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432 So. 2d 633

Docket No. 82-1756.

State v. Blanco

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jesus BLANCO, Lazaro Estevez and Angel Estevez Quintero, Appellees.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided May 31, 1983.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1983-05-31

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“the state specifically denies that the material facts as presented in the defendant's sworn motion to dismiss are the only facts upon which the state would rely during the state's case in chief.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 758 So. 2d 110 - State v. Kalogeropolous, 678 So. 2d 426 - Branciforte v. State

“[Wjhere, as here, the facts as alleged in the sworn motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) do not constitute all of the material facts which the state will rely upon at trial to constitute the crime charged, there is no basis upon which to grant the motion. In such a case, the trial court is not in a position to ascertain whether the facts upon which the state relies to constitute the crime charged establish, as a matter of law, a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. Upon the filing of the traverse in the instant case, the trial court was required to deny the sworn motions to dismiss. 432 So.2d 634 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Cole

Relies on State v. Upton · 380 So. 2d 534 - State v. Fort · State v. Horne

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-05-31

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently May 2000

11 state decisions

50198319902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*634 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

¶2Emilio de la Cal, Miami and Nathaniel L. Barone, Jr., South Miami, for appellees.

¶3Before HENDRY, HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5The final order dismissing the information in this cause under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Our review of the record indicates that the state filed a traverse to the defendants' sworn motions to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) wherein the state averred at the outset:

"The State specifically denies that the material facts as presented in the Defendant's Sworn Motion to Dismiss are the only facts upon which the State would rely during the State's case in chief."

¶6It follows, given this traverse, that the trial court did not have before it all the material undisputed facts in the case and, accordingly, had no basis to conclude, as it did, that the material undisputed facts of the case did not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.

¶7The court stated in State v. Upton,392 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), as follows:

"The function of a `(c)(4)' motion to dismiss is to ascertain whether or not the facts which the State relies upon to constitute the crime charged, and on which it will offer evidence to prove it, do, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of guilt of the accused."

¶8It is clear that where, as here, the facts as alleged in the sworn motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) do not constitute all of the material facts which the state will rely upon at trial to constitute the crime charged, there is no basis upon which to grant the motion. In such a case, the trial court is not in a position to ascertain whether the facts upon which the state relies to constitute the crime charged establish, as a matter of law, a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. Upon the filing of the traverse in the instant case, the trial court was required to deny the sworn motions to dismiss. See e.g., State v. Horne,399 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Wright,386 So.2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Fort,380 So.2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

¶9Reversed and remanded.

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