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← 437 F.2d 1228 - Brown v. Peyton

Brown v. Peyton’s Empirical Analysis

437 F.2d 1228 · 1971

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
June 2020
most recently cited

23 federal appellate · 7 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2020 · most notably Procunier v. Martinez (1974), Landman v. Royster (1971)

23 federal appellate · 7 district · 2 state decisions

470197119801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · Sherbert v. Verner · Shelton v. Tucker · Price v. Johnston · Cooper v. Pate

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “'a prisoner does not shed his first amendment rights at the prison portals,'”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Prison officials have to confine dangerous men in unpleasant circumstances. They must protect the public at large, prison employees, and also other prisoners, who are almost totally dependent on the prison for their well-being. Prison authorities have a legitimate interest in the rehabilitation of prisoners, and may legitimately restrict freedoms in order to further this interest, where a coherent, consistently-applied program of rehabilitation exists. Furthermore, many restrictions on first amendment rights are undoubtedly justifiable as part of the punitive regimen of a prison: confinement itself, for example, prevents unlimited communication with the outside world but is permissible in order to punish and deter crime; additional restrictions may "be imposed as part of the system of punishing misbehavior within prison. Finally, the state has an interest in reducing the burden and expense of administration. It may, for example, place reasonable restrictions on the number of publications received by each inmate in order to limit the burden of examining incoming materials. But the fact that interests of these sorts frequently arise does not excuse the necessity of a showing that they exist in particular cases.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The state may restrict religious acts if it can be shown that they pose ‘some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,’ and that there is a ‘compelling state interest in the . . . regulation.’ [P]laintiff’s desire to practice his religion may be restricted only upon a convincing showing that paramount state interests so require.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.