Burgess v. G’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “11 USC § 541 . Property of the estate (a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Matthews · In the Matter Of: Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture

2. “sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Brown · In re Carroll

3. “Thus, under current law, a debtor's interest in property may be contingent or enjoyment of the interest may be postponed until after bankruptcy, but the debtor must have had a prepetition legal interest nonetheless. Second, Segal is distinguishable because the debtor did have a prepetition legal interest in that case... Here, by contrast, Burgess suffered the crop loss before filing for bankruptcy, but he did not have a prepetition claim to, or interest in, the disaster-relief payment because the legislation authorizing the payment had not yet been enacted . If Burgess had no right or interest that constituted property within the meaning of 541(a)(1) at the commencement of the case, then the payment he later received cannot be proceeds of property of the estate under 541(a)(6). ... In this case, at the time of filing, Burgess had only a mere hope that crop- disaster-relief legislation would be enacted . "This sort of nebulous possibility is not property ." [ In re ] Schmitz , 270 F.3d [1254] at 1257 [ (9th Cir. 2001) ]. Were the law otherwise, any postpetition legislation or contract could retroactively create property of the estate. That cannot be the law; 541 clearly states that a bankruptcy estate is established at "the commencement of [the] case." Thus, Burgess had no interest, contingent or otherwise, in the disaster-relief payment when he filed his bankruptcy petition.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Carroll