436 Pa. Super. 277 - Commonwealth v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
43 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently April 2023 · most notably People v. Fry (2004), Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., Inc. (1995)
43 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ohio v. Roberts · Idaho v. Wright · Styer v. Hugo · Kremer v. Grant · Commonwealth v. McGrogan
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The rationale for the hearsay rule is that hearsay is too untrustworthy to be considered by the trier of fact. Exceptions have been fashioned to accommodate certain classes of hearsay that are substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in general, and thus merit exception to the hearsay rule.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[When] a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the prosecution. And if that possibility exists, the jury should know about it. The jury may choose to believe the witness even after it learns of actual promises made or possible promises of leniency which may be made in the future, but the defendant, under the right guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution to confront witnesses against him, must have the opportunity at least to raise some doubt in the mind of the jury as to whether the prosecution witness is biased. It is not for the court to determine whether the cross-examination for bias would affect the jury’s determination of the case.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(1) the witness responsible for that testimony is presently unavailable; (2) the defendant had counsel; and (3) the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the declarant during the earlier proceeding. Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 523 Pa. 614 , 568 A.2d 924 (1990); Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , 512 A.2d 603 (1986); Melson, supra; Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 423 Pa.Super. 178 , 620 A.2d 1169 (1993); Commonwealth v. Smith, 380 Pa.Super. 619 , 552 A.2d 1053 (1988). As well, the issues in the prior proceeding and the purpose for which the testimony was there offered “must have been such that the present opponent had an adequate motive for testing on cross-examination, the credibility of the testimony now offered.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Commonwealth v. Bell
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.