Michael Arthur Donovan v. Earl Reinbold and Harley Askew, Michael Arthur Donovan v. Earl Reinbold and Harley Askew’s Empirical Analysis
433 F.2d 738 · 1970
Citation profile
81 federal appellate · 25 district · 16 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 143 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2016 · most notably Carey v. Piphus (1978), 16 Cal. 3d 834 - Williams v. Horvath (1976)
81 federal appellate · 25 district · 16 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 Will County Illinois · Monroe v. Pape · Pierson v. Ray · Flast v. Cohen
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 143 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Their alternative contention is that state officials are immune from liability for discretionary acts done within the scope of their authority. (Citations omitted) . . . cautiously extend immunity to some state officials performing some kinds of discretionary acts. Thus in Silver [Silver v. Dickson, 9 Cir., 403 F.2d 642 ] immunity was extended to members of a state parole board in the performance of their discretionary duties in denying parole. In Hoffman [Hoffman v. Halden, 9 Cir., 268 F.2d 280 ] immunity was recognized for a jailer or keeper who refused to release a prisoner held on warrant or commitment. Neither case stands for the broad principle that all public officials are immune from Civil Rights Act liability if their acts were discretionary and were done within the scope of their official duties.” 433 F.2d 738, 744 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““[t]he purpose of according judicial immunity is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. It is not to shield lawyers or judges from liability for the invasion of another’s federally secured constitutional rights, when the alleged invasion did not occur during the performance of acts that are an integral part of the judicial process.” 433 F.2d at 743 . [Emphasis supplied]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Congress has not evinced any intention to defer to the states the definition of the federal right created in section 1983, or to adopt the states’ remedies or procedures for the vindication of that right. It has never indicated an intent to engraft onto the federal right state concepts of sovereign immunity or of state susceptibility to suit, which are the concepts that are the roots of the California Tort Claims Act. Indeed, the history of section 1983, summarized in Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 , vividly demonstrates that state concepts of sovereign immunity were alien to the purposes to be served by the Civil Rights Act. (See also, Beauregard v. Wingard (S.D.Cal.1964) 230 F.Supp. 167, 173 .) An incorporation of such state created policies ‘would practically constitute a judicial repeal of the Civil Rights Act.’ (Hoffman v. Halden (9th Cir. 1959) 268 F.2d 280, 300 ; Jobson v. Henne (2d Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 129 .) At p. 742.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.