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← 439 NE2D 1189 - Clipp v. Weaver

Clipp v. Weaver’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
September 2014
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 160 Ind. App. 244 - Podgorny v. Great Central Insurance Co. · Chaffin v. Nicosia · Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lamb · 178 Ind. App. 77 - Ernst v. Underwriters National Assurance Co. · 96 Ind. App. 15 - Munson v. Rupker

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"When reviewing the trial court's entry of summary judgment, this court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the law was applied correctly. Zalewski v. Simpson, (1982) Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 74 ; Carroll v. Lordy, (1982) Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 118 . The burden is on the proponent to prove no genuine issue of material fact exists. Podgorny v. Great Central Insurance Co., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 244 , 311 N.E.2d 640 . While summary judgment is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to dispose of cases where only legal issues exist, it may not be used as a substitute for trial in determining factual disputes. Id."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"It seems to us that the only sensible and humane rule is that an owner and driver of an automobile owes a guest at sufferance the duty of using reasonable care so as not to injure him. The rule as to trespassers and licensees upon real estate, with all its niceties and distinctions, is not to be applied to one riding in an automobile at the invitation of, or with the knowledge and tacit consent of, the owner and operator of the automobile. A trespasser and licensee going upon a tract of land-an inert, immovable body-takes it as he finds it, with knowledge that the owner cannot and will not by any act of his start it in motion and hurl it through space in a manner that may mean death to him who enters thereon. He who enters an automobile to take a ride with the owner also takes the automobile and the driver as he finds them. But, when the owner of the automobile starts it in motion, he, as it were, takes the life of his guest into his keeping, and in the operation of such car he must use reasonable care not to injure any one riding therein with his knowledge and consent. It will not do to say that the operator of an automobile owes no more duty to a person riding with him as a guest at sufferance, or as a self-invited guest, than a gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood. The law exacts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control it with skill and eare in proportion to the danger created. This rule applies to a guest at sufferance as well as to a guest by invita”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “"The words 'careful and prudent manner' are determinative of the standard of care issue. We can find no case where the court applying the 'careful and prudent manner' standard permitted recovery only for injuries due to willful or wanton misconduct. Rather, Indiana cases using these words apply only the standard of reasonable and ordinary care. Orth v. Smedley, (1978) Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 20 ; Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Lamb, (1977) Ind.App., 361 N.E.2d 174 . ... We also find the words 'other persons' to be broad enough to include gratuitous guests."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.