Estate of Smith v. Marasco’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 6 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “confronted with a hyperpressurized environment such as a high-speed chase . . . it is usually necessary to show that the officer deliberately harmed the victim.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Eichelman v. Lancaster County · John Kaucher v. County Of Bucks

2. “'the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight...[whether] the physical force applied was of such an extent as to lead to injury...the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time' ") (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing , 128 F.3d 810 , 821-22 (3d Cir. 1997) ). With respect to whether any right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the defendant's conduct, the Kisela Court further explained: Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 904 F. Supp. 2d 785 - Eibel v. Melton · 328 F. Supp. 3d 447 - Kelley v. O'Malley

3. “[E]xcept in those cases involving either true split-second decisions or . . . those in which officials have the luxury of relaxed deliberation, an official's conduct may create state-created danger liability if it exhibits a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that shocks the conscience.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. John Kaucher v. County Of Bucks · Kaucher