Vespe v. DiMarco’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 83 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 89 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff must prove that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and the defendant under a general denial may show any circumstance which militates against his negligence or its causal effect. The so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing more than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury. * * * The statement in the quoted instruction on `unavoidable or inevitable accident' that these terms `simply denote an accident that occurred without having been proximately caused by negligence' informs the jury that the question of unavoidability or inevitability of an accident arises only where the plaintiff fails to sustain his burden of proving that the defendant's negligence caused the accident. Since the ordinary instructions on negligence and proximate cause sufficiently show that the plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof on these issues in order to recover, the instruction on unavoidable accident serves no useful purpose. * * * * * * "The instruction is not only unnecessary, but it is also confusing. When the jurors are told that `in law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable or inevitable accident' they may get the impression that unavoidability is an issue to be decided and that, if proved, it constitutes a separate ground of nonliability of the defendant. Thus they may be misled as to the proper m”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Schaub v. Linehan · Fry v. Carter

2. “Immediately thereafter [the trial judge] gave this specific declaration: “Members of the jury, negligence is never presumed, it must be proved. The mere happening of a collision or the sustaining of injuries is not in and of itself evidence of negligence. * * * ” That statement, in the light of the proof in the case and defense counsel’s summation, and because of its location in the charge after the reference to defendant’s skidding, not only did not instruct the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur, it affirmatively excluded the relevant inference of negligence from their consideration. Thus having been advised they must follow the law as given by the court, they were now told they could not infer negligence from the fact that defendant’s skidding car struck the faultless plaintiff. Such a positive deprivation of an important benefit to which plaintiff was entitled and on which his case depended in substantial measure, was not just error; it was more than that. It injuriously affected a substantial right of the plaintiff and possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. Therefore, it was plain error. We do not believe a trial judge discharges his burden fully when he fails to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its effect on the case when it is clearly applicable. In such cases he should advise the jury that from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff as to the manner in which the accident happened, they may infer causative negligenc”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 86 N.J. Super. 323 - Ardis v. Reed · Eaton v. Eaton

3. “[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a type of circumstantial evidence upon which plaintiff may rely to discharge his burden of proving defendant's negligence.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 86 N.J. Super. 323 - Ardis v. Reed · 266 N.J. Super. 662 - Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises