¶1concurring in result.
¶2I concur in the result reached by the majority. I am compelled however to address the issue of attorney fees.
¶3Generally, a trial court may take judicial notice of what a reasonable attorney fee should be.
In re Lockyear (1974), 261 Ind. 448, 305 N.E.2d 440;
McDaniel v. McDaniel (1964), 245 Ind. 551, 201 N.E.2d 215;
In re Marriage of Gray (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 696;
First Valley Bank v. First S & L Ass’n. (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 1237.
¶4This is true because the trial judge is an expert in his own right and may base the award on his knowledge and experience in the legal profession. See generally Fox v. Galvin (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 103. In making such a determination, the trial judge is acting as the fact-finder in a case tried without a jury.
¶5The present case however, presents a different situation. This case was tried before a jury. The jury therefore acted as the finder of fact. Generally, jurors do not have the expertise necessary to make a determination regarding a reasonable attorney fee. In such cases there must be sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s determination. The record in the present case does not contain sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of attorney fees.