Bondholder Committee v. Williamson County’s Empirical Analysis
43 F.3d 256 · 1994
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently February 2015 · most notably In Re John H. Gledhill, Fischer Enterprises, Inc. v. Geremia (In Re Kalian) (1995)
8 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 1141 · 11 U.S.C. § 301 · 11 U.S.C. § 362 · 11 U.S.C. § 502 · 11 U.S.C. § 503 · 11 U.S.C. § 506
Relies on United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. · Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority · New York v. United States · Doerr v. Doerr · Gregory v. Ashcroft
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“A “consensual” claim is one arising from a negotiated agreement, such as a security agreement giving the creditor an interest in specified collateral. A “non-consensual” claim is one arising without a specific agreement, such as a tax claim arising by statute or a judgment lien resulting from litigation.[ ] If § 506(b) controls this case, the result is that a commercial creditor is placed in a better position for the purposes of bankruptcy than a state in its taxing authority. This seems incongruous to us because under the construction given by the courts below a bank or other lender which enters into a security agreement can collect its costs and fees as itemized in the agreement, but a state entitled by statute to collect costs and fees is denied them because they arise by operation of law and not under an agreement. Both the policy and the result clearly seem unwise. However, a historical inquiry into this area of bankruptcy law convinces us that such is in fact the case and that like the courts below we are constrained to so hold.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. In Re Gift“Because we are persuaded that the 1978 Code follows pre-Code law in its general denial of postpetition additions to tax claims regardless of their origin, we find that Ron Pair applies to this state tax claim. ... Since the Supreme Court has ruled decisively on the meaning of § 506(b), it is now clear to us that the bankruptcy court was correct in allowing the County to recover postpetition interest but concluding that “Ron Pair requires disallowance of Williamson County’s claim for post-petition fees and costs because Williamson County’s claim arose by operation of law and not by agreement.” Brentwood Outpatient, 134 B.R. at 270.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.