Pena v. Deprisco’s Empirical Analysis
432 F.3d 98 · 2005
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 12 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 109 later decisions — most recently November 2021 · most notably Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A. (2006), Sanford ex rel. Estate of Sanford v. Stiles (2006)
24 federal appellate · 12 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Relies on Mitchell v. Forsyth · County of Sacramento v. Lewis · Duncan v. Walker · SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al. · Joshua Deshaney, a Minor, by His Guardian Ad Litem, and Melody Deshaney,s v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, et al.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In order to establish a violation of a right to substantive due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only government action but also that the government action was 'so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.' " Pena , 432 F.3d at 112 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 1717 n.8, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) ). To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must show the government decision it challenges "was arbitrary or irrational or motivated by bad faith.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We did not, in Dwares , explicitly ask Whether the officers’ conduct there in issue “shocked the conscience.” We did, however, note that the complaint before the court made “sufficient factual allegations from which a factfinder could infer intentional discrimination.” Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Proof of an agreement by defendant officers with ‘skinheads’ . expressly to permit flag burners to. be beaten up without official interference or reprisal, and of a failure by the officers to interrupt such beatings inflicted in their presence, would easily permit the finder of fact to infer that the officers intended the flag burners qua fag burners to suffer the injuries inflicted.” (emphasis added)). If the question had been asked explicitly, we think that-we would have answered that such intentional inflict of injury would shock even the least sensitive of contemporary consciences.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Although it is a close question, we think that the substantive due process violation that the plaintiffs allege here was not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. Dwares did not address, let alone decide, whether repeated inaction on the part of government officials over a long period of time without an explicit statement of approval, might effectively constitute such an implicit “prior assurance” that it rises to the level of an affirmative act. Dwares also did not indicate whether government officials may implicitly send a message of official sanction by engaging in related misconduct themselves or by participating in or tolerating such a practice.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.