432 Pa. Super. 276 - Schriver v. Mazziotti’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

62 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Moreover, in summary judgment proceedings, it is not the court’s function to determine the facts, but only to determine if an issue of material fact exists. Summary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record and affidavits on file support the trial court’s conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 437 Pa. Super. 41 - Acme Markets, Inc. v. Federal Armored Express, Inc. · 439 Pa. Super. 366 - Feninger v. Capital Accumulations Services, Inc.

2. “Both Leidich and Hoeke [ 6 ] indicate that when the plaintiff attempts to give notice to the defendant, and does so, albeit in a technically defective fashion, and the plaintiff has not engaged in conduct to forestall ‘the machinery of justice’, our court’s [sic] will find that the statute of limitations has been tolled and allow the action to proceed. In the instant case, however, appellant never sent notice, technically defective or otherwise, to appellee within the limitations period....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia · 455 Pa. Super. 30 - Fulco v. Shaffer

3. “Plaintiffs are required to make a good faith effort to notify a defendant of a commenced action ... Lamp v. Heyman, 469 Pa. 465 , 366 A.2d 882 (1976). The purpose behind this requirement is “to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but by not making a good faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” Lamp, 469 Pa. at 478 , 366 A.2d at 889 . Thus the Court in Lamp held that a “writ of summons shall remain effective to commence an action only if the plaintiff then refrains from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion.” Id. * * * A plaintiff will, therefore, fail to satisfy the good faith requirement when he takes affirmative steps to prevent service on a defendant. (Citations omitted.) Additionally, “At a minimum, the good faith effort required in Lamp v. Heyman, supra, mandates compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure, and importantly, local practice.” (Citations omitted.) Moreover, when “a praecipe is filed but the writ is not served the burden is on the plaintiff to show that he made a good faith attempt to have the writ served.” (Citations omitted.) The same burden applies when a complaint is filed but service is not effected. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Teamann v. Zafris