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← 439 F.2d 328 - Levine v. Seilon, Inc.

Levine v. Seilon, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

439 F.2d 328 · 1971

Citation profile

104
cited by 104 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
March 2016
most recently cited

43 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 104 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2016 · most notably Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores (1975), Securities & Exchange Commission v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. (1972)

43 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

47019711980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Desist v. United States · United States v. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n · Coates v. Securities & Exchange Commission · Swift v. Tyson · Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he difference between the value of what [the defrauded investor] got and what it was represented he would be getting”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We have followed other courts in holding that the quoted phrase (of the S.E.C. Act) generally limits standing to those who are defrauded ‘purchasers’ or ‘sellers’ of securities, and to limit the coverage of the statute and rule to fraudulent practices in connection with the ‘purchase’ or ‘sale’ of securities.””
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]f the property is not bought from, but sold to the fraudulent party, future accretions not foreseeable at the time of the transfer even on the true facts, and hence speculative, are subject to another factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent party. It may, as in the ease at bar, be entirely speculative whether, had plaintiffs not sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in the same way, and to their same profit. However, there can be no speculation but that the defendant actually made the profit and, once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud, that the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud, whether foreseeable or not. It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.