Schwennen v. Abell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The fault of parties toward the claimant which has not been placed in issue cannot be considered. Peterson v. Pittman, 391 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 1986). Similarly, fault of parties placed in issue in the pleadings which is ultimately determined to be legally insufficient to support the claim may not be considered in the aggregate fault apportionment. Payne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Bob McKiness Excavating & Grading, 382 N.W.2d 156, 158-60 (Iowa 1986); Reese v. Werts Corp., 379 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1985).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lee v. Small · Pepper v. Star Equipment, Ltd.

2. “A salient feature of our comparative fault legislation is the provision in section 668.3(5) that the jury must be made aware of the effect of its fault apportionment on the claimant’s right of recovery. In Reese, 379 N.W.2d at 4 , we found it to be reversible error for the court to fail to instruct on this matter or to give misleading instructions with respect thereto. The instructions given the jury in the present case were based on the premise that William could be subjected, as he was, to some allocation of causal fault. When William’s fault is disregarded the interpolated verdicts suggested by Mary will have a substantially different effect on the Schwennen defendants and Floyd County than the jury would have perceived them to have under the trial court’s instructions. This circumstance, we believe, requires that the apportionment of fault among the remaining parties must be tried anew.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reilly v. Anderson

3. “[Loss of consortium] is comprised of [the deprived spouse’s] own physical, psychological and emotional pain and anguish which results when her husband is negligently injured to the extent that he is no longer capable of providing the love, affection, companionship, comfort or sexual relations concomitant with a normal married life.... From the vantage point of the negligent defendant, [the deprived spouse] is simply a foreseeable plaintiff to whom he owes a separate duty of care.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Huber v. Hovey