Kauchick v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"A necessary predicate of the duty under such rule is knowledge on the part of the physician `of the fact of the wrong done to the patient.' 80 A.L.R.2d 407 . See Brown v. Grinstead, 212 Mo. App. 533 , 252 S.W. 973 , 974[1]; Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n., Inc., 265 Ky. 452 , 97 S.W.2d 9, 10 ; Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133 , 67 S.W.2d 140, 141 [1]; Maloney v. Brackett, 275 Mass. 479 , 176 N.E. 604, 607 . Here, there was no evidence that Dr. Mattison was aware of matters which would require him to make a disclosure to Mrs. Kauchick. The negligence charged against him was his erroneous computation from the X-rays of the intertuberous space. However, nothing further was produced other than his X-ray reports and the subsequent measurements by Dr. McNalley which disclosed the error in Dr. Mattison's reading. Mrs. Kauchick testified that X-rays were taken but made no mention of Dr. Mattison by name. He, in fact, testified that he never saw Mrs. Kauchick; that he merely examined and reported upon the X-ray pictures made by another physician at the hospital. Mrs. Kauchick would infer that Dr. Mattison became aware of his error because `he was called upon to take X-rays of Mrs. Kauchick after delivery by Caesarean section * * *.' The evidence did not show that Dr. Mattison took such X-rays. In any event, Dr. Mattison's knowledge of the Caesarean would not require the inference that his X-ray computation had been erroneous and that he had knowledge thereof. We do not consider the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 333 So. 2d 25 - Nardone v. Reynolds

2. “If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smile v. Lawson