United States v. Woodall’s Empirical Analysis
438 F.2d 1317 · 1970
Citation profile
118 federal appellate · 2 district · 24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 183 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably United States v. Campanale (1975), Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc. (1981)
118 federal appellate · 2 district · 24 state decisions — followed in 17 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2113
Relies on North Carolina v. Alford · Brady v. United States · Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · United States v. Jackson · Parker v. North Carolina
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 183 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... [W]aiver by implication involves two basic elements. The first is subjective—Does the person holding the right to claim the privilege intend to waive it? The second element is objective—Is it fair and consistent with the assertion of the claim or defense being made to allow the privilege to be invoked? This objective determination should be based upon whether the position taken by the party goes so far into the matter covered by the privilege that fairness requires the privilege shall [terminate] when, subjectively, he never intended the result.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience,”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Although we are unwilling to lay down a per se rule which would hold every form of misinformation as to plea consequences which indicated more rigorous consequences than the law would truly permit could never be considered in an attack on a guilty plea, we do now expressly overrule the prior panel holdings of this court in Stephen and Grant, supra. Isolating all other factors that could influence a defendant in determining to enter a plea of guilty, the court is of the opinion that even if Woodall had been told the district judge could pyramid the maximum sentences under each of the separate counts of the two indictments to which he pled, this factor would not invalidate his plea. The probability such information would have influenced Woodall not to change his plea so far outweighs the possibility that the prospect of stiffer punishment may have caused the change, that we refuse to consider the latter as relevant. It is apt to repeat the admonition of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Mass., 291 U. S. 97 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934), ‘There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt * * * if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction * * * and set the guilty free: 291 U. S. at 122 , 54 S. Ct. at 338 .” (Emphasis added)”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.