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← 430 F.2d 132 - Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services

Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services’s Empirical Analysis

430 F.2d 132 · 1970

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
August 1995
most recently cited

32 federal appellate · 6 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 1995 · most notably Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran (1982), Fey v. Walston & Co. (1974)

32 federal appellate · 6 district · 1 state decisions

340197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 283 F. Supp. 417 - Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co. · 291 F. Supp. 705 - Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co. · 265 F. Supp. 440 - Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co. · Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “While the point was not argued by the parties, we feel it necessary to consider first whether an investor has a right to institute an action against a dealer for churning a commodity account. Such an action is not specifically provided for by the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 . We believe, however, that a private remedy for churning a commodity account is permitted by either § 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F.Supp. 440 (N.D.Ill.1967), or the applicable portions of the Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq., Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F.Supp. 423, 429, n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1968); W.J. Abbott & Co. v. S.E.C., 276 F.Supp. 502 (W.D.Pa.1967). See also, Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F.Supp. 705 (D.Minn.1968); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F.Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.1968).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Whether or not trading in an account has been excessive is a fact question which cannot be determined by any precise rule or formula. “The essential question of fact for determination is whether the volume and frequency of transactions, considered in the light of the nature of the account and the situation, needs and objectives of the customer, have been so ‘excessive’ as to indicate a purpose of the broker to derive profit for himself while disregarding the interests of his customer.” Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., supra, 283 F.Supp. [417] at 435 [N.D.Cal. 1968].... In attempting to make this subjective determination, the SEC and the courts often look to the more objective criteria of turnover ratio, nature of the trading and the dealer’s profits.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The commodity markets are highly volatile and are thus trading rather than investing vehicles.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.