430 Pa. Super. 63 - Commonwealth v. Manchas’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, supra 324 Pa.Super. [420] at 425, 471 A.2d [1228] at 1230 [ (1984) ]. The decision whether to grant a new trial on this basis rests within the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 381 Pa.Super. 606, 617 , 554 A.2d 550, 555 (1989). “A trial court should award a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and [make] the award of a new trial [ ] imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 239 , 512 A.2d 1152, 1155-1156 (1986). “The role of an appellate court in reviewing the weight of the evidence is very limited.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 426 Pa.Super. 362, 367 , 627 A.2d 183,185 (1993). “The purpose of that review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and not to substitute [the reviewing] Court’s judgment for that of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 408 Pa.Super. 435, 440 , 597 A.2d 111, 114 (1991) (en banc). Accordingly, “[w]here the evidence is conflicting, the credibility of the witnesses is solely for the jury, and if its finding is supported by the record, the trial ”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 447 Pa. Super. 98 - Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno · 441 Pa. Super. 653 - Commonwealth v. Hodge

2. ““It is the rule in Pennsylvania that the testimony of an accomplice of a defendant, given at the latter’s trial, comes from a corrupt source and is to be carefully scrutinized and accepted with caution; it is clear error for the trial judge to refuse to give a charge to this effect after being specifically requested to do so— The justification for the instruction is that an accomplice witness will inculpate others out of a reasonable expectation of leni ency.... An accomplice charge is necessitated not only when the evidence requires an inference that the witness was an accomplice, but also when it permits that inference. . . . Thus if the evidence is sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the prosecution’s witness was an accomplice, the defendant is entitled to an instruction as to the weight to be given to that witness’ testimony.... Where, however, there is no evidence that would permit the juiy to infer that a Commonwealth witness was an accomplice, the court may conclude as a matter of law that he was not an accomplice and may refuse to give the charge. . . . This is so because a trial court is not obliged to instruct a jury upon legal principles which have no applicability to the presented facts. There must be some relationship between the law upon which an instruction is required and the evidence presented at trial.” Commonwealth v. Manchas, 430 Pa. Super. 63, 80-81 , 633 A.2d 618, 627 (1993). (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (in”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Aviles · 2005 Pa. Super. 33 - Commonwealth v. Hall