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431 So. 2d 704

Docket No. 82-1978.

State v. Bartz

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Janet Marie BARTZ, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1983-05-20

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 1996

11 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[t]he record fails to reflect that [Williams] had a lawful property interest in the automobile or the seized items, and there was no other evidence presented to establish that [he] had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile in which [he] was a passenger.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 173 W. Va. 187 - State v. Tadder, 640 So. 2d 1206 - Williams v. State

“By simply showing that he was a passenger in the car from which the police seized the incriminating evidence, defendant did not demonstrate that he possessed any ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in the area searched. The disputed search and seizure did not infringe upon any interest of defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. Since defendant has failed to show that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by this search and seizure, he cannot gain standing by asserting the constitutional rights of others.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 173 W. Va. 187 - State v. Tadder

Relies on Rakas v. Illinois · Jones v. United States · United States v. Salvucci

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-05-20

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

¶2No appearance for appellee.

¶3SCHOONOVER, Judge.

¶4The appellant, the State of Florida, has appealed from an order suppressing evidence seized during a warrantless search of an automobile in which the appellee, Janet Marie Bartz, was a passenger. The state contends that the appellee did not demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the property was seized and therefore the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.

¶5The state filed an information charging the appellee with possession of cocaine and cannabis. The appellee then filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle in which she was a passenger at the time of her arrest. Her motion alleged that the search and seizure was conducted without a search warrant and there was no probable cause for her arrest.

¶6At the commencement of the hearing on the appellee's motion, the assistant state attorney asserted that the appellee did not have "standing" to attack the search because she was a passenger in the vehicle. The court reserved ruling on the state's assertion and the hearing proceeded. Testimony revealed that the controlled substances in question were seized from the center console of the automobile in which the appellee was a passenger and from the person of the driver of the automobile. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the appellee's motion to suppress.

¶7It is not necessary to determine if the trial court erred in its ruling on the issue concerning the legality of the search. Regardless of the propriety of the search, the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois,439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Hutchinson,404 So.2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States,362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci,448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), and by this court in State v. Hutchinson.

¶8*705 The record fails to reflect that the appellee had a lawful property interest in the automobile or the seized items, and there was no other evidence presented to establish that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile in which she was a passenger. The trial court accordingly erred in granting the motion to suppress. Acebo v. State,415 So.2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. W.E.T.,399 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

¶9We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.

¶10HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.

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