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← 438 F.2d 13 - United States v. Patillo

United States v. Patillo’s Empirical Analysis

438 F.2d 13 · 1971

Citation profile

58
cited by 58 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
June 2013
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 58 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2013 · most notably Rogers v. United States (1975), United States v. Kelner (1976)

50 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

19019711980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Watts v. United States · Roy v. United States · United States v. Patillo · United States v. Compton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a present intention either to injure the President, or to incite others to injure him, or to restrict his movements”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “This Court therefore construes the willfulness requirement of the statute to require only that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does not require that the defendant actually intend to carry out the threat. [Footnotes omitted.] ■ . If a threat were made in a context of levity, so that a reasonable person would interpret the words used to be mere hyperbole or jest, not intended to express a true intention to inflict bodily harm upon the President, then the words would not constitute a threat within the scope of the statute. In this context it would be apparent to a reasonable person that the individual uttering the words was not making a serious threat.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “trier of fact may ... consider all relevant facts concerning the background of the defendant, his motives, the manner in which the threat was made, and the reaction of those who heard the threat and thus have an opportunity to form an opinion about the speaker's present intention to injure the President of the United States.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.