¶1(dissenting).
¶2I believe that Richard L. Heideman is immune from suit by his employee. This result does not require a legislative act but results from interpretation of the existing statute.
¶3Iowa Code section 85.61 defines the terms employer and worker for purposes of Chapters 85, 86, and 87. The statute expressly states: “unless the context otherwise requires, the following definitions of terms shall prevail ...”
¶4Because there are many possible combinations of titles one may possess in a small business, the statute allows the court to interpret the context of a situation to determine whether an individual is functionally more like an employer or a worker. Heideman is more like an employer and Crees should be limited to recovering under the workers compensation statute.
¶5Heideman and his wife are the only two shareholders and officers of the corporation. The district court found that Heide-man ran the business as if he were the sole proprietor or sole manager. Heideman is functioning as the employer.
¶6This is similar to the situation in Pappas v. Hughes, '406 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa App. 1987). There we quoted Professor Larson’s treatise on Workmen’s Compensation which says:
If the defendant so dominates the corporation, perhaps as stockholder, president and manager, that he can honestly be said to be the alter ego of the corporation, this in itself may suffice to bar any action against him.
¶72A Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 72.13 (1983).
¶8The alter ego serves the purpose of the worker’s compensation statutes. It provides coverage under the act for situations that do not fit within the clear definitions of the terms. There is no reason to overturn the Pappascase as it is consistent with the intent of the worker’s compensation statute and the legislature has not amended that part of the statute since the Pappasdecision was announced. Therefore, I would affirm the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment for defendant Richard L. Heideman.
¶9SACKETT, J., joins this dissent.