¶1concurring.
¶2I concur with the majority opinion, insofar as it declines to rule unconstitutional NYSRWB Rules 4120.5, 4120.6 and 4116.11, 9 NYCRR 4120.5, 4120.6 and 4116.11.
¶3I also concur with the majority holding as to Section 8022, but with a few additional comments.
¶4Section 8022 gives the Board discretion to impose sanctions, such as revocation of license, prior to hearing. The statute provides for a hearing by the Board at the request of an aggrieved party, but states:
“Pending such hearing and final determination thereon, the action of the commission in refusing to grant or in revoking or suspending a license shall remain in full force and effect.”
¶5The majority opinion interprets this language as prohibiting the Board from granting a stay of a sanction pending a hearing. Thus, as the majority reads the statute, the Board or its representative has the power to impose immediate severe economic sanctions without a hearing, and is prevented from even considering an application for a stay pending a hearing no matter what good cause is shown.
¶6Although it might be possible to construe the statute in some other way, I must agree that the majority’s interpretation is based upon the obvious meaning of the language. And, under this interpretation, there are the violations of due process and equal protection which the majority condemns.
¶7However, in my view (and I believe this to be the meaning of the majority opinion also) Section 8022 would not be constitu*785tionally defective, if the language quoted above about the prohibition on stays were eliminated or were replaced with a provision allowing the Board to have the discretion to grant a stay pending a hearing. This means that the statute would be constitutionally proper if it granted the Board the discretion to impose pre-hearing sanctions, if this were coupled with the discretion to stay such sanctions pending a hearing.