436 So. 2d 1122 - Helmick v. Helmick’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Common-law and statutory procedures governing the remedies for the establishment and enforcement of orders of support for children by responsible parents under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act have not proven sufficiently effective or efficient to cope with the increasing incidence of establishing and collecting child-support obligations when the petitioner and respondent reside in different states. The state, therefore, exercising its police and sovereign powers, declares that the common-law and statutory remedies pertaining to family desertion and non-support of dependent children shall be augmented by the additional remedies directed to the resources of the responsible parents as mandated by the Florida IV-D program in chapter 409. In order to render resources more immediately available to satisfy child-support orders, it is the legislative intent that the remedies provided herein shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, existing remedies. It is declared to be the public policy of this state that this act shall be construed and administered to the end that the children residing in this or some other state shall be maintained from the resources of responsible parents, whether the responsible parents live in this or some other state, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden borne by the custodial parent or the general citizenry through public assistance programs.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 446 So. 2d 1174 - State ex rel. Quigley v. Quigley

2. “Although a URESA action under the Civil Enforcement provisions may be based on previously entered orders of support, a previous support order is not essential, only facts giving rise to a duty to support. Furthermore, regardless of any previous support order, it is the responding court and not the initiating court that makes the final determination of the amount of support required to be paid by the respondent in the responding state. Although an initiating court's determination of an amount of support needed by the petitioner and that respondent is able to provide may be prima facie evidence of this need and ability, this determination is not binding on the respondent court. The responding court is free to enter an award higher than a previous award or lower than a previous award. Although the responding court determines the amount of support required in the URESA proceeding, this determination does not modify the initiating state's, or any other state's, previous order of support. Amounts paid under the order of a responding state are merely credited against amounts due under the unmodified support order of an initiating state.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. STATE, DHRS v. Franklin

3. “A foreign decree that determines a duty to support and sets the amount of support is subject to modification in the future and is therefore only res judicata of the duty to support under the circumstances existing at the time of the judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 781 So. 2d 431 - Haskin v. Haskin