Brady v. Interstate Commerce Commission’s Empirical Analysis
43 F.2d 847 · 1930
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 21 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2008
9 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 41
Relies on In Re Peterson · Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad · United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad · United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · Procter Gamble Company v. United States of America
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Amending section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Act June 29, 1906 provided that the Commission should determine just and reasonable maximum rates and just, fair, and reasonable practices with respect to transportation, and issue orders to carriers with respect thereto, and that all orders of the Commission, except orders for the payment of money, should take effect within such reasonable time, not less than thirty days, as might be prescribed by the Commission, unless same should be suspended or set aside by the Commission or by a court of competent jurisdiction. 34 Stat. 589 § 4 ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 15 ). By the amendment of section 16 ( 34 Stat. 590 , § 5 ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 16 ) ), it drew a clear distinction between reparation orders and other orders of the Commission, by providing for suit in the circuit courts to collect damages in the case of reparation orders not complied with, and for application to a court of equity for the enforcement of other orders. Following this was the provision for suits to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend orders of the Commission; and when all of these provisions are considered together, we think it clear that the jurisdiction thus conferred was intended to relate to quasi legislative orders, in which the public at large are interested, disobedience of which is made punishable, and the suspension of which is expressly provided for by section 15 of the act, and not to reparation orders which affect only the rights of private individuals, ”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The power to give reparations in rate cases is of statutory genesis and was unknown to the common law. It is a discretionary authority reposed in the Commission in order to round out the scheme of regulation. Congress endowed with administrative finality such orders of the Commission. “Jurisdiction of the District Court, sitting with three judges, in this type of situation is only to ‘enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.’ There are many orders of the Commission which cannot be reviewed by such a court. Although the earlier cases used phraseology indicating that such a court had no jurisdiction to set aside a ‘negative order which denies relief without more compels nothing requiring enforcement, and contemplates no action susceptible of being stayed,’ it was found that this formula ■ was too loosely stated for specific application. However, the courts constituted as this one is have no jurisdiction to review an order failing to allow reparations. The purpose of Congress in constituting the Commission and in the various acts giving jurisdiction was the establishment of uniformity of administration in light of the declared policy upon these very matters. “The prescription of reasonable and lawful rates for the future might be a basis for action, except that plaintiff obviously does not desire or seek annulment of the order upon the theory that relief should be granted as to this feature.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“affect only the rights of private individuals, have no binding force and do not subject anyone to punishment for disobedience.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.