tho Superior Court from the doings of the commissioners on the estate in rejecting a claim presented by him, and in his reasons of appeal assigned, in addition to the disallowance of his claim, tho fact that the deceased did not have his domicil at the time of his death within the probate district of B, the court of which had assumed jurisdiction of the settlement of his estate, but within the probate district of IF, and that therefore the Superior Court had no jurisdiction of the ease. Upon the trial in that court the appellant offered evidence in support of these allegations, but the court rejected the evidence on the ground that that was not the proper time nor mode of raising the question of its jurisdiction. Held, on a motion for a new trial by the appellant,—</p> <p>1 That the fact thus set up was not a sufficient ground of appeal, since, if established, it would render the whole proceeding void, both before the commissioners and in the appellate court.</p> <p>2 That the allegations did not properly constitute a plea to the jurisdiction, that plea being in its nature and by rule a preliminary one.</p> <p>3 But that the allegations, brought to the notice of the court by the offer of evidence to sustain them, were to be regarded as a suggestion to the court of its want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. That such a suggestion was always proper, and should be favorably received by the court.</p> <p>5. That it was no objection to the entertaining of the question of jurisdiction, that the case had come into court by appeal from the doings of commissioners.</p> <p>6. That if the want of jurisdiction in the probate court should be shown, the Superior Court would have no jurisdiction, and could only dismiss the case.</p> <p>7. That in that case the report of the commissioners would not stand, as if it had not been appealed from, but the judgment of the commissioners on the claim appealed having been vacated by the appeal, the whole proceeding in the probate court, so far as dependent on the report of the commissioners, would be permanently suspended, and the final settlement of the estate in that court rendered impossible.</p> <p>8. That the only course to be taken in that case would be, to abandon the proceedings in the probate court not having jurisdiction, and take out administration in the probate court which had jurisdiction.</p> <p>Whether the commissioners on an insolvent estate can themselves entertain the question of the jurisdiction of the probate court and of themselves: Q'icere.</p> <p>Commissioners on insolvent estates, though appointed by the courts of probate, are yet an independent tribunal, and appeals from their doings are not appeals from any action of the court of probate.</p> <p>Upon the question whether a deceased person was indebted to one of his heirs who presented a claim against his estate, a declaration in a will left by the deceased that he had already paid the heir so much that he directed that he should have no part of his estate, was held to be admissible under the statute admitting memoranda of deceased persons, as being a declaration that he did not regard himself as indebted to the claimant.</p>

<p>Covenant, for tlie breach of a covenant in a deed against incumbrances; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The following facts were found by the court.</p> <p>The premises in question, known as the Savin Rock property, were on the 16th of September, 1870, owned by J. H. Dawe, T. H. Dawe and Thomas Scott, partners under the name of J. H. & T. H. Dawe & Co., who continued to own the same until the 15th of May, 1871, when they conveyed them to the defendant.</p> <p>On the 19th of May, 1871, the defendant conveyed the promises to tlio plaintiff, by a warranty deed, with a covenant against all incumbrances.</p> <p>On the 16th of September, 1870, while Dawe & Co. were the owners of the property, one McGinn had attached the property in an action against them upon a claim against them in his own favor, upon a writ returnable, and afterwards duly returned, to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County at its October term in the year 1870. The writ demanded five hundred dollars damages. The parties respectively appeared in the suit and it came by regular continuances to the January term of the court in the year 1874, when the defendants made default of appearance and the plaintiff in the suit on the 22d of January obtained a valid judgment against them for $334.95 (including costs,) and on the 3d of March, 1874, took out execution in due form of law and delivered it to Hobart L. Hotchkiss, then a deputy sheriff of New Haven County, to be levied.</p> <p>There was also another attachment put upon the property by Johnson & Ward, creditors of Dawe & Co., at about the same time with that of McGinn. Their suit was brought to the same court and went into judgment at the same term with that of McGinn, but it did not appear that execution was ever levied upon tlio property attached.</p> <p>While the plaintiff was negotiating with the defendant for the purchase of the Savin Rock property he had no knowledge of any attachment upon the property, but on the day when he took his deed from the defendant (May 19th, 1871,) these attachments were spoken of, and as an additional protection to the plaintiff, but not in lieu of the covenant in the deed, the defendant signed an agreement to pay all expenses in defending against the suits.</p> <p>About February 14th, 1874, the plaintiff learned that McGinn and Johnson & Ward had then or recently obtained judgments in their respective suits, and intended to collect the same out of the property, and on the 16th of February he wrote to the defendant, then in St. Augustine, Florida, stating the facts, and asking for instructions. The defendant received this letter about February 24th,' 1874, but did not answer it.</p> <p>On the 6th of April, 1874, Hotchkiss, the deputy sheriff, with the McGinn execution, made demand of the plaintiff for the payment of the same, and notified him that if payment was not made he should proceed to levy the execution on the property. The plaintiff thereupon wrote again to the defendant for instructions, but received no answer.</p> <p>On the 6th day of April, 1874, the deputy sheriff levied the execution on the premises, and made return of his doings on the execution, which execution and return were offered in evidence by the plaintiff. The defendant objected to the return, on the ground that upon its face the officer had not shown that he had made any demand at the last usual place of abode of the debtors, for goods and chattels of the debtors, whereon to levy the execution; and further, because it did not sufficiently appear from the return that D. S. Thompson, one of the appraisers, was an indifferent person. The plaintiff claimed that it did sufficiently appear from the return that due demand and search for goods and chattels of the debtors had been made, and that Thompson was an indifferent person, and further that the defendant had no right to object to the validity of the return, or take any advantage of any defects therein, and that no such defense .was set up in the notice. The court admitted the return in evidence sulyect to the objection.</p> <p>After the demand made upon the plaintiff to pay the execution, he supposed that the property would be posted for sale, like personal property on execution, and accordingly kept watch of the sign post, where the notice would be posted. On or about April 17th, 1874, he first learned that the effect of the levy had been or would be to vest in McGinn the absolute title to a small fractional interest in the whole of the Savin Rock property, and that McGinn and he had become or would become tenants in common. Such a result would have been of very great damage to the plaintiff, exceeding the appraised value of McGinn’s fractional interest, unless McGinn would have been willing to sell out his interest for the appraised value. In order to prevent any such tenancy in common, or to regain the title, if McGinn had then obtained the title, and to remove all claim which McGinn had or might have on the property, by virtue of the attachment or levy, the plaintiff, on the 17th of April, 1874, opened negotiations with him, the result of which -was that McGinn agreed to transfer, and did transfer, whatever interest he had in the property to the plaintiff, for the consideration of $800, paid him by the plaintiff. The transfer was made by a quit claim deed.</p> <p>The defendant offered evidence to prove, and if the evidence was admissible did prove, by the testimony of Scott, one of the execution debtors, that ever since the McGinn suit was commenced to the present time, he had been a resident of the town of Orange, in the village of West Haven, in which village the Savin Rock property is situated. The plaintiff objected to the admission of this evidence, because there was no notice of such defense, and because the defendant had no right to object to the validity of the levy of the execution; but the court admitted it, subject to the objection. The defendant claimed that for this reason the levy was invalid.</p> <p>The officer serving the execution did not know that Scott was then a resident of Orange, and acted in good faith.</p> <p>The plaintiff at the time of the payment of the $300 to McGinn, and receiving the quit claim deed from him, was ignorant of any mistakes that the officer might have made in the levy, or of any defects in the levy or return, and acted in good faith.</p> <p>The plaintiff thereupon offered evidence to show, and if the evidence was admissible did show, that Scott, since January 1st, 1874, to the present time, never had any other property with which he could have paid the McGinn execution, or any other property which he could have exposed to the officer having the execution, whereon to levy, and also that J. H. & T. H. Dawe during the same period had no other property within the precincts of the officer, or elsewhere in this state, whereon the execution could be levied, except the interest in the Savin Rock property.</p> <p>Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this court.</p>

Assumpsit, upon the common counts; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court, before .Robinson, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and motion in error by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion, and more fully in the report of the case of Platt v. Birmingham, Axle Company, 41 Conn., 255, the facts having been the same in that case.

Bill to foreclose a builders’ lien; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County and tried before Robinson, J. The court found the following facts: On and for some time before tlie 8tli day of September, 1873, the respondent owned a tract of land in the town of Orange in New Haven County, of which the land sought to bo foreclosed is. a part, and on that day made the following contract with William P. Billon, a builder, the contract being executed under seal by…

Action upon the statute with regard to highways and bridges, for an injury from a defect in a bridge of the defendant town; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury, upon the general issue, before Robinson, J. Upon the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and the defendants did not deny, that on the 15th of October, 1874, he was the owner of a span of horses, which, on that day, after using them on 1ns farm, he hitched by a…

Petition for advice as to the execution of their trust, by the receivers of the Townsend Savings Bank of New Haven; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Assumpsit, for goods sold; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The defendant pleaded in bar a receipt of the plaintiff for a certain note, in full discharge of the indebtedness; and the plaintiff replied that the receipt was obtained by fraud and was void. The following facts were found by a committee.

Assumpsit for use and occupation; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court on the general issue before Robinson, J. The plaintiffs’ evidence being in, the defendant moved for judgment as in case of non-suit, which motion the court allowed. The plaintiffs then moved that the non-suit be set aside, which motion the court denied, and the plaintiffs brought the record before this court by a motion in error.

Action qui tam, upon a statute with regard to nuisances upon highways, to recover a penalty given by the statute, one half to the prosecutor and one half to the toAvn;- brought before a justice of the peace, and appealed by the plaintiff, from the judgment of the justice in faA'or of the defendant, to the Court of Common Picas of New Haven County.

Trespass qu. el.fr., brought to the Superior Court in New Ilaven County, and hoard in damages, on demurrer overruled, before HiteTicoch, J. The court found the following facts. The plaintiff was, at the lime of llie transactions hereinafter stated, and still is, the owner of a homestead, fronting on Colony street in the city of Meriden, one hundred and thirty-two feet front by two hundred and twenty-ñve feet deep.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The defendant filed the following plea to the jurisdiction.

Petition for a new trial, brought to the Superior Court in Now Haven County. The former trial was of an action of assumpsit upon a policy of insurance upon the life of one Jesse L. Savage, issued by the present petitioners, in favor of the respondent, as the wife of the insured, the application for the insurance, signed by the said Jesse, representing her as his wife.

Assumpsit, to recover for services as an attorney; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. A new trial having been granted in the case, (40 Conn. R., 97,) the case was referred to an auditor, who reported that there was nothing due the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed the following remonstrance against the acceptance of the report of the auditor. 1.

Trespass for an assault and battery, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County; being the same case that is reported in 42 Conn. R., 206. Pinal judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff in the case, a question arose between the parties as to the taxation of the plaintiff’s costs.

Ejectment ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court on the general issue before Robinson, J. The court found the following facts: The premises in question are a part of a tract of land in the town of New Haven which was conveyed by warranty deed December 2d, 1801, by Eli Mix to Stephen Ball, and in the deed is described as follows: “A certain piece of land situated in said New Haven, containing seven acres, be the same more or less,…

Assumpsit, for supplies furnished to a pauper of the defendant town; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Robinson, J. Verdict for the plaintiffs, and motion for a new trial for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit for supplies furnished a pauper claimed to belong to the defendant town; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Robinson, J. Verdict for the plaintiffs and motion for a new trial by the defendants for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit to recover commissions as a real estate broker; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court on the general issue. The court found the following facts. ' The plaintiff, on the 10th day of May, 1871, and for some: time before, was a real estate broker in the city of New Haven. Norton on that day placed in his hands for sale or exchange a certain piece of real estate in New Haven.

Trespass for taking and carrying away the goods of the' plaintiff; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and heard in damages after demurrer overruled, by Robinson, J. The goods in question were a large quantity of furnishing goods of various kinds, kept by the plaintiff in his store in Ansonia in this state.

Petition to the Superior Court in New Haven County for . the amending or setting aside of an assessment of damages for a street improvement; brought under a provision of the charter of the respondent city. The petitioners were a cemetery association, organized under the general law with regard to such associations, and owned for purposes of burial certain land taken by the city for the street.

Trespass on the case for an injury to property in the hands of the plaintiffs as common carriers, by the negligence of the defendant, who was their servant; brought to the City Court of the city of Meriden.

Trespass on the case for fraud in the sale of a horse; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court upon the general issue, before Pede, J. The court found the following facts. On the loth day of May, 1874, the defendant sold a horse to the plaintiff, and gave him a warranty in writing in the following words: “Southbury, May 15, 1874. I, Harvey Thomas, Jun., sold a bay horse to Patrick Mullain.

Bill in equity for an injunction; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and being the same case before this court at a former term, and reported in 40 Conn. R., 410. In accordance with the advice then given (p. 437,) the Superior Court made a further finding of facts upon a single point in the case and rendered judgment for the petitioners, this court having so advised in the event of the facts being so found.

Writ op error, brought to this court to reverse a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County inflicting a fine and imprisonment upon the plaintiff in error for a contempt of court. The facts are recited in the judgment of the court below, which was as follows: In the matter of ) Court of Common Pleas. Elijah B. Middlebrook. ) Fairfield County, April term, 1872.

Petitiom for a divorce; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The petition, after alleging the marriage, thus stated the gi’ounds of divorce. The petitioner further shows that the respondent, for a period of more than four years last past, has been and now is habitually intemperate.

Bill to redeem and for tlie conveyance of title; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County.

Action upon the covenants of seizin and warranty in a deed; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The defendant denied the breach of the covenants. The case was tried to the court before Be Forest, J. Upon the trial the plaintiff offered his deed in evidence, containing the covenants of warranty and seizin for a breach of which the action was brought.

The insolvent proceedings were instituted by George A. Hoyt, a creditor of the corporation, upon a claim of over three hundred dollars, and the trustee was appointed under the provisions of the insolvent law of the state.

Bill to foreclose a lien for the amount of benefits assessed upon the land of the respondents for a city improvement; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County.

Assumpsit, to recover money paid as a tax, claimed to have been illegally assessed; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County, and tried to the jury, upon the general issue, before I)e Forest, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and motion for a now trial by the defendants, for error in the charge of the court, and a like motion by the plaintiff for error in the exclusion of evidence. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Bill for a divorce and for the custody of children; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The ground of divorce alleged in the petition was the wilful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent, with neglect of all the duties of a husband, for more than three years before the bringing of the petition.

Trover for sundry articles belonging to the equipment of a vessel; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. Held: as matter of law, that the plaintiffs had no lien on the articles for the repairs, and that they were not entitled to the possession of them as against the defendant by virtue of any such lien simply.

Assumpsit upon a promissory note executed jointly by the defendants; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The defendant Whitby M. Smith suffered a default, and the defendant Susan E. Smith pleaded the general issue, on which the case was tried to the court before Ccranger, J. The court found the following facts: The two defendants are husband and wife.

Assumpsit against the . defendants as common carriers; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County.

Welch, deceased, in disallowing a claim of the appellant; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The following facts were found by a committee: ' The appellant was, on the 8th day of May, 1860, married to George L. Welch, the decedent, of Berlin in this state, with whom she lived as his wife until the 18th day of May, 1873, when, upon her petition, she was lawfully divorced from him by a decree of the Superior Court.

The Attorney averred in the application that the respond- ' ents were authorized by their charter, which was granted by the General Assembly in 1846, to construct and operate a railroad from New Haven in this state northerly to the town of Farmington in this state, through the town of Southington, with a provision in the charter that it might bejamende.d, altered or repealed at the pleasure of the General Assembly; that the respondents did immediately thereafter so…

<p>Trover, for sundry goods; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, and tried to the jury before McManus, J. The plea was the general issue, with notice that the defendant took the goods by attachment as a deputy sheriff, as the property of one Richmond, upon a writ against him in favor of one Cummings, a creditor of Richmond.</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that on the 18th day of May, 1874, he purchased of Richmond, for a valuable consideration, a stock of goods, then belonging to Richmond, and in a store in New Britain, and that he then took the same into his possession; and that he-afterwards purchased at different times, and from different parties, other and similar goods, and added the same to the stock, and that he continued to possess the original and newly purchased goods, and did business therewith at the store, until the 13th day of June, 1874, when the defendant entered the store, and forcibly removed therefrom a large quantity of goods, in part consisting of original goods sold by Richmond to the plaintiff, and in part of goods so added by later purchases.</p> <p>The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that the purchase from Richmond was made bond fide; and that he at once took open possession of the same, and so continued down to the acts of the defendant complained of; and that the goods subsequently purchased by him and added to the stock were paid for by him from his individual funds.</p> <p>The defendant offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that he was a deputy sheriff, and took the goods by virtue of a writ of attachment brought by one Cummings against Richmond to recover a debt due before and at the time of the conveyance of the stock of goods by Richmond to the plaintiff; that that conveyance was fraudulent in fact, and was also fraudulent in law, because Richmond was allowed to remain in possession and exercise control over the store and goods, and the additions thereto, after the sale, and down to the time of the attachment by the defendant, in the same way as before the sale; and that if any goods were bought by the plaintiff of parties other than Richmond and added to the stock, they were paid for by the plaintiff from the proceeds of the original goods.</p> <p>It was admitted that proper demand had been made by the plaintiff upon the defendant for the goods.</p> <p>Upon the evidence and claims of the respective parties it became material for the jury to distinguish between the property bought of Richmond and the property purchased subsequently of other parties.</p> <p>The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury, that if they should find that the sale was fraudulent and void as against attaching creditors on the ground that there was no change of possession, and that subsequently the plaintiff bought other goods of parties other than Richmond, and the defendant took some of the latter goods and converted them to his own use, he was liable to the plaintiff for the value thereof, and that the infirmity of the plaintiff’s title, if any there was, to the goods bought of Richmond, by reason of a want of change of possession, did not extend over to or affect the title of the plaintiff to the goods subsequently bought; and that this was so even if the last named goods were bought with the proceeds of the sale of the goods bought of Richmond.</p> <p>The court charged the jury upon this point as follows: that if they should find that the conveyance of the store and stock of goods from Richmond to the plaintiff, was fraudulent and void in fact, or was fraudulent in law and void as against a bond fide attaching creditor of Richmond by reason of a retention of possession by the vendor, and that they should also find that the defendant had taken goods from the store that had been purchased subsequent to the sale in question and from other parties than Richmond, then the plaintiff, to entitle himself to recover for such last mentioned goods, must have satisfied the jury that the same had been purchased by him with means other than the proceeds of such fraudulent and void conveyance; but did not otherwise charge as requested.</p> <p>The jury having returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the court.</p>

<p>Assumpsit against the defendant as au endorser of a promissory note; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The following facts were found by a committee.</p> <p>The note in suit, as described in the declaration and as it appears upon it's face, is for $5,000, and is dated July 1st, 1873, is signed by James H. Conklin, is made payable to the order of Oliver F. Winchester, the defendant, at the bank of the plaintiffs, in four months from its date, and is endorsed by the defendant. As originally written, it was for the sum of $2,000 only, and as such was endorsed by the defendant; and after, being so endorsed was returned to the maker to be negotiated, to take up or provide for other notes, upon which the defendant was then endorser as hereinafter stated, and while so in his hands, and before negotiation, and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, it was altered by the maker to a note for $5,000.</p> <p>About the year 1867, the defendant commenced endorsing notes for Conklin, for his accommodation, and endorsed to the amount of $7,000; which notes as they became due were renewed or provided for with other notes endorsed in like manner, and returned to Conklin to be negotiated for that purpose; and the latter as they fell due, from time to time, were renewed or provided for as before, and in that manner the line of endorsement by the defendant continued until in 1873, as hereinafter stated.</p> <p>In the year 1869 Conklin began to have a portion of these notes, to the amount of $5,000, discounted by the plaintiffs. That line of discount was carried from September, 1869, to July, 1873. On the 7th of July, 1873, Conklin enclosed to the defendant four promissory notes, all signed by him, and payable to the order of the defendant, as follows: one dated June 25th, 1873, at four months, for $1*000, due October 28th, and paid by the defendant; one dated July 1st, at four months, for $2,000, being the note now in suit; one dated July 5th, at three months, for $1,000, due October 8th, and paid by the defendant; and one dated July 7th, at three months, for $1,000, due October 10th, also paid by the defendant.</p> <p>On the same day the plaintiffs held notes of Conklin, as follows: one due July 6th, 1873, for $1,000, endorsed by the defendant; one due July 16th, for $1,000, endorsed by William R. Cone; one due July 18th, for $2,000, endorsed by the defendant; and one due August 7th, for $2,000, endorsed by the defendant. The note of July 6th was then due, had been duly protested, and notice of its non-payment given to the defendant.</p> <p>The four notes dated, respectively, June 25th, July 1st, July 5th, and July 7th, were endorsed by the defendant for the purpose of enabling the maker to take up or provide for the notes thus held by the plaintiffs, amounting to $5,000, and which were endorsed by the defendant. And after the notes were so endorsed they were returned by him to Conklin to be negotiated for that purpose.</p> <p>The note dated July 5th, for $1,000, was sent by Conklin on the 14th of July to the plaintiffs for the purpose of taking up the note for the same amount due July 6th, and was used for that purpose. The other two notes, for $1,000 each, were used by Conklin, who procured them to be discounted by other parties, and were afterwards taken up by the defendant. The note for $2,000, dated July 1st, was altered to $5,000 by the maker in his own handwriting, and is the note in suit. This note was discounted by the plaintiffs July 18th, and the proceeds used to take up the note endorsed by Mr. Cone, for $1,000, falling due July 16th, 1873, and also the two notes endorsed by the defendant for $2,000 each, and falling due, one July 18th, and the other August 7th, 1873; Conklin having so directed in the letter enclosing the note to the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The first notes endorsed by the defendant for Conklin, amounting to $7,000, were endorsed for his accommodation. The other notes were also accommodation notes, as between the maker and the” endorser, and the defendant had no interest in, and derived no benefit from them, except as they were designed and used to renew or provide for other notes upon which the defendant was then endorser.</p> <p>The notes discounted by the plaintiffs were all blank forms, filled in by the maker in his own handwriting, as is also the note in suit. This was true also of the other notes endorsed by the defendant, and discounted by other parties; and all the notes were payable to the order of the defendant.</p> <p>At the time the note in suit was discounted by the plaintiffs . they had no knowledge or suspicion that it had been altered. The note would not have been taken or discounted but for the endorsement of the defendant.</p> <p>The note was taken in the usual course of business, and the plaintiffs are bond fide holders thereof, except as it may appear otherwise from the facts hereinafter stated.</p> <p>Previous to April 9th, 1873, the defendant occasionally, (pei'haps half a dozen times,) endorsed notes for Conklin, with the length of time they were to run left blank, for Conklin to fill the blanks as he might have need. The note in suit, and those accompanying it, were, at the time of the endorsement, complete in all respects.</p> <p>Previous to January 1st, 1873, the defendant kept no record or memoranda of the notes endorsed by him for Conklin, except as he kept the letters sent by him with the notes when they were sent for endorsement. Since January 1st, 1873, he has kept a record of his endorsements.</p> <p>During the time of these endorsements Conklin resided in Hamden, about three miles from the defendant, and his daily employment was in the city of New Haven, about one and a quarter miles distant from the defendant. He had been in the defendant’s employment as a bookkeeper about a year before the endorsements commenced, and during that time acquitted himself with honesty and fidelity, so far as the defendant knew.</p> <p>The note in suit was not paid when due, and was duly protested for non-payment, and notice thereof was duly given to the defendant as endorser.</p> <p>Upon the facts thus found the case was reserved for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>Bill in Equity, for an appropriation of certain real estate belonging to the respondent wife to the payment of certain notes executed by her; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The following facts were found by the court:</p> <p>The respondents are, and were at the time of the giving of the notes in question, husband and wife. On the 10th of December, 1873, William C. Williams, the husband, was indebted to the petitioners for merchandise sold to the amount of more than $10,000, and was insolvent. Geraldine Y. 0. Williams, the wife, at that time owned in her own right, but not to her sole use, certain valuable real estate in the town of New Britain in Hartford County where they resided, and on that day, at the request of the petitioners and of her husband, she joined with him in executing to the petitioners four notes of $1,200 each. The notes were on one, two, three, and four months’ time respectively. The debt from Mr. Williams to the petitioners was at the time overdue and unpaid; the notes were given on account of it, and the petitioners on receiving them and in consideration of them agreed to give Mr. Williams the time on his original debt that was stated in the notes. The notes were all in the following form, differing only in the time of payment:</p> <p>“New Britain, Dec. 10th, 1873.</p> <p>“ One month after date, we jointly and severally promise to pay Smith, Northam & Robinson, or order, twelve hundred dollars, value received, each intending hereby to charge our individual property and estate for the payment of this note, payable at the Mercantile National Bank, at Hartford.</p> <p>W. C. Williams,</p> <p>G. V. S. Williams.”</p> <p>Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>Petition for a divorce, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The respondent filed an answer denying the allegations of the petition, which were of cruelty and general misconduct, and a cross-bill alleging such misconduct on the part of the petitioner as permanently destroyed his happiness in the marriage relation. A committee, to whom the case was referred, found the allegations of the petition not true and those of the cross-bill true, and the court thereupon granted a divorce, upon the cross-bill, against the petitioner.</p> <p>The petitioner thereupon filed the following motion for an assignment to her under the statute of a reasonable part of the respondent’s estate:</p> <p>Allen v. Allen.</p> <p>The petitioner in the above entitled cause respectfully represents that, upon her petition for a divorce and an answer in the nature of a cross-bill filed by the respondent, this court, at its present term, has denied her petition, and upon the said cross-bill has granted a divorce to the respondent, on the ground of her general misconduct; that the said respondent is possessed of property worth, according to his own admissions, between twelve and fifteen thousand dollars; that she has been married to the respondent for thirty years, and lived with him as his wife for more than twenty-five years, raising a family of children: and that she is now penniless, without any means of support. Your petitioner therefore prays this court to assign her such part of her husband’s estate as shall be just and reasonable, not exceeding one-third part thereof.</p> <p>Upon this motion the court (Beardsley, J".,) made the following finding and reservation:</p> <p>I find that it is just and proper that a portion of the respondent’s estate be assigned to the petitioner as alimony under our statute law; and that the respondent’s property exceeds the sum of twelve thousand dollars, and cannot be divided without injury. • I further find that two thousand dollars is a just and reasonable sum to be assigned to the petitioner as such alimony from her husband’s estate, and that an order ought to be passed, if such order be legal, directing said Hiram M. Allen to pay to said Lucy A. Allen the sum of two thousand dollars as alimony under our statute law, within two months of the date of the passing such order, under penalty of twenty-five hundred dollars in case of failure. Upon these facts the case is reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors upon this question of law:— Has the Superior Court power upon the facts as herein found, to assign to the wife as alimony, under our statute law, any portion of the husband’s property ?</p> <p>The provisions of the statute with regard to divorces, which are material to the question, are given in full in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Actions of trespass on the case, for injuries from the negligent acts of the servant of the defendant; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The two cases involved the same facts and were tried together. The court made the following finding of facts:</p> <p>On the first day of November, 1872, Stiles was, and had for a long time been, engaged in selling flour and feed in Suffield. He then had, and for more than a year before had had, in his employ one George H. Babcock, whose principal employment was to deliver the goods so sold by Stiles to his customers. On that day, in the afternoon, Babcock took a load of twenty bags of flour and six of bran, the former to be delivered at a Mr. King’s and the latter at a Mr. Smith’s.' Smith lived on a side road branching off from the road leading to King’s, and when Babcock came to this side road he took off from his load the bags destined for Smith’s and piled them up on the side of the road within the limits of the highway, and left them there while he went on to King’s with the remainder. While these bags were so remaining there Mrs. Samuel C. Phelon and Mrs. Ellen Phelon were driving along the road, and their horse being frightened at the bags ran away and threw them both out and injured them.</p> <p>I find that the bags so left were an object calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness; that the horse driven by the plaintiffs was of ordinary gentleness; and that the plaintiffs were not guilty of any negligence which contributed to the injury.</p> <p>I find that Babcock placed the bags in the highway without the knowledge or express authority of the defendant, and for the purpose of so shortening the time to be occupied by him in delivering the goods as to enable him to return to Suffield in time to take a train for Hartford on the same day on his own private business.</p> <p>If the defendant was liable to pay the damages so happening to tlie plaintiffs, I assess the damages at the sum of three hundred dollars in each case, and I reserve for the advice of the Supreme Court the question whether Stiles is liable for the damages so caused by the acts of Babcock.</p>

<p>C, an employe of tlie defendants, a corporation, who had been sent with an officer to find property of one M to attach upon a note which they held against him, soon after settled the claim with M by taking a horse at an agreed price and a bill of sale to himself of a wagon, which latter he was to sell, retain $50 of the proceeds for the defendants, and return the balance to M. 0 took the wagon into his possession, delivered the horse to the defendants and paid them the $50 which he was to get from the sale of the wagon; at the same time informing the president of the company of the particulars of the arrangement. The president expressed no disapproval, but withdrew the suit that had been instituted and delivered the note of M to C. C acted in the whole matter for the benefit of the defendants. The wagon proved to be the property of D, who demanded it of the defendants; they replied that they Itnew nothing of it, and he sued them in trover. Held that the acts of O would be regarded in law as ratified by the defendants, and his possession of the wagon as the possession of their agent.</p>

<p>Petition for tlie laying out of a highway; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The report of a committee in favor of the laying out of the road, was, upon a remonstrance against its acceptance, set aside by the court (Martin, J.,~) and a new committee appointed. Tips committee reported against the laying out of the road, and upon a remonstrance of the petitioners against the acceptance of the report, the court (Beardsley, J.,~) accepted it, and dismissed the petition. The petitioners then brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Assumpsit on a contract of hiring; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The case was referred to a committee to find the facts, who reported in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants remonstrated, and the court overruled the remonstrance and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, for the amount found due him by the committee. At a later day in the same term at which the judgment was rendered the defendants filed a written motion that the case be recommitted to the committee on the ground that his finding upon a certain question of fact was against the evidence in the case, and that a mistake had been made by him to the injury of the defendants. On the trial of this motion the court found the following facts:</p> <p>The plaintiff entered into the defendants’ employment as salesman in January, 1872. He was dismissed June 19th, 1872. The main questions on the hearing before the committee were, whether the plaintiff was hired by the defendants for six or twelve months, (the plaintiff claiming twelve, the defendants six months,) and whether the plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed by the defendants. The plaintiff testified that he was employed at a meeting of the directors of the defendant corporation, in January, 1872, and that a vote was then passed by the directors stating the term of his employment to be for twelve months.</p> <p>The records of the corporation being produced showed a vote of employment for twelve months. The record so stood during the whole term of the plaintiff’s service. In August, 1872, and after the plaintiff had been dismissed and had made a claim on the defendants for a breach of contract in not employing him for twelve months, the secretary of the defendant corporation changed the record by erasing the figures “12” before the word “months,” and substituting “6.”</p> <p>Several of the directors, who were present at the meeting, testified that the vote, as actually passed, was for sis months and not for twelve.</p> <p>Upon this and other testimony on the one side and the other, the committee took the case into consideration, and determined, as a conclusion of fact, upon his then views of the testimony, that the plaintiff was hired for the period of twelve months, and also found that the plaintiff had been dismissed without cause. The committee assessed the damages accordingly, and made and returned his report, as on file.</p> <p>After the report was made and filed in court the committee was accosted by one of the directors of the defendant corporation, who was also one of the defendants’ witnesses on the trial before the committee, and a conversation ensued between the committee and the witness in regard to the committee’s finding that the plaintiff was not rightfully dismissed by the defendants. In consequence of this conversation the committee was induced to reconsider the evidence given in the case, and upon such reconsideration came to the conclusion that he had, in his finding, mistaken the weight of the testimony so far as the same related to the term of hiring, by reason of having, upon grounds of public policy, attached an undue and mistaken importance, as evidence in the case, to the original entry upon the records as to the vote of employment, and that, if he were to rejudge the case, lie should be obliged to find that the hiring was for six months only, and to re-assess the damages accordingly.</p> <p>Upon the foregoing facts the defendants insisted that the court had power and ought to recommit the case to the committee. The plaintiff denied the power of the court to recommit for such a cause, and insisted that he was entitled to hold the judgment already rendered in the case, and to have execution issue thereon.</p> <p>The court, being of opinion that the case ought to he recommitted if the court had power to do so, reserved the question of its power on the ahoye facts for the advice of this court.</p>

Action on the case to recover damages for the neglect of the defendants, a railroad company, to keep certain cattle-passes in repair which they had agreed to maintain; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court on the general issue before Beardsley, J. Judgment for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the plaintiff for error in the rule of damages adopted by the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity, by a husband against his wife, for an account and delivery of certain furniture and other personal property, claimed to be in her possession and which she refused to give up, and to recover for moneys expended for the benefit of her real estate and for her personal benefit; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County.

Information against Charles W. Church and Newton S. Waldo, upon several counts, for obtaining land and money by false pretences; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the jury, bn the plea of not guilty, before Culver, J. Upon the trial the Attorney for the State offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, the following facts: In May, 1878, one John W. Finley was the owner of a farm in Glastonbury, and employed his daughter, Mrs. Lincoln,…

Bastardy complaint; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, and tried to the jury on the plea of not guilty, before McManus, J. Upon the trial the plaintiff offered herself as a witness and swore that the defendant was the father of the child, and stated all the circumstances with regard to the matter; but it appeared that she had not made disclosure of the fact at the time of her travail.

Information for burglary; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty, before Pardee, J. On the trial the Attorney for the State offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that the defendant entered the house of one Gantz, in the night season, through a window in the second story of the house about fifteen feet from the ground, which window was raised about sis inches and supported in this position by an…

Bill for an injunction against the granting of free passes, by the respondents, to members of the General Assembly and other state officers; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. Facts found and petition dismissed by the court, (Beardsley, J.,') and motion in error by the petitioner. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

- Trover for a horse; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County, and tried to the court, upon the general issue, before Mather, J. The court found the following facts: On the 23d of April, 1874, the plaintiff was married to Edwin C. Wheeler, then of Bozrah in this state, and on the same day started with him for Mount Carmel, in the state of New York, for the purpose of visiting a family named Powers who were residents of that place.

Bill in Equity, for an injunction against the collection of a judgment and for the ascertainment of partnership interest in certain attached and receipted property; brought to the Superior Court in Windham County. The respondent demurred to the bill, and the court (Granger, J'.,') sustained the demurrer and dismissed the- bill. The petitioner then brought the case before this court by a motion in error. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Replevin, to recover a mowing machine, claimed to be unlawfully detained by the defendant; brought to the Superior Court in Windham County, and tried to the court, on the general issue, before Q-ranger, J. The court found the following facts:—The plaintiff on the 10th of July, 1873, owned the mowing machine in question, and on that day made an agreement with one Armstrong under which the latter was to take the machine and pay the plaintiff $110 for it—$30 the next day and…

Petition for a new trial, upon a conviction of murder in the first degree; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, upon a finding of the facts, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Trespass de bonis asportatis; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court, on the general issue, with notice that the property was taken on an attachment by the defendant as an officer, before Peek, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Ejectment by husband and wife to recover possession of a piece of land claimed to belong to the wife; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Robinson, J. Both parties claimed under the following distribution of the estate of Joseph Ball, made on the 5th day of Eebruary, 1873, Mrs. Eoberti as an heir, and the defendant as grantee of Josiah I. M. Beach, another heir. “To Sarah B. Ball, widow of the deceased,…

Action on the case for damages to the plaintiffs as accommodation endorsers of a promissory note, by fraudulent acts of the defendant in relation to the note; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court, on the general issue, before Peck, J. The court made the following finding of facts.

Petitions for a partition and for an injunction; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. Pacts found by a committee and both cases reserved together for the advice of this court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on the statute concerning highways and bridges, for damages from an injury caused by a defect in a bridge of the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and heard in damages after demurrer overruled, by Sanford, J. Upon the hearing the plaintiff introduced evidence as to the place, cause, manner and extent of his injury, and among others, offered the testimony of one Martin, as to the character of the alleged defect in the bridge, who…

Assumpsit -upon a promissory note executed by the defendant, a married woman; brought to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, and heard before Shipman, District Judge, at the September Term, 1875, upon the general issue closed to the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>The term “mutual credits” is peculiar to the bankrupt laws of England and the United States. It has a more extensive meaning than the term “ mutual debts,” as used in the statutes relating to set-off, and has received a liberal construction for the benefit of trade.</p> <p>Where there is a debt due on one side, and on the other a delivery of property with directions to turn it into money, the property thus delivered constitutes a credit, and the case becomes one of mutual credit under the bankrupt laws.</p> <p>And where the party delivering the property goes into bankruptcy before the property is turned into money, the other party may still sell the property and apply the proceeds as a set-off against his debt to the bankrupt.</p> <p>Where there is a mere deposit of property without authority to turn it into money, it does not make a case of credit.</p> <p>It is not essential to such a credit that the delivery of the property must necessarily result in a pecuniary debt. It is enough if it would naturally so result, even though the bailor or his assignee in bankruptcy has the power to repay the advances and demand the property.</p> <p>And the indebtedness of the bailor to the bailee, upon which the proceeds of the sale of the property are applied, need not be merely advances made upon the property, but any existing indebtedness of the bailor to the bailee.</p> <p>Where the bailee had previous to the bankruptcy of the bailor and in good faith purchased for value the promissory notes of the bailor, it was held that the proceeds of such property could be held by the bailee for the payment of the notes.</p>

Petitions in cliancery brought to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, and heard at its September term, 1876, before Shipman, J. The cases are fully stated in the opinion.

Trespass on the case ; brought to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut. The defendants suffered a default, and the plaintiff moved for a hearing in damages before the Jury. The motion was argued at the September Term, 1876, before Shipman, District Judge.