432 So. 2d 234 - State v. Wiggins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Surely, the legislature has the authority under its police power to limit the `rights of citizenship' restored by an automatic pardon....”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dear v. State · State v. Riser

2. “A. It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of [certain enumerated felo nies], or who has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would be one of the above enumerated crimes, to possess a firearm or cany a concealed weapon. C. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Section shall not apply to the following cases: (1) The provisions of this Section prohibiting the possession of firearms and carrying concealed weapons by persons who have been convicted of certain felonies shall not apply to any person who has not been convicted of any felony for a period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. (2) Upon completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence the convicted felon shall have the right to apply to the sheriff of the parish in which he resides, or in the case of Orleans Parish the superintendent of police, for a permit to possess firearms. The felon shall be entitled to possess firearms upon the issuing of the permit. La.Rev.StatAnn. § 14:95.1 (West 1986 & Supp.1995).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Dupaquier · 438 So. 2d 565 - State v. Wiggins

3. “... We recognize that there is a difference in the effect of a "pardon" under Art. 4, § 5(E)(1), and restoration of "full rights of citizenship" under Art. 1, § 20. Art. 1, § 20 restores only the basic rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote, work or hold public office. On the other hand, Art. 4, § 5(E)(1) restores privileges as well as rights, such as the privilege of holding a liquor license. That does not mean, however, that the automatic pardon provision restores the status of innocence to the convict who has merely served out his sentence. * * * * * * A full pardon granted by the governor has presumably been given the careful consideration of several persons who have taken into account the circumstances surrounding the offense, and particular facts relating to the individual. We do not feel, however, that the delegates to the 1973 Constitutional Convention, in including this provision in the 1974 Constitution (or the legislature before them in proposing a similar amendment to Art. 5, § 10 of the 1921 Constitution, La. Acts 1968, No. 662, § 1), intended that service of one's sentence be the only prerequisite for restoration of the status of innocence. If the legislature had intended that a first offense could not be relied upon for enhancement of punishment, it could easily have said so. Hence, we hold that the automatic pardon provision of Art. 4, § 5(E)(1) does not preclude consideration of a first felony conviction in adjudicating a person as a habitual offend”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Riser