Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 432 F.2d 741 - Austin Village, Inc. v. United States

Austin Village, Inc. v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

432 F.2d 741 · 1970

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
June 2008
most recently cited

15 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently June 2008 · most notably Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner (1986), Raymond v. United States (1975)

15 federal appellate ·

1701970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 163

Relies on Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein D Stanton · Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States · Tyler v. Tomlinson · Berthold v. Commissioner · Byerlite Corporation v. Parker C. Williams, District Director of Internal Revenue, Eighteenth District of Ohio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Although the intention of the [parties] is weighed heavily in determining whether the advances are loans, * * * the intention of the [parties] ‘can appropriately be viewed with some diffidence unless supported by other facts which bring the transaction much closer to a normal arms-length loan.’ Berthold v. Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] [ 404 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1968)] * * * This Court has recently stated that important proofs of such intent are the arrangements concerning the normal security, interest and repayment or efforts to secure the same.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ * * * we have analyzed the factors relevant to a determination whether the advances here constituted genuine loans, and have concluded that any finding other than that the advances represented capital investments would be clearly erroneous. The maturity dates and interest rates assigned to the alleged loans were, at best, illusory and in fact no interest payments or payments of principal had been made at the time this litigation commenced. Moreover, there was no unconditional promise to repay the loans, no fixed schedule of payments, no security and no sinking fund to provide funds for repayment. Also, it is significant that the putative loans were subordinated to the claims of all other creditors and were the result of the shareholders’ inability to obtain sufficient conventional financing for the project.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The maturity dates and interest rates assigned to the alleged loans were, at best, illusory, and in fact no interest payments or payments of principal had been made at the time this litigation commenced. Moreover, there was no unconditional promise to repay the loans, no fixed schedule of payments, no security and no sinking fund to provide funds for repayment. Also, it is significant that the putative loans were subordinated to the claims of all other creditors and were the result of the shareholders’ inability to obtain sufficient conventional financing for the project. By way of contrast, the bank loans that eventually were obtained had the conventional indicia of debt and were repaid in due course.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.