State v. Garvin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Court: I’m going to sentence you on January 6. Understand that? “The Defendant: Yes, sir. “The Court: Now, if I give you more than fifteen [suspended] after eight and three probation, you can take your plea back. Understand that? As long as I give you that sentence you can’t take your plea back by saying I violated the plea agreement. You understand that? “The Defendant: Yes, sir. “The Court: Now, if you don’t show up on January 6, I’m going to order a rearrest, and they are going to come and they will find you, and they’ll arrest you. Now you are charged with failure to appear, you could get five years and, or, $5000 on that. You understand that? “The Defendant: Yes, sir. “The Court: But, I’m not going to be bound by the plea agreement of fifteen years suspended after eight years and three years probation. You understand that? “The Defendant: Yes, sir. “The Court: If you don’t show up, when they catch you, I could give you anywhere from nine months to forty years on the robbery, risk of injury, and the sexual assault second degree, plus you have the failure to appear to worry about. You understand that? “The Defendant: Yes, sir. “The Court: Any misunderstanding about that? “The Defendant: No, sir.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 144-45 n.3.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Gordon

2. “[T]he prohibition against double jeopardy is not implicated when a defendant is indicted for an incident of conduct previously used to increase the length of his sentence for a separate offense. . . . The Double Jeopardy Clause is no more implicated here than when a sentencing judge considered prior criminal activity (or convictions) in imposing a sentence. Consideration of criminal conduct as an aggravating circumstance does not convert the sentencing proceeding into a trial, conviction, or punishment for the criminal activity so considered. . . . [C]onsideration of other crimes at sentencing does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant is not actually being punished for the crimes so considered. Rather, the other crimes aggravate his guilt of, and justify heavier punishment for, the specific crime for which the defendant has just been convicted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11979 - State v. Saltus, No. Cr93-61897 (Nov. 13, 1997)

3. “Included as part of this consideration is conduct arising subsequent to the conviction of the underlying crime and prior to final sentencing. Although this subsequent conduct may result in separate criminal charges, numerous federal courts have held that such subsequent action is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. See United States v. Carey, 943 F.2d 44 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Mack, 938 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.1989); Sekou v. Blackburn, 796 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Brown, 785 F.2d 587 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Wise, 603 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir.1979).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Rowley