Smith v. Smith

¶1The issue we must decide in this case is whether the Age of Majority Act1 effectively rendered as null and void the "exceptional circumstances” clause of MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1). Upon dissolution of a marriage, § 17a grants the court jurisdiction to require either parent to make payments for the support of each child until the age of eighteen years, and in the case of "exceptional circumstances,” support payments may be required after a child "attains that age.”

¶2We find that the amendments of the child support and custody statutes enacted subsequent to the passage of the Age of Majority Act, which employ the restrictive term "minor child,” evidence a legislative intent to authorize support payments for the benefit of minor children only. *610Further, the history of appellate court interpretation of § 17a supports the conclusion that the duration of child support payments is limited by the age of majority statute. Therefore, we conclude that the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a is a legal nullity and that support payments may not be awarded beyond the age of majority, eighteen years.

¶3Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in authorizing postmajority child support payments upon a finding of "exceptional circumstances.” Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

¶4I. PACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

¶5The Washtenaw Circuit Court granted Mary Carien Smith and Michael Clarke Smith a judgment of divorce on August 30, 1973. The parties had one child, Aimee, who suffers physical and mental deficiencies as a result of birth defects. These deficiencies have been diagnosed to be permanent.

¶6In August of 1984, plaintiff filed a motion to increase child support and to extend support beyond Aimee’s eighteenth birthday. The trial court denied the motion, holding that it lacked authority to award postmajority support. However, the Court of Appeals authorized the trial court to award postmajority support and remanded the case to determine whether Aimee’s condition constituted an "exceptional circumstance.”2 Defendant sought leave to appeal, which we granted on June 22, 1988.3_

¶7*611II. ANALYSES

¶8A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

¶9The child support statute upon which the issue centers is MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1). The pertinent part of § 17a provides:

The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter to award custody of each child to 1 of the parties or a third person until each child has attained the age of 18 years and may require either parent to pay such allowance as may be deemed proper for the support of each child until each child shall have attained that age and may in case of exceptional circumstances, require payment of such allowance for any child after he attains that age.

¶10In the event of exceptional circumstances, Michigan courts have consistently authorized support payments beyond the prescribed statutory age, but limited such support to the age of majority, which was then twenty-one years. Titus v Titus, 311 Mich 434, 437; 18 NW2d 883 (1945); Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich 418, 426; 78 NW2d 216 (1956).4 However, the subsequent amendment of the Age of Majority *612Act, which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years, put in question the legal validity of the exceptional-circumstances provision of § 17a.

¶11We begin our analyses by looking at the first sentence of § 17a which provides: "The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter . . . MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1) (emphasis added). Following this sentence, § 17a uses the word "child”5 five additional times. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines the term "child”:

2a: a young person esp. between infancy and youth; b: a childlike or childish person; c: a person not yet of age.

¶12Given this commonly accepted definition of "child” and the use of the words "minor children” in the first sentence of § 17a, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended the word "child” in § 17a to apply exclusively to minor children.6

¶13Moreover, it is important to note that at the time the Legislature enacted § 17a, the age of majority in Michigan was twenty-one. Thus, absent exceptional circumstances, § 17a statutorily limited support payments up to the time of a child’s eighteenth birthday, three years before the age of majority. It was this Court in Johnson, supra,that interpreted the exceptional-circumstances clause to allow support payments beyond a *613child’s eighteenth birthday, but not beyond the age of majority.

¶14After MCL 722.52; MSA 25.244(52) reduced the age of majority to eighteen years, in our judgment, amendments of the child support and custody laws evidence the intention of the Legislature to leave intact the Johnsonrationale.

¶15MCL 552.15; MSA 25.95 governs the care, custody, and support of minor children during the pendency of an action to dissolve a marriage. Specifically, § 1 of the current version of this statute, 1985 PA 214,7 uses the term "minor children” three times; whereas, the preamendment version of § 1 referred only once to "minor children,” and once to "children.”8_

¶16*614Similarly, MCL 552.16; MSA 25.96 governs the care, custody, and support of minor children after a divorce judgment. Again, the pertinent segment of the statute, § 16(1), refers only to "minor children.”9

¶17There can be no dispute that §§ 15 through 17a of Michigan’s divorce laws, MCL 552.1 et seq.; MSA 25.81 et seq., address the issue of child custody and support pursuant to a divorce action. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together. Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 531; 33 NW2d 69 (1948). Thus, § 17a, by its initial reference to "minor children,” coupled with §§ 15 and 16 which refer exclusively to "minor children,” evidence the intent of the Legislature to align the child support laws with the rationale that payments are to be limited by the age of majority, currently eighteen years.

¶18Consistent with the legislative intent of §§ 15 through 17a is the 1980 amendment of the Child Custody Act.101980 PA 161, § 1 amended § 7(1) of *615the Child Custody Act by deleting the "exceptional circumstances” clause. Now, pursuant to § 7(1), a circuit court has authority to award support payments only until a child becomes eighteen years of age. Reference to "exceptional circumstances” has been completely omitted.11

¶19Finally, 1972 PA 16 amended 1968 PA 29312 for the specific purpose of reconciling the statute with the Age of Majority Act. 1972 PA 16, § 1 amended the definition of the term "minor” to "a person under the age of 18 years,” from "a person under the age of 21 years.” MCL 722.1(a); MSA 25.244(l)(a). The saving clause of this amendment, 1972 PA 16, § 2, preserves all rights and duties of a person incurred prior to January 1, 1972, "[a]s if [1971 PA 79] had not been passed.”131972 PA 16*616also amended § 4(l)(b) of the emancipation statute which now provides: "(1) An emancipation occurs by operation of law: (b) When a person reaches the age of 18 years.”14 In fact, throughout the entire emancipation statute, reference is only made to "a minor.” See MCL 722.4; MSA 25.244(4).15

¶20*617The amendments of the Child Custody Act and the emancipation statute exemplify how the Legislature has acted to conform the laws governing the protection and support of children with the Age of Majority Act.16 Quoting from Kaimowitz, Legal emancipation of minors in Michigan, 19 Wayne L R 23, 24 (1972):

If a legislative body wishes, for whatever purpose, it can wave a magic wand and emancipate him [a minor] to suit its convenience. Though 21 usually is the dividing line between minority and majority, the age of majority in Michigan is now 18. The state seemingly can be as arbitrary as it pleases in raising or lowering the barrier for all or just some purposes.11

¶21While the Legislature has the ability to "waive a magic wand,” this Court is bound to interpret § 17a in accordance with the intent of the Legisla*618ture. Const 1963, art 3, § 2,17 and art 4, § l.18 The power to statutorily limit the duration of child support payments is within the exclusive discretion of the Legislature. Though nearly a century old, the holding of Detroit v Wayne Co Circuit Judge, 79 Mich 384, 387; 44 NW 622 (1890), is applicable. ("It is one of the necessary and fundamental rules of law that the judicial power cannot interfere with the legitimate discretion of any other department of government.”) See also Wayne Co Prosecutor v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 93 Mich App 114, 121; 286 NW2d 62 (1979) ("The judiciary will not interfere with the discretionary actions of the legislative bodies”).

¶22The Legislature has taken affirmative action to amend the child support laws, the Child Custody Act, and the Emancipation of Minors Act. All of the amendments evidence a legislative intent to retain the longstanding rule that support payments are to be limited by the age of majority.19 It is the intent of the Legislature, supported by its affirmative actions, which we find persuasive.20 The contention by the dissent that we are "relying on legislative silence,” post, p 652, is wholly un*619founded and in disregard of the actions of the Legislature. When a legislature enacts or amends a statute, it must be presumed to have knowledge of existing statutes and laws. People v Rosecrants, 88 Mich App 667, 670; 278 NW2d 713 (1979). Therefore, we conclude that the exceptional-circumstances clause of MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1) is legally void.21

¶23We acknowledge that this conclusion is contrary to MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b), originally adopted by this Court in 1972 as GCR 1963, 729.2(1).22 However, this Court has said that court rules may take precedence over statutory language only in matters involving judicial rules of practice and proce*620dure. See Perin v Peuler, 373 Mich 531; 130 NW2d 4 (1964). The child support provision of § 17a is a matter of substantive law and, as such, supersedes MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b).

¶24Furthermore, because the court’s jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding is defined by statute, the court rule cannot expand jurisdiction to authorize child support beyond a child’s eighteenth birthday. Felcoski v Felcoski, 159 Mich App 762; 407 NW2d 11 (1987). Therefore, we hold that MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b) does not provide a court authority to award postmajority child support. Moreover, insofar as this court rule may interfere with any legislative act governing substantive law, the court rule is without legal effect.23

¶25While the dissent does not contradict the rule that substantive statutory language supplants a contradictory court rule, it does make the claim that MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b) "is a further indication that the appellate courts of this state have not clearly resolved this issue, and that, therefore, the Legislature cannot be held to have acquiesced in what the appellate courts of this state have not finally resolved.” Post, p 652.

¶26Ironically, Justice Cavanagh participated in a Court of Appeals decision which addressed this precise issue, involving the same statute and the same court rule. In McNames v McNames, 93 Mich App 477, 480; 286 NW2d 892 (1979), the Court cited verbatim Price v Price, 51 Mich App 656, 660-661; 215 NW2d 756 (1974), which held:

"The problem arises when we attempt to insert the court rule in place of the statutory language. *621The Supreme Court itself has indicated that court rules may take precedence over statutory language only in matters involving judicial rules of practice and procedure. Perm v Peuler, 373 Mich 531; 130 NW2d 4 (1964). This being a matter of the substantive law, the legislative enactment must control. The trial court’s reliance on GCR 1963, 729.2(1) to justify an award of support to a child who has reached the age of majority contravenes the Legislature’s expressed intent in the statute enabling a circuit court to award any support at all, as interpreted by decisions of the Supreme Court. Until such time as the Legislature sees fit to settle the inconsistency between the support statute and the Age of Majority Act, we are bound to follow its mandate.” [Emphasis added.]

The correctness of this reasoning was not assailed by our Supreme Court when it reversed the result in Price v Price, 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975).

¶27Thus, the conclusion of the dissent is not only in conflict with the prior position of its author, it contravenes the history of Michigan jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the present matter before us and its progeny, no final Michigan appellate decision has sustained an award of postmajority child support.

¶28B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

¶29This Court has consistently held that support payments may be required only until a child attains the age of majority. This principle was recognized over 120 years ago in Chaffee v Chaffee, 15 Mich 184, 190 (1867), when Justice Christiancy wrote:

The daughter is above the age of majority, and however desirable it might be that she should be provided for with the mother, I can discover no *622recognized principle upon which it can be done by a decree in this proceeding.[24]

¶30The "exceptional circumstances” clause was addressed when continued support was sought beyond the statutory age limit of seventeen years to allow a child to achieve a high school diploma. In interpreting 1940 CL 12739-1,25 the precursor of today’s § 17a, this Court held that extended support for educational purposes did constitute an exceptional circumstance. However, it extended the support payments for only eighteen months beyond the child’s seventeenth birthday, well before he reached the age of majority, twenty-one years. Barry v Barry, 291 Mich 666; 289 NW 397 (1939). Similarly, the Court held that educational pursuit constituted an exceptional circumstance in Titus, supra.Again, the support was specifically limited by the age of majority: "[T]he allowance must thereupon cease, and shall cease in any case upon [the child’s] arrival at majority . . . .” In Rybinski v Rybinski, 333 Mich 592; 53 NW2d 386 (1952), the Court once more held that support could not be ordered after the child had reached her majority.

¶31Barry, Titus, and Rybinskiall provided the framework for the Johnsondecision, which prohibited required support beyond a child’s majority age even though exceptional circumstances existed.26

¶32After the Age of Majority Act became effective, this Court and the Court of Appeals continued to follow the same line of reasoning, which effectively negated the legal authority of the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a._

¶33*623This issue was addressed in Price v Price, 51 Mich App 656; 215 NW2d 756 (1974), rev’d on other grounds 395 Mich 6; 232 NW2d 630 (1975), when the Court of Appeals held:

The clear intent of the Legislature, as expressed in this enactment and as authoritatively interpreted by decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court, indicates that there is no right to receive support payments after the age of majority is reached. The statute explicitly provides that the above jurisdiction is "relative to the minor children” of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) The succeeding clauses allowing support for children attaining the age of 18 must be read, then, in the context of minor children. When the statute was enacted, it was possible for a minor child to be over the age of 18, since the age of majority was 21. [51 Mich App 658.]

¶34Additionally, the Price Court said:

Since the Legislature has made an 18-year-old an adult for all purposes whatsoever, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, support cannot properly be awarded to a child who has reached the age of 18. [51 Mich App 660. Emphasis in original.]

¶35In reviewing the Price decision, the Court chose not to invalidate the lower court’s reasoning, but rather to reverse on the basis of the saving clause of the Age of Majority Act.27 In Price, the rights of the child accrued prior to the effective date of *624MCL 722.52; MSA 25.244(52). Therefore, the eighteen-year age of majority was not applicable, and the twenty-one-year age of majority did apply. Accordingly, this Court granted support payments until the child attained the applicable majority age, twenty-one years.

¶36Though the courts have never dissented from the rule that the age of majority limits the duration of child-support payments, this saving clause has been used, when applicable, to provide for support up to a child’s twenty-first birthday. See Charlton v Charlton, 397 Mich 84; 243 NW2d 261 (1976); Milbrand v Milbrand, 66 Mich App 730; 239 NW2d 730 (1976); Barbier v Barbier, 45 Mich App 402; 206 NW2d 464 (1973).

¶37The Johnsonand Price decisions provided the foundation for a series of cases which, absent an express agreement to the contrary, negate the obligation of a parent to provide child support payments beyond the age of majority, eighteen years. See Arndt v Kasem, 135 Mich App 252; 353 NW2d 497 (1984), Boyd v Boyd, 116 Mich App 774; 323 NW2d 553 (1982), Sumerix v Sumerix, 106 Mich App 7; 307 NW2d 727 (1981), McNames v McNames, supra,and Allen v Allen, 63 Mich App 475; 235 NW2d 22 (1975).28_

¶38*625The only indication that appears contrary to this significant body of case law is in footnote 5 of Price.29However, this footnote has no value as a legal precedent and was identified as merely "dicta” by the Court of Appeals. Parrish v Parrish, 138 Mich App 546, 551; 361 NW2d 366 (1984) (parents have no obligation to support their adult children).

¶39While this footnote does provide that "[t]he Age of Majority Act does not purport to deprive persons between the ages of 18 and 21 of any rights theretofore enjoyed by them . . . ,” the saving clause of the Age of Majority Act30 specifically provides that rights "incurred before the effective date of this act may be continued or instituted *626under and in accordance with the law in force at the time of the . . . right accruing, accrued or acquired . . . MCL 722.54; MSA 25.244(54). Although the Age of Majority Act did not purport to deprive anyone of existing rights, these rights were nonetheless restricted by law existing prior to January 1, 1972. The law prior to January 1, 1972, authorized support payments only until a child attained the age of majority. Johnson, supra.Therefore, the inference of the footnote is frustrated by the same legal authority from which it appears to have been borne.31

¶40Again, we note that since the release of the Price decision by this Court fourteen years ago, the rationale behind this footnote, and the inference implicit therein, has never been persuasive in any proceeding before a Michigan appellate court save in the matter before us today and its progeny.

¶41The dissent asserts that our decision is based "[primarily in reliance on this Court’s decision in Johnson. . . .” Post, pp 643-644. The dissent goes on to claim that we have employed a "dubious analysis of legislative intent . . . that is clearly *627contrary to express statutory language . . . .” Post, p 658. Finally, it argues that we are attempting to "reduce [our] responsibility for this result by stating that the result reflects the will of the Legislature and that to hold otherwise would be a usurpation of legislative power.” Id.

¶42Not so. What we have done by our decision today is recognize that the overriding responsibility of this Court is to act within the limits of its authority as expressed in the constitution of this state.32 The authority to determine the duration of child support payments is vested in the Legislature, not this Court. See Kaimowitz, ante, p 617. The dissent fails to acknowledge, or even to address, the fact that the amendments of §§ 15-17a of the child support laws enacted by the Legislature after the reduction of the age of majority have resulted in an increased use of the limiting word "minor.” See ante, pp 611-619.

¶43Furthermore, the dissent, in mischaracterizing our opinion as being based "primarily in reliance” on Johnson, totally disregards Michigan’s history of judicial interpretation regarding the duration of child support payments. Our decision is based on the express actions of the Legislature and on an analysis of how legislative action has been interpreted by our appellate courts. While persuasive, Johnsonis but one instance in a forty-five-year survey of Michigan case law. See ante, pp 621-626.

¶44C. OTHER JURISDICTIONS

¶45A review of other jurisdictions reveals that states which provide for postmajority support can be broken down into two categories: (1) those which have enacted specific statutory language, and (2) those in which courts have interpreted the *628support statute to include adult children when the statute merely refers to "child,” as opposed to the term "minor child.”

¶46In the first category, the child support statute of each state provides express jurisdiction. Examples of states with express jurisdiction include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington.

¶47The Illinois Marriage & Dissolution Act provides "relevant factors” for a court to consider when determining a reasonable amount of support that "either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage” must pay.33 One of the factors, § 505(2)(d) is "the physical and emotional condition of the child . . . .” The Illinois statute does not limit the duration of child support by use of the term "minor child.”

¶48Similarly, the Indiana dissolution of marriage laws include the "physical or mental condition of the child and his educational needs”34 as relevant factors to consider in awarding child support.35 Indiana takes one step further to add the provision that the "duty to support a child under this chapter ceases when the child reaches his twenty-first (21st) birthday unless ... (2) the child is incapacitated in which case the child support continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.”36

¶49Iowa has provided for postmajority child support in its statutory definition of the word "support.”37 Here, support includes obligations "for a child who is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years who is regularly attending an accredited *629school . . . leading to high school diploma or its equivalent . . . vocational-technical training ... a full-time student in a college, university, or area school. . or a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the dissolution proceedings because of physical or mental disability” (Emphasis added.)38

¶50Prior to lowering its age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen years in 1971, Washington recognized only a duty to provide support for minor children.39 However, Washington revised its Divorce Act in 1973. The Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1973 was amended to provide, "the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support.”40 In Childers v Childers, 89 Wash 2d 592, 597; 575 P2d 201 (1978), the Washington Supreme Court held, "[w]e construe the dissolution act as basing any support obligation on dependency, not minority, and ending the obligation at emancipation, not majority.” One of the factors the court found persuasive was the fact that the Washington Legislature removed all reference to the term "minor” when it revised the dissolution act in 1973. Child*630ers at 596. Washington courts continue to cite Childersas authority for the award of postminority child support. See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 52 Wash App 56; 757 P2d 537 (1988).

¶51In the second category, state courts have relied on the lack of restrictive language in the child support statutes for their decisions. The fact that the word "minor” did not appear before the word "child” in the statute was interpreted as to allow a court jurisdiction to award postmajority child support. Examples of these states include New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.41

¶52However, in the State of New Hampshire, after its supreme court held that the statute did not preclude postmajority child support,42 its legislature amended the statute to expressly limit support until a child reaches the age of eighteen. Yet, the legislature added a provision to award postmajority support for handicapped children: "If the order involves a handicapped child, the court shall specify the duration of the order, which may be beyond the time when the child reaches the age of 18.”43

¶53Our legislative analysis and case-law review make it evident that the factors which have led to the award of postmajority child support in other jurisdictions do not exist in the present Michigan statute. A thorough analysis of the cases cited by the dissent serves only to buttress this conclusion.

¶54The dissent cites Ex parte Brewington, 445 So 2d 294 (Ala, 1983), wherein the Alabama Supreme Court held that the Alabama child support laws *631should not be interpreted as limiting support only to "minor” children. The primary reason for the decision was the fact that the Alabama child support laws did not use the word "minor” before the word "children.” Therefore, the application of the Brewington court reasoning to the Michigan child support laws, which employ the word "minor,” leads to a result consistent with our opinion. Thus, Alabama falls under the category of states whose courts have relied on the lack of restrictive language in their child support statutes. See ante, p 630.

¶55The dissent quotes Koltay v Koltay, 667 P2d 1374 (Colo, 1983), in which the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted that state’s child support law. The Colorado law, based on the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, provides for child support which is to terminate upon a child’s "emancipation.” The court held that a physically or mentally disabled child who is incapable of self-support is not emancipated. However, the Koltaycourt employed a review of the history of Colorado’s dissolution of marriage legislation that is similar to the legislative analysis we have employed. See ante, pp 611-619. The Colorado Supreme Court found persuasive the fact that in 1958 the Colorado Legislature amended its dissolution of marriage legislation to remove the word "minor,” and again enacted new legislation in 1971 when it replaced the Colorado divorce statute with the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act.

¶56The current Colorado statute, interpreted by the Koltaycourt, authorized support for a " 'child of the marriage’ after considering several factors, including the . . . physical and emotional condition [of the child].” Koltay at 1377. Therefore, Colorado falls under the category of jurisdictions that provide specific statutory language which au*632thorizes postmajority child support. See ante, pp 628-630.

¶57Finally, the dissent cites cases from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals44 and from the Supreme Court of Ohio.45 However, both of these cases are based on the absence of any statutory provision contrary to postmajority child support.46 As amply demonstrated by this opinion, Michigan’s statutory provisions are expressly contrary to the award of postmajority child support.

¶58Section 17a does contain the limiting language of "minor child.” Moreover, amendments of §§ 15-16 of the child support statute that occurred after the change of the majority act have only increased the use of this restrictive language. As one commentator has noted, "where statutes limit support orders to minors, only a legislative change can remove the obstruction.”47 As inequitable as it may appear, Michigan remains in the majority of states that do not provide postmajority child support.48

¶59III. CONCLUSION

¶60We have considered the legislative amendments of the child support statutes and the voluminous case law regarding the issue of postmajority child support. In weighing these factors against the *633Price footnote, we conclude that current Michigan law does not provide for postmajority child support.

¶61In Price, this Court reiterated the words of the Court of Appeals Price decision: "[The Court of Appeals] sent a veiled message to the Legislature to 'settle the inconsistency between the support statute [§ 17a] and the Age of Majority Act.’ ” 395 Mich 9. The Legislature has declined the invitation this Court extended fourteen years ago in Price. We urge the Legislature to reconsider the child support laws in order to align them with the laws of those states that have expressly provided for postmajority child support. For, as desirable as it may be, we are restricted by the constitution of our state from reforming the moral obligation of a divorced parent of an adult child into that of a legal obligation.

¶62The inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that the Legislature has acquiesced in the judicial construction given § 17a pursuant to the passage of the Age of Majority Act. Therefore, we hold that the Age of Majority Act renders nugatory the exceptional-circumstances provision of § 17a. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

¶119(concurring). I agree with Chief Justice Riley that the Age of Majority Act, MCL 722.51 et seq.; MSA 25.244(51) et seq., "renders nugatory” the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a of the divorce statute,1 governing the support of the minor children of divorced parents. MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1). I write separately, however, to iden*634tify the legal foundation upon which I believe we must base this clearly exceptional conclusion.

¶120The defendant in this case argues that the reduction in the age of majority from age twenty-one to age eighteen by the Age of Majority Act has called into question the effect of the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a. That clause, by its terms, authorizes the circuit courts to grant support for a child even after the child has attained the age of eighteen; however, the clause has been consistently read by this Court not to allow such support after the child has reached the age of majority. Since the age of majority has been lowered to eighteen, the defendant argues, the exceptional-circumstances clause can no longer be given any practical effect.

¶121Although the defendant has not specifically identified it as such, his fundamental legal argument, in my view, and as stated by both Justice Cavanagh and the Court of Appeals, is essentially that the Age of Majority Act repeals the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a by necessary implication. Try as I might, I am unable to disagree with the defendant. I reach this conclusion despite my understanding that, as Justice Cavanagh observes, the repeal of statutes by implication is strongly disfavored:

"Repeal by implication is not permitted if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. Couvelis v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 281 Mich 223 [274 NW 771 (1937)]; People v Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611 (4 LRA 751) [42 NW 1124 (1889)]. If by any reasonable construction 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose found to be served by each, both must stand, Garfield Twp v A B Klise Lumber Co, 219 Mich 31 [188 NW 459 (1922)]; Edwards v Auditor General, 161 Mich 639 [126 NW 853 (1910)]; People v Harrison, 194 Mich *635363 [160 NW 623 (1916)]. The duty of the courts is to reconcile statutes if possible and to enforce them, Bd of Control of the Michigan State Prison v Auditor General, 197 Mich 377 [163 NW 921 (1917)]. The courts will regard all statutes on the same general subject as part of 1 system and later statutes should be construed as supplementary to those preceding them, Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227 [229 NW 911 (1930)]. See, also, Rathbun v State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521 [280 NW 35 (1938)].” People v Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22 [4 NW2d 448 (1942)].

"This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a former.” In re Estate of Reynolds, 274 Mich 354, 360 [264 NW 399 (1936)]. [Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138, 144; 123 NW2d 227 (1963).]

¶122See also Council No 23 v Recorder’s Court Judges, 399 Mich 1, 8; 248 NW2d 220 (1976) (opinion of Williams, J.), Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist, 393 Mich 616; 277 NW2d 736 (1975) (opinion of Williams, J.), Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44; 214 NW2d 803 (1974), and 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 23.10, pp 346-347.

¶123Put simply, I agree with the defendant that these two provisions of law simply cannot stand together. As interpreted by this Court in Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich 418; 78 NW2d 216 (1956), the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a allows a circuit court to award support for a child after he attains the age of eighteen, but only until he reaches the age of majority. The Age of Majority Act states that the age of majority is eighteen. The conflict between these two acts is thus clear and unavoidable. Given the reduction in the age of majority to eighteen, there can be no time during which support can be awarded after a child attains *636the age of eighteen, but before he reaches majority.

¶124It is, of course, very tempting to follow the course taken by Justice Cavanagh in his dissent, of simply overturning the decision in Johnson, along with the earlier decisions upon which it relied,2 and finding that under the literal language of the clause support can be awarded after the child reaches the age of eighteen and for as long as the exceptional circumstances exist. Were it not for the actions of the Legislature itself following these decisions, Justice Cavanagh’s position might be persuasive. However, while I believe that Justice Cavanagh’s admonition against relying too heavily on legislative silence when construing statutory provisions applies with some force here, post, pp 652-653,1 find myself unable to accept his solution in light of the subsequent reenactment of § 17a in 1970, only shortly before the Age of Majority Act, but long after the limited construction had, without fail, been given to the exceptional-circumstances clause by this Court.

¶125The Legislature is presumed to know of existing interpretations of legislation. Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675, 691; 377 NW2d 804 (1985); Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich 637, 650; 202 NW2d 300 (1972); Jeruzal v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 350 Mich 527, 534; 87 NW2d 122 (1957). Thus, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that when the Legislature, with this presumed knowledge of prior judicial interpretation, reenacts a statute or provision in substantially the same form as that interpreted, it is deemed to have adopted the interpretation into the language of the statute or provision. As stated in Jeruzal, supra,p 534:_

*637In passing this legislation, the legislature is presumed to have known of the [prior] judicial interpretation of this Court [of the language of the statute], . . . and, also, to have known that when a statute, clause or provision thereof, has been construed by the court of last resort of this State and the same is substantially re-enacted the legislature adopts such construction, unless the contrary is clearly shown by the language of the act. See People v Powell, 280 Mich 699 (111 ALR 721) [274 NW 372 (1937)]. [Emphasis added.]

¶126See also Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544; 78 NW2d 273 (1956); Wood v Detroit Edison Co, 409 Mich 279, 293-294; 294 NW2d 571 (1980) (opinion of Moody, J.); Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 383 Mich 251, 295; 174 NW2d 836 (1970) (Adams, J., dissenting); Smith v Detroit, supra, pp 650-651.3

¶127In this case, we must presume that the Legislature knew, when it amended § 17a in 1970, of the limited construction given the exceptional-circum*638stances clause of that section by this Court in Johnsonand its predecessors. Since the Legislature failed to make any substantive change in the language of the clause,4 we must conclude that it intended to adopt the construction of the clause found in those cases. This is true even though we are unable to conclude that the Legislature actually reconsidered that language in light of our judicial interpretations when it amended and reenacted the provision, leaving the exceptional-circumstances clause substantially intact as interpreted. The purpose of the presumption, obviously, is to recognize precisely that fact.

¶128Were we construing the exceptional-circumstances clause for the first time today, I think a persuasive case could clearly be made for the interpretation given it by Justice Cavanagh. The language of the statute, after all, does appear to be open-ended. However, the consistent, limited construction of the exceptional-circumstances clause over the years by this Court, including that in Johnson, supra,along with the Legislature’s reenactment of § 17a without any truly substantive changes in the language of the clause despite that limited construction, in my view requires us to conclude that the open-ended interpretation sought by Justice Cavanagh is simply no longer available to this Court.5_

¶129*639CONCLUSION

¶130I am well aware that today’s decision by the majority to declare that these two provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, and that the earlier exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a must therefore be seen as repealed by necessary implication by the later Age of Majority Act, is, as Justice Cavanagh states, an "extraordinary step.” I am not convinced, however, that this result is any more extraordinary than that which Justice Cavanagh himself proposes.

¶131It is not our function in this case to determine what the "best” rule regarding the payment of child support by a noncustodial divorced parent is or properly should be. Such a decision, as both the Chief Justice and Justice Archer point out, is the province of our state Legislature.6 Nor should we in this case merely take our best guess as to what the Legislature intended to do when it enacted the Age of Majority Act, or as to what it might do in response to this decision. If that were true, the analysis would have to focus heavily, as that of the Chief Justice in some respects does, upon the action of the Legislature in amending in 1980 the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq., specifically, § 7(1) of that act, to delete the exceptional-circumstances clause providing support for children between the age of eighteen and the age of majority, once the conflict *640between it and the Age of Majority Act was noticed.7

¶132Rather, we are left in this case, in the absence of any specific indication of legislative intent with respect to the effect of the Age of Majority Act upon § 17a, with the task of determining that intent in light of established principles of statutory construction and interpretation. In this case, those principles require us to conclude that since we cannot reasonably reconcile these two provisions, the earlier exceptional-circumstances clause must be the one to fall.