O'Malley v. Eagan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 77 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘A motorist has a right to presume that the driver of a vehicle coming from the opposite direction will obey the law, and to act upon such an assumption in determining his own manner of using the road; and a driver, therefore, proceeding on the right side of the traveled way, may assume that the driver of a vehicle approaching on the same side, or on his left side, will yield half the way, or will turn out in time to avoid a collision, and not force him, in violation of the statute or ordinance, or the lam of the road, to turn from the part of the road, on which he is lawfully driving, until.he sees or ought to see, that such assumption is unwarranted.’ [1 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of ' Automobile Law, p. 416.]” (Emphasis supplied by defendants.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cimoli v. Greyhound Corporation · Farrell v. Cameron

2. ““An automobile driver who, by the negligence of another and not by his own negligence, is suddenly placed in an emergency and compelled to act instantly to avoid a collision or injury is not guilty of negligence if he makes such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make, even though he did not make the wisest choice and one that would have been re- ■ quired in the exercise of ordinary-care, but for the emergency. Nor, if he so acts under these circumstances, is he guilty of contributory negligence, at least, negligence or contributory negligence on his part cannot be found as a matter of law. Where the situation of peril arises because of the driver’s own negligence, the emergency rule cannot be invoked in his behalf. Moreover, the emergency rule does not apply if the driver is not in a position of sudden peril, even though he mistakenly thinks he is because he does ■ not use his sense of sight to see what is plainly observable. “The sudden emergency doctrine is not an exception to the general rule; the question is whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent and careful person would have done under the same circumstances, and the emergency is one of the circumstances contemplated by the rule. If the defendant’s course was one that an ordinarily prudent and careful driver put in such a position might have taken, he is relieved from liability; otherwise he is not. The driver’s own judgment or impulse is not in any situation, emergen”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Leonard v. United States

3. “Conceding, as mentioned, the defendant's negligence as above stated, it must be determined as to whether or not it was the proximate cause of the injury, or one of the proximate causes thereof. Ordinarily that question is for the jury. Hines v. Sweeney , 28 Wyo. 57 , 201 P. 165 , 1018 ; 45 C. J. 1168. That is true where different inferences may fairly be drawn even though the evidence is undisputed. But it is a question for the court where but one inference and conclusion can be drawn from the evidence; and whether only one inference may be drawn must necessarily ultimately rest with the court, for otherwise the jury would at all times have the right to arbitrarily determine the point.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wood v. CRST Expedited, Inc.