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← 43 F.1d 37 - Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R.’s Empirical Analysis

43 F. 37 · 1890

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
6
cited 6 times by the Supreme Court
June 1982
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 4 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions (6 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1982 · most notably Cincinnati Ry Co v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896), Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Kirby (1912)

9 federal appellate · 4 district ·

1501890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota · McDonald v. Hovey · McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester Railroad · Union Pac Ry Co v. United States · Killmer v. . N.Y.C. H.R.R.R. Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[sections 1, 2, 3 and 22] were intended to prohibit favoritism and partiality in traffic rates, where the circumstances and conditions were substantially similar and the service contemporaneous. Persons in like situations, requiring or desiring like and contemporaneous service on the part of carriers, were to be treated, in the matter of rates, impartially. This is expressed both affirmatively and negatively in the language of section 3. The carrier shall not give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favor of any particular person, company, or traffic, nor subject any particular person, company, or traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. These words necessarily involve the idea or element of comparison of one service or traffic with another similarly situated and circumstanced, and require that, to be undue and unreasonable, the preference or prejudice must relate and have reference to competing parties, producing between them unfairness and an unjust inequality in the rates charged them respectively for contemporaneous service under substantially the same circumstances and conditions. In determining the question whether rates give an undue preference or impose an undue’prejudice or disadvantage, consideration must be had to the relation which the persons or traffic affected bear to each other and to the carrier. When and so long as their relations are similar or “substantially” so, the carrier is prohibited from dealing different”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust and unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue preference or advantage, or subject to undue preference or disadvantage, persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers as they were at common law, free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, and generally to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are recognized as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.