43 Ill. 2d 36 - Thorpe v. Mahin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 100 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 107 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is next contended that the Act violates the uniformity provision of section 1 of article IX of our constitution and the equal-protection and due-process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by creating multiple classes and discriminating unreasonably among them. This contention is advanced specifically against the provisions which tax corporations at a 4% rate and individuals, trusts, and estates at 2}4% rate. “Both the equal-protection argument and the uniformity argument depend on the reasonableness of putting corporations in one class and individuals, trusts, and estates in another class for purposes of this tax. (See Grenier & Co. v. Stevenson, 42 Ill.2d 289 .) When the due-process contention has been advanced, this court, citing Supreme Court cases, has stated: ‘It has long been settled that the power of the legislature to make classifications, particularly in the field of taxation, is very broad, and that the fourteenth amendment imposes no “iron rule” of equal taxation. [Citations.] The reasons justifying the classification, moreover, need not appear on the face of the statute, and the classification must be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Citations.] The burden therefore rests on one who assails the statute to negate the existence of such facts. [Citations.]’ Department of Revenue v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 2 Ill.2d 483, 489-490 . “When the uniformity contention has been advance”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 49 Ill. 2d 137 - Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen

2. ““The Act does not state, however, whether the basis for determining gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset purchased or acquired prior to August 1, 1969, should be its August 1, 1969, value or its'date of acquisition value . . . . (I)t is most unusual that the tax would be made prospective by such specific language and the basis date for computing gain on the sale or exchange of property should be made retroactive by such nonspecific language, particularly when the rule of statutory construction is that statutes will not be construed retroactively unless it clearly appears such was the legislative intent.” Id. at 640.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tiedemann v. Johnson

3. ““*** in computing taxable gain on property acquired prior to August 1, 1969, the basis is date of acquisition value or the August 1, 1969, value, whichever is greater; in computing a deductible loss on property acquired prior to August 1, 1969, the basis is the date of acquisition value or the August 1, 1969, value, whichever is less.” (Thorpe v. Mahin (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 36, 54 , 250 N.E.2d 633, 642 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Revenue