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43 Mo. App. 629

Cunningham v. Williams

Missouri Court of Appeals

Decided February 2, 1891

Missouri Court of Appeals · decided 1891-02-02

— Hon. John A. Hockaday, Judge. (1) Defendants rely for reversal of this case on the ground that there never was a binding contract made by the parties, and under the statute of frauds neither'party can enforce the agreement. Both parties must be bound or neither is bound. Langstrap v. Ins. Co.. 48 Mo. 201, 204. All bargains to be complete are mutual and reciprocal; both parties must be bound and not one alone. 2 Schouler’s Personal Property [2 Ed.] secs. 223-229.

Relies on Mastin v. Grimes · Moore v. Mountcastle

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Afithmhd · Decided 1891-02-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently March 1943

12 state decisions

40189119001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Gill, J.

¶1This is an action wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for defendants’ failure and *631refusal to accept and pay for a lot of wheat alleged to have been contracted for by said defendants through their agent, A. W. Evans. The defense relied upon is the statute of frauds. On the trial in the circuit court plaintiff recovered damages in the sum of $480.26, and defendants appeal to this court.

¶2I. When Evans, the agent, agreed with plaintiff for the purchase of the wheat there was no memorandum in writing made and signed by either party. Evans, however, immediately reported by letter the terms, etc., of the purchase to his principals, these defendants. And they subsequently wrote to Evans in full acknowledgment of the purchase, and instructed Evans to see Cunningham and arrange with him to hold the wheat in his bins till a future day — that they were not ready then to receive it. There was ample memoranda in writing signed by defendants, and their authorized agent, to fill the requirements of the statute. The agreement is sufficiently shown if it appears by different memoranda, or even if in a letter written by the party sought to be charged and directed to a third party. 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 268; Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424.

¶3II. Defendants’ counsel, however, with seeming confidence, urges that the writing required by the statute is one signed by both parties to the contract of sale, and unless so signed cannot be enforced against either. The position is not tenable. The memorandum is sufficient if signed by the party to be charged — the party sought to be charged by the suit. Browne on Stat. of Frauds, sec. 365; Mastin v. Grimes, 88 Mo. 478. No distinction is made whether the section reads '■'■party to be charged” or “parties to be charged.” The same construction is adopted. Browne Stat. of Frauds, sec. 365.

¶4This record discloses no error in the action of the trial court. Its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

All concur.
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