United States v. Synnes’s Empirical Analysis
438 F.2d 764 · 1971
Citation profile
71 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 94 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2009 · most notably United States v. Bass (1971), Stevens v. United States (1971)
71 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 891 · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 925 · 21 U.S.C. § 331 (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)
Relies on McGowan v. State of Maryland Gallagher · Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · Shapiro v. Thompson · Bolling v. Sharpe · Sherbert v. Verner
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““(a) Any person who— (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, * * * and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, gives to Congress the power to regulate both interstate commerce and any intrastate activity which * * exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce * * *.' Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 , 63 S.Ct. 82 , 89, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). See also, Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 , 85 S.Ct. 377 , 13 L.Ed. 290 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 , 85 S.Ct. 348 , 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964). As Justice Black stated in his concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel: * * [T]his Court has steadfastly followed, and indeed has emphasized time and time again, that Congress has ample power to protect interstate commerce from activities adversely and injuriously affecting it, which but for this adverse effect on interstate commerce would be beyond the power of Congress to regulate.’ 379 U.S. at 272, 85 S.Ct. at 365 (Emphasis added.). “In determining whether the legislation in question is within the limits set out above, we examine: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that receipt or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon affects commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to protect commerce are reasonable and appropriate. See, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra at 258-259, 85 S.Ct. 348 [at 358]; White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813, 823 (8th Cir.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““While these data may not be as precise or particular as might be desired, we find it impossible to say that Congress had no rational basis for finding that receipt or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon affects commerce. “Having found a rational nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, we cannot say that the proscriptions of § 1202(a)(1) are unreasonable or inappropriate means for eliminating the evil perceived by Congress. Again, our viewpoint must be relative rather than absolute; the exercise of congressional power need not coincide with what we believe to be the optimum choice of available alternatives. It need only be reasonable and appropriate. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra; United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2nd Cir.), cert, granted, 400 U.S. 915 , 91 S.Ct. 175 , 27 L.Ed.2d 154 (1970). Therefore, while licensing or registration systems or a more limited prohibition may also pass constitutional muster, we find it both reasonable and appropriate for Congress to prohibit convicted felons from possessing or receiving firearms.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.