White v. White’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘ “If a provision of the judgment appears to have been fixed by consent, or is undisputed, or, for any reason, cannot be changed or reversed by the appeal, an acceptance of the benefit given by such provision is not a waiver of the appeal.” ‘Moreover, in Grant v. Grant, [ 226 N.W.2d 358 (N.D.1975) ] supra we recognized that the rule which bars a subsequent appeal when substantial benefits of a divorce judgment are accepted is not absolute when we said: ‘ “Before the waiver of the right to appeal can be found to exist, there must be an unconditional, voluntary, and conscious acceptance of a substantial benefit under the judgment.” 226 N.W.2d at 361 . * * * * * * ‘In addition to the exceptions recognized above, this court has also held that: ‘ “It is both practical and just that if one jointly or individually possesses an asset during the pendency of a divorce action and is subsequently awarded that asset by the divorce judgment, he should not have to divest himself of that asset before appealing the judgment. This is most obvious when the asset is a necessity of life.” Piper v. Piper, 234 N.W.2d [621] at 623 [(N.D.1975)]. ⅛ sje * # ⅜« >je ‘Finally, in Hoge v. Hoge, 281 N.W.2d 557 (N.D.1979), we recognized a caveat to the general principle that acceptance of benefits under a judgment of divorce precludes a later appeal.... We said in Hoge that a party is not estopped from an appeal of a divorce judgment by the acceptance of alimony and property “to which he or she was entitl”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. Davis

2. ““We recognized in Sanford v. Sanford, [ 295 N.W.2d 139, 141-42 (N.D.1980) ], that the general rule was subject to several recognized exceptions: ‘In Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377 , 61 N.W. 468 (1894), we said: ‘ “Where the reversal of the judgment cannot possibly affect the appellant’s right to the benefit he has secured under the judgment, then an appeal may be taken, and will be sustained, despite the fact that the appellant has sought and secured such benefit.” 4 N.D. at 381 , 61 N.W. at 469 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. Davis

3. ““After taking into account the affirmative actions taken by Martha to transfer title to the homestead to her name, to transfer rights to the bar and liquor license, and to divide the remaining items of property of substantial value, we conclude that Martha accepted substantial benefits under the divorce judgment and therefore Martha waived her right to appeal. Accordingly, Thomas’ motion to dismiss Martha’s appeal is granted.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. Davis